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ABSTRACT
THE MARKET AND ETHICS: THE CASE OF THE 1994 DECISION BY THE 
CLINTON ADMINISTRATION TO DELINK CHINA’S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD 
FROM MOST-FAVORED-NATION STATUS
Susan C. Morris 
Old Dominion University, 2000 
Director: Dr. Francis Adams
Amid the globalization of markets and the interdependence of states, human 
rights violations throughout the world still persist. The purpose of this study is to 
investigate the relationship between the economic interdependence of nations and the 
moral responsibilities of nations by examining the case of the 1994 decision by the 
Clinton administration to delink China’s human rights practices from most-favored- 
nation status.
The annual 1997 Freedom House world survey of human rights rated China at its 
lowest point and quoted that “the regime continues to have one of the worst human rights 
records in the world.”1 Yet despite China’s ongoing human rights transgressions, 
economic relations between the United States and China continue to expand. The 1994 
decision is a particularly significant one because it represents a decisive change in how 
human rights issues are— and will be— addressed in U.S. foreign policy. The decision 
brings to the fore the conflicting issues of states’ moral responsibilities to the protection 
of universal human rights and states’ economic interests.2
'Freedom House, Freedom In The World 1996-1997(New York: The Heritage 
Foundation, 1997).
2See, for instance, Ezra F. Vogel, ed., Living with China (New York: W.W. Norton,
1997).
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This study adds insights not only into the Sino-American relationship, but also 
into the broader understanding of the relationship between national interests and ethical 
principles.
The three major competing theoretical paradigms of realism, liberalism and 
radicalism are applied to the question of why the Clinton administration considered it no 
longer useful to condition trade on China’s respect for human rights. The findings 
suggest that each paradigm alone was theoretically limited in explaining the motives for 
the decision, and therefore, an alternative explanation, that considers the complexities of 
the post-Cold War era, is advanced.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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One of the major ideas to emerge from the twentieth century is human rights.1 
Flagrant human rights violations that occurred before and during the second World War 
served as the catalyst for the human rights and fundamental freedoms stipulated in the 
1945 United Nations Charter.2 From this charter grew an international law which 
superceded the traditional rights of states and acknowledged the rights of individual men 
and women.3 The international system of rights expanded to include the Universal
'For this project. I use the concept of human rights, taken from Kenneth A. Bollen.
Bollen identifies three categories of human rights. (1) political rights and liberties; (2) 
rights to protect the integrity of a person, (or civil rights) and (3) social and economic 
rights. This project focuses on political rights and liberties because of their importance in 
influencing other rights. The justification for this is that when political rights and 
liberties are strong, there is greater potential to bring about social and economic rights 
and personal integrity. "Political rights exist when the national government is 
accountable to the general population and each individual is entitled to participate in the 
government directly or through Representatives. Political liberties exist when the people 
of a country have the freedom to express any political opinions in any media and the 
freedom to form or participate in any political group.” Kenneth A. Bollen, "Political 
Rights and Political Liberties in Nations: An Evaluation of Human Rights Measures 
1950-1984.” in Human Rights and Statistics: Getting the Record Straight, eds. Thomas 
B. Jabine and Richard P. Claude (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992),
188-215. Ultimately and ideally, all of these rights are mutually reinforcing.
:John P. Humphrey, "Human Rights: The Necessary Conditions of Peace,” International 
Relation 10. no. 2 (Nov. 1990): 119-121. The 1945 United Nations Charter formed 
the legal basis for the Nuremberg trials, the Genocide Convention and the 1948 
Universal Declaration.
3”WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED...to reaffirm faith 
in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal 
rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish respect for the
The format for this dissertation follows current style requirements of the Chicago Manual
o f Style.
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Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 10,
1948.4
Signed in 1966 and entered into force by ratification by states in 1976, were the 
two International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights,5 and Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights.6 A number of regional conventions on human rights have also been 
formed, most prominently, the European Convention on Human Rights, drafted by the 
Council of Europe in 1953. All of these major proclamations, combined with a growing 
number of international, regional and national organizational human rights conventions, 
constitute the "New World Law of Human Rights.”7
The human rights revolution has evolved dramatically, particularly during the last 
thirty years, or so. In the 1960's, for example, human rights groups were unwelcome in 
most parts of the world and found difficulties finding a voice in government. Today,
obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, 
and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom ...[emphasis 
added!" United Nations. Charter o f the United Nations and Statute o f the International 
Court o f Justice (United Nations: Department of Public Information. 1945). signed June 
26. 1945. in San Francisco at the conclusion of the United Nations Conference on 
International Organization.
4 As Humphrey explains, the Declaration did not acquire legal force, as resolutions of the 
General Assembly have only the force of recommendations, but because the Declaration 
has been invoked repeatedly throughout the years, it has become part of the customary 
law of nations. Humphrey, 120.
5Civil and political rights include "‘the right to life, liberty, security, freedom from torture, 
freedom of thought, religion and opinion,” United Nations, Everyone’s United Nations: A 
Handbook o f the Work o f The United Nations. 10th ed. (New York: U.N. Department of 
Public Information. 1986), 303.
6Economic. social and cultural rights include “ the right to equal pay for equal work, to 
education, social security and an adequate standard of living,” United Nations,
Everyone's United Nations, 304.
7Humphrey, 119-121.
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3
human rights activists and advocates meet regularly with government, and most foreign 
aid programs contain stipulations for democracy-building and the protection of human 
rights.8 The Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, for example, were waged in the name of moral 
principles rather than strategic interests.9 The universality of application for the respect 
for individual human rights has been evidenced in Spain’s request for the extradition of 
former Chilean dictator, Augusto Pinochet, to face trial for thousands of 
"disappearances” of political opponents during his regime. Human rights offenders 
throughout the world are now being brought to trial for crimes against humanity.
The United States government has rhetorically and often actively affirmed its 
commitment to human rights over the last half century. One recent U.S. affirmation to 
human rights was addressed at the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, 
Austria. U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher articulated "My delegation will 
support the forces of freedom— of tolerance, of respect for the rights of the individual— 
not only in the next few weeks in Vienna, but every day in the conduct of our foreign 
policy throughout the world. The United States will never join those who would 
undermine the Universal Declaration and the movement toward democracy and human 
rights.”10
In May 1994. however, the policy shifted when President Clinton announced that
8David Rieff. "The Precarious Triumph of Human Rights,” New York Times Magazine,
8 Aug. 1999,38.
9Rieff. 37.
10Secretary of State Warren Christopher, "Democracy and Human Rights: Where America 
Stands,” Remarks at the World Conference on Human Rights, 14 June 1993, on-line, 
available from gopher://gopher.state.gov. Public Affairs.
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there would no longer be a connection between China’s human rights record and most- 
favored-nation11 (MFN) status. “The Clinton administration maintained that one of the 
ways to promote human rights in China was to encourage market reform and trade.” 
Ambassador Stapleton Roy, former U.S. Ambassador to China asserted, in 1993:
If you look at the 150 years of modem Chinese 
history...you can’t avoid the conclusion that the last 15 
years are the best in terms of prosperity, individual choice, 
access to outside sources of information, freedom of 
movement within the country and stable domestic 
conditions.12
Although there have been significant human rights improvements throughout the 
world, there remain governments who continue to repress dissidents and who engage in
1 'The guiding principle of the World Trade Organization is the concept of most-favored- 
nation. which assures that member countries "have the benefit of any advantage, favor, 
privilege or immunity granted by any other country to any product originating in or 
destined for any other country.” Protocol of Provisional Application, 61 Stat. (5), (6), 
T.l.A.S. No 1700.4 Bevans 639.55-61 U.N.T.S.; current amended version, BISD vol. IV 
(concluded at Geneva. October 30.1947, entered into force, January 1.1948.) The 
concept of most-favored-nation status has existed, in a bilateral form, at least since the 
seventeenth century. "To reduce the impact of protectionist trade measures, countries 
have long concluded international agreements providing reciprocally for the favorable 
treatment of each other's merchants.” In recent decades, most-favored-nation status has 
been granted through the multilateral mechanism of the General Agreement On Tariffs 
and Trade, formed in 1947. now known as the World Trade Organization. Mark W. 
Janis. An Introduction to International Law (Boston: Little, Brown And Company,
1988). 206- 207. The term “most-favored-nation” may be somewhat misleading in 
the sense that it implies that one nation is favored over another. From the U.S. point of 
view. MFN is not a privilege or reward, nor is MFN actually the most favored tariff 
treatment the U.S. provides. For example, special tariff treatment more favorable than 
MFN has been provided to more than 100 countries under a number of special tariff 
programs such as the General System of Preferences (GSP) and NAFTA. The tariff rates 
under these agreements have been lower than most-favored-nation rates. American 
Electronics Association, MFN Fact Sheet, April 1996, on-line, available from http: 
//aea_web I .aeanet.org/homepge/pubpoF21 ae.html.
12 American Electronics Association, MFN Fact Sheet.
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torture without trial. In 1998, for example, the international human rights organization, 
Amnesty International, reported that there were a significant number of Chinese still in 
prison for participating in the peaceful, pro-democracy protests of 1989 and many others 
for listening to the Voice of America. And many of China’s prisoners were jailed 
without charge or trial under 'reeducation through labor’ provisions.”|jlj Amnesty also 
reported that of 1,625 executions worldwide, in 1998,80 percent were in China 
(1.067).14
"The 1.2 billion people in China cannot speak out, do not have freedom of 
expression, and there is no independent public advocacy on social, political, religious, 
environmental, or economic issues. There is no independent judicial system that can 
defend the victims of human rights, and there is no free press for the people.’’15 Despite 
ongoing reports of China's human rights transgressions, economic relations between the 
United States and China continue to expand.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union has resulted in a major global 
transformation. National borders, once closed, have now opened, and new and untapped
13Director. Washington D.C. Office of Amnesty International USA Stephen Rickard. 
Congress. House. Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee On International 
Operations And Human Rights, Human Rights In China, hearing, 105th Cong., 2nd 
sess.. 26 June 1998 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1998), 22-26.
14 It was further reported that “Amnesty believes that the true totals for China are higher 
than those reported. The death penalty remains most entrenched in East Asia. China 
alone regularly accounts for more executions than the rest o f the world combined and 
applies it to a wide range of crimes beyond murder.”"The cruel and ever more unusual 
punishment.” Economist 351, no. 8119 (May 15, 1999): 95.
l5Rickard, Human Rights In China, 22-26.
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markets are ripe for the first takers. More cross-national political and economic contacts 
have become possible since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Yet, in light of these geopolitical 
and economic transformations, systematic human rights violations persist throughout the 
world. Notorious examples include the human rights atrocities of the former 
Yugoslavia, and the Rwandan genocide of 1994.16 The most recent outrage is in 
Chechnya, where civilians have become the targets of persecution and summary 
executions in the name of Russian nationalism.17 As the twentieth century comes to a 
close, the list of human rights violations continues unabated.
Against this backdrop, this study attempts to establish a relationship between the 
economic interdependence18 of nations and the moral responsibilities of nations by 
examining the U.S.-China case19 of the 1994 Clinton administration decision to delink
l6Over one half million people were exterminated in this genocide. For further 
explanation, see Human Rights Watch. Inquiry Demanded On U.S. Role In Genocide. 6 
Apr. 1999. on-line, available from http://hrwatchnyc.igc.org.
17 ‘'Human rights are no reason to interfere in the internal affairs of a state.” said Russia's 
Foreign Minister. Igor Ivanov.” As quoted by Craig R. Whitney, "Hands Off: The No 
Man's Land in the Fight for Human Rights,” New York Times. 12 Dec. 1999,1. Also 
refer to Human Rights Watch, More Than Sixty Civilians Murdered in Grozny, 23 Feb. 
2000. on-line, available from hrwatchnyc.igc.org.
l8Robert 0 . Keohane defines interdependence as “situations characterized by reciprocal 
effects among countries or among actors in different countries. Interdependence, most 
simply defined, is mutual dependence.” Keohane contrasts interdependence with 
complex interdependence, the latter being a far more broader issue because it involves the 
entire international arena and a network of multilateral institutions. See Robert O. 
Keohane and Joseph S. Nye. Power and Interdependence (Harvard University:
Harper Collins, 1989), 206,8.
l9Eckstein tells us that “the type of study most frequently made in the field is the intensive 
study of individual cases. Case studies run the gamut from the most microscosmic to the 
most macroscosmic levels o f political phenomena. Case studies are valuable at all stages 
of theory building, and most valuable at the stage at which candidate theories are tested.” 
Harry Eckstein. “Case Study And Theory In Political Science,” in Cumulative Index,
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China’s human rights practices from most-favored-nation status. In further delineation, 
this research asks the question why the Clinton administration decided to separate 
China's human rights record from most-favored-nation trading status.
The 1994 decision is a particularly salient one because it represents a marked 
change in how human rights issues are- and will be— addressed in U.S. foreign policy. 
The decision brings to the fore both conflicting and complementary interests of a states' 
moral obligations to the protection of universal human rights and state economic 
interests. Thus, adding insights not only into Sino-American relations, but also into the 
broader relationship between global market forces and ethical principles. Can corporate 
profit and morality20 coexist, for example? Human rights activists have expressed 
concern that future world governments may only be willing to uphold human rights 
principles where economically unimportant countries like Serbia or Burma are 
involved.21
By examining, specifically, the U.S.-China case of the 1994 decision, new
Handbook o f Political Science, eds. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading: 
Addison-Weslev Publishing Company. 1975). 79-80.
:oThe definition of morality is often a matter of conjecture. Morality is understood here 
as "a commitment to protecting human rights, raising living standards and 
democratization.*' as defined by David Little, ’’Morality and National Security.” in 
Morality and Foreign Policy: Realpolitik Revisited, eds. Kenneth M. Jensen and 
Elizabeth P. Faulkner (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1991), 3. An 
alternate definition is provided by Robert J. Myers: “Morality can be seen as deriving 
from four sources: 1) religion, 2) utilitarianism, 3) deontology, 4) human virtue. The four 
sources of morality are the basic stuff of ethics, ethics being the rules of conduct,” in 
Robert J. Meyers. “After The Cold War.” Society 28, no.3 (Mar./Apr. 1991): 30. This 
thesis also takes the utilitarian approach to morality, as described by Myers- that is -  a 
particular policy or action that is guaranteed to produce the greatest good for the greatest 
number.”
2lRieff. 38-40.
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insights may be obtained into the consequences and implications of economic 
instruments as tools for human rights improvements. The issue raises substantive 
questions, such as will expanding human rights, globally, undermine the free market 
mechanism by applying externalities22 that could affect jobs and prices of goods and 
services? Or. would the free market mechanism help to further the progress of human 
rights? Which of the many policy options recommended by scholars and practitioners 
would improve human rights conditions in China and in other countries? The case also 
brings to light the continuing question of the sovereign rights of states as protectors of 
human rights and the protection of human rights under international law.
The case of the 1994 U.S. decision to delink China’s human rights record from 
most-favored-nation status is particularly significant because of China’s increasing role 
in the international political economy. “It is predicted that if China's economy continues 
to grow at the annual rate of 10 percent, and if it acquires advanced technology 
capabilities. China's impact on the international economic system will dwarf that of 
Japan during its most influential period of the 1970's and 1980's.”23
As the only “developing” nation24 with a permanent seat on the United Nations
"Externalities refer to “the costs or benefits of a transaction that are incurred or received 
by members of the society but are not taken into account by the parties to the transaction.” 
Richard G. Lipsey and Peter O. Steiner. Economics. 6th ed. (New York: Harper and 
Row Publishers, 1981), 424, as quoted by Gordon C.K. Cheung, Market Liberalism: 
American Foreign Policy Toward China (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers,
1998). 9.
^Robert S. Ross. "Enter The Dragon,” Foreign Policy, 104 (Fall 1996): 19.
24The question of whether China can be classified as a “developing” nation has been 
challenged by political and economic analysts when applying purchasing power parity 
(PPP) to the level of development. Cheung, for example, points out that in March 1995, 
China's GDP per capita was $435, but using PPP, the figure soared to $2,428. Cheung
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Security Council, China exerts considerable influence on world affairs. The 1994 
decision is also important because of the role the United States and China have to one 
another. The United States is China’s second largest trading partner, for both exports 
and imports. In 1998, for example, China’s exports to the U.S. amounted to $38 billion, 
second only to Hong Kong, at $39 billion. Comparably, in 1998, China’s imports from 
the U.S. amounted to $17 billion, second only to Japan, at $28 billion.25 And bilaterally, 
both the U.S. and China offer major market entry and growth potential for each others' 
firms. In particular, however, to the United States and to U.S. firms, China offers the 
opportunity to sell to what potentially could be the world’s largest market, home to 
approximately one fifth of the earth’s population.
The U.S.-China trade and human rights issue encompass political, economic and 
ethical concerns that are interwoven into the discourse and actions of both countries, and 
ultimately into the international economic and political arena. “The MFN treatment, 
granted reciprocally, is the most important clause in the Sino-U.S. Trade Agreement, and
recommends that because of “the increasing internationalization of China and opening of 
its economy. PPP would be a more precise and appropriate unit of measurement.” 
Cheung, 307-308.
25PRC General Administration of Customs, China’s Customs Statistics 1997,1998, as 
quoted by the U.S. China Business Council, on-line, available from www.uschina.org. 
Note that China's export figures to the U.S. for the year 1998 differ from the U.S. imports 
from China figure (as shown in Table 2 of Chapter III) for the year 1998. For example, 
the U.S., for the year 1998. reports imports from China in the amount of U.S. $71.2 
billion, whereas China reports exports to the U.S., for the year 1998, as $38 billion. This 
statistical discrepancy is due to the different reporting methods used by the PRC General 
Administration of Customs and the U.S. Department o f Commerce. According to the 
PRC. trade with the U.S. is classified as trade with Hong Kong if it passes through Hong 
Kong ports.
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is the foundation for the development of Sino-U.S. trade and economic cooperation.”26 
Despite the 1994 decision to delink trade and human rights, the issue of MFN and human 
rights continues to raise an intense debate in the Congress.
RESEARCH DESIGN
The three major competing paradigms.27 realism, liberalism and radicalism, are 
utilized as foundations for testing alternative hypotheses. Alternative theories or 
approaches may be useful, but have not been chosen as a framework for analysis of the 
issue. The bureaucratic politics approach, for example, may be applicable to a degree, 
but intrinsic to the model are some weaknesses. The increasing influence of externalities 
on the bureaucratic process in the U.S. government may not lend itself to the intricacies 
involved in present day foreign policy decision-making.
The growing interdependence of states and the increased role of the private sector 
and international governmental bodies in governmental decision making, has created 
complexities that reach beyond the bureaucratic network of the Congress, Executive 
Branch and intra governmental agencies. Fast-paced global forces, such as the speed of 
international financial transactions and political upheaval, may question the applicability 
of the bureaucratic decision-making model as a basis for analyses because of the
26Chen. Wenjing, 'The Status Quo and Prospects of Sino-U.S. Trade Relations,” Journal 
o f World Trade 30. no. 1 (1996): 20.
27As Eckstein explains, “the most powerful way to test and improve a theory is to be 
hard on your own approach and be easy on the alternatives. Theorists must be ready to 
tolerate some of the propositions of the opposite camp.” Eckstein, 188-120.
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slowness of the bureaucratic decision-making process. “The general literature on 
government bureaucracies has paid much greater attention to how organizations respond 
to incremental changes in their external environments than to revolutionary changes.
Yet, U.S. foreign policy agencies now face revolutionary changes in their external 
environment.'’28 The psychological approach to foreign policy analysis perhaps may be 
useful. Theories of cognitive psychology provide insights into the way individual 
decision makers think and perceive situations. Cognitive knowledge, or beliefs about the 
world and their images, are the key explanatory variables in foreign policy behavior. But 
the psychological approach also has its limitations. It does not, for instance, consider the 
influence of the environment on the beliefs of the decision-maker. For example, there is 
the potential for inaccurate predictions of one's own behavior by mis-calculating the 
degree to which an event may stir emotions. In this approach, the pre-existing belief 
system of the decision-maker may deter the ability to predict political outcomes that are 
guided by beliefs that are different. As well, today’s global environment is in constant 
transformation. This makes human patterns of perception or mis-perception difficult if 
not impossible to follow and decipher when interpreting the decisions of foreign policy­
makers.
Moreover, the market mechanism, in which trade patterns rely and operate, is a 
significant factor in the 1994 MFN decision. The market mechanism is structured on the 
interactions of economic units, such as the interactions between savings, financial 
institutions, investment income, wages, consumer and government expenditures, land,
■8James M. Lindsay and Randall B. Ripley, “U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changing World,” 
in U.S. Foreign Policy After The Cold War, eds. James M. Lindsay and Randall B. Ripley 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997), 9.
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labor and capital, rather than on the beliefs or perceptions of individual government 
leaders. For these reasons, the psychological approach to foreign policy has not been 
chosen as a framework for analysis. Many other theories have been considered by 
scholars as a basis for investigation. Nonetheless, it is of the opinion of the present 
writer that the three major traditional theories of realism, liberalism and radicalism 
provide a broader scope for analysis of the issue.
Deriving from the previous literature on the subject, to be further expanded upon 
in chapter two, the following hypotheses are suggested: Based upon the realist 
perspective, it is proposed that H I: The U.S. intent to sustain and increase power9 in the 
Asian region influenced the 1994 U.S. decision to separate China’s human rights record 
from most-favored-nation status/0 Based upon the liberal perspective, it is proposed 
that H2: The U.S. intent to improve respect for human rights in China through economic 
engagement influenced the 1994 U.S. decision to separate China’s human rights record 
from most-favored-nation status.31 Based upon the radical perspective, it is proposed
:9"Ray Cline divides power into two components, tangible and intangible. The formula 
is: Pp= (C+E+M) * (S + W), whce Pp= perceived power; C= critical mass = population 
+ territory; E= economic capability; M= military capability; S= strategic purpose: W= 
will to pursue national strategy. C. E and M are tangible, while S and W are intangible.” 
Ray S. Cline. World Power Assessment: A Calculus o f Strategic Drift (Boulder:
Westview Press. 1977). 11, as noted by Cheung, 107.
3uSee Richard N. Haass, “Paradigm Lost: From Containment to Confusion,” Foreign 
Affairs 76. no. 2 (Mar/Apr. 1997): 43-58; Michael Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar 
Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War.” International 
Security 21. no. 4 (spring 1997): 49-78; Gerald Segal, “East Asia and The Constrainment 
of China.” International Security 20, no. 4 (spring 1996): 107-135; Charles 
Krauthammer. “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs (winter 1990-91): 23-33.
JISee Sheldon W. Simon. “Security, Economic Liberalism And Democracy: Asian Elite 
Perceptions of Post-Cold War Foreign Policy Values,” NBR Analysis 7 (1996):5-52;
Bryce Harland, “For A Strong China,” Foreign Policy 94 (spring 1994/95): 48-52; David
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that. H3: Corporate influence is associated with the 1994 U.S. decision to separate 
China’s human rights record from most-favored-nation status.32 The hypotheses 
speculate three causal relationships among the variables. The first causal relationship is 
between the U.S. quest for power in the Asian region and the 1994 decision to delink 
China's human rights record from most-favored-nation status. The second causal 
relationship is between the U.S. intent to improve respect for human rights in China and 
the 1994 decision to separate China’s human rights record from most-favored-nation 
status. The third causal relationship is the influence of the corporate sector and the 1994 
decision to separate China’s human rights record from most-favored-nation status.
The above hypotheses indicate one dependent variable and three independent 
variables. The dependent variable is identified as the 1994 U.S. decision to delink 
China's human rights record from most-favored nation status. The independent 
variables are identified as; i) the U.S. intent to sustain and increase power in the Asian 
region; ii) the U.S. intent to advance human rights in China through economic 
engagement; and iii) corporate interests. The preceding hypotheses, although worthy of 
testing, may be oversimplifications of the problem, however. The New World Order
P. Levine. "Global Interdependence and National Prosperity.” in U.S. Trade Policy and 
Global Growth, ed. Robert A. Blecker (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe. 1996): 37-57; James 
Lillev. "Freedom Through Trade.” Foreign Policy 94 (spring 1994/95): 37-45.
j2See Paul R. Streeten. ’’Against Minimalism,” in State and Market in Development, 
Synergy or Rivalry?, Louis Putterman and Dietrich Rueschemeyer. eds. (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers. 1992). 3-38; William Robinson, ’’Globalization, the world system, 
and democracy promotion in U.S. foreign policy.” Theory and Society 25 (1996): 615- 
655: Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Agonies of Liberalism, What Hope Progress?,” New 
Left Review. no. 204 (Mar. 1994): 3-17; David Shambaugh, Beautiful Imperialist 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Susan Silbey, “Let Them Eat Cake: 
Globalization, Postmodern Colonialism, and the Possibilities of Justice,” Law & Society 
Review 31, no. 2 (1997): 207-335.
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has ushered in new complexities into the world system. A multitude of post-Cold War 
evolutionary and revolutionary events have taken place. Such dynamic events have 
included newly forming states and boundaries, cross-border state alliances, transnational 
corporate mergers, a new monetary union on the European Continent, and the expansion 
and solidification of international and regional trade regimes, such as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the 
European Union (EU), in addition to the formation and influence of international non­
governmental organizations (NGO’s).
With the demise of the Soviet Union, the bi-polar "balance of power,” Cold War 
structure has been broken. The Cold War arrangement that had been the basis for 
international political analyses, for nearly half a century, is no longer applicable. These 
global transformations, coupled with the global spread of information technology, may 
bring into question the plausibility of traditional theories as explanations for social 
phenomena in the postmodern era.
Realism, for example, with its emphasis on state power, may overlook 
explanations in international relations that arise from a changing world of complex 
interdependence.33 Liberalism, with its emphasis on international trade as a means for 
peaceful relations among countries, may underestimate the significance of state survival
'■"’Complex interdependence refers to a situation among a number of countries in which 
multiple channels of contact connect societies, where states do not monopolize these 
contacts. These channels of contact include informal ties between governmental elites, as 
well as foreign office arrangements and channels between transnational corporations. 
Complex Interdependence consists of multiple issues that are not arranged in a clear 
consistent hierarchy. The absence of hierarchy means that military security does not 
consistently dominate the agenda.” Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence,
24-25.
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as a motivation for behavior. Lastly, radicalism, in its assumption that the international 
social order is guided by an elite ruling class that is fueled by the hands of corporations, 
may overlook human values, consumer sovereignty, public opinion and independent 
social groups as influential factors in foreign policy decisions.
Because of these global transformations, each hypothesis, in and of itself, may 
not be sufficient in explaining the U.S. 1994 decision to delink China’s human rights 
record from most-favored-nation status. Each of the three stated hypotheses may serve 
as a partial explanation of the 1994 U.S. decision to delink China’s human rights record 
from most-favored-nation status. But even in combination, the hypotheses may not be 
sufficient in explaining the 1994 U.S. decision. Externalities that reach beyond the U.S.- 
China bilateral relationship may have affected the decision to separate human rights and 
trade.
Therefore, an alternative hypothesis. H4. is proposed. The fourth, or alternative 
hypothesis draws upon elements of past approaches but places the U.S. foreign policy 
decision on China in the context of complex interdependence. The independent variables 
include: i) the U.S. intent to sustain and increase power in the Asian region; ii) the U.S. 
intent to advance human rights in China; iii) corporate interests, and iv) complex 
interdependence. The dependent variable is the 1994 U.S. decision. Thus a fourth 
causal relationship would be between all four of these factors and the 1994 U.S. 
decision.
This study employed primary and secondary sources from available data, utilizing 
a content analysis approach to research. Primary sources included public documents and
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official records, such as the proceedings of U.S. government bodies34 and testimonies of 
major actors that surrounded the 1994 decision. These key actors include government 
officials, corporate Executives, human rights organizations and specialists, business and 
interest groups and academicians. Secondary sources, such as previous research, the 
media and opinions of analysts on the subject, will also be consulted.
CENTRAL CONTRIBUTIONS
Much of the literature on the U.S.-China MFN debate, and the resultant 1994 
U.S. decision to delink trade from human rights concerns, analyze the issue from a 
journalistic standpoint, a legal standpoint or a marketing standpoint. Many scholars and 
practitioners have engaged in fruitful policy analysis of the 1994 decision. Ail of these 
approaches are indeed valid and appropriate to the subject, and are incorporated into the 
analysis of the present study. Fewer studies, however, have examined the 1994 U.S. 
decision from a theoretical perspective. By applying the case of the U.S. 1994 decision 
to the three major alternative theoretical schools of realism, liberalism and radicalism, 
this study attempts to contribute to the knowledge of the current scholarship.
34" Hearings are good ways to look at not only the practitioners' view points but also the 
other opinions drawn from the society at large. More often than not, people from 
business groups, academic circles, and 'careerists and ins-and-outers,‘ including foreign 
policy elites, the executives of large firms, and academic professionals, are substantially 
influential in foreign policy-making.” Thomas J. McCormick. America’s Half-Century: 
United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and After, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 1995), 7-16, as quoted by Cheung, 9. Cheung further asserts 
that "although congressional hearings cannot reveal everything about U.S. foreign policy, 
they indicate the discourse of the U.S. foreign policy. Like the political party, the hearing 
functions as the articulation of ideas and the aggregation of opinions.”
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The case study of the U.S. 1994 decision contributes to theory by questioning, 
confirming or improving upon existing theoretical constructs as explanations for political 
and economic outcomes. These insights contribute not only to a theoretical 
understanding of the problem, but also to a practical understanding. The practical value 
of researching the 1994 MFN decision is that by expanding on the available literature, 
American policy-makers may gain further insights into the relationship between trade 
and human rights, and the social consequences and implications that trade policy has on 
the progress of international human rights.
Through empirical investigation and analysis, this research study will offer 
insights into the motives of major decision makers that surrounded the 1994 decision. 
Implicitly, the research study contributes to the understanding of the bilateral U.S.-China 
relationship. A more thorough understanding may be gained as to the political and 
economic consequences of the 1994 decision on the U.S.-China relationship, thereby 
contributing to the knowledge that can be applied to U.S. policy choices on China. 
Explicitly, the research attempts to provide some answers into the future status of 
universal human rights. For instance, which mechanisms will be utilized to address 
human rights in the future, and what role the United States can play as guarantor of 
universal rights.
ORGANIZATION OF THE RESEARCH
The research is presented in six chapters. Chapter two consists of a review of the 
relevant literature within the context o f three major political paradigms; realism,
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liberalism and radicalism. Each school of thought is briefly reviewed, followed by a 
discussion of the viewpoints of major analysts within each school. The strengths and 
limitations of each theoretical school as applied to U.S. foreign policy behavior are 
assessed. The chapter begins with a discussion of the literature on realism, which 
focuses on scholars whose opinions are suggestive of the importance of the U.S. national 
interest and the acquisition of national power. Neorealists suggest that the best way for 
the U.S. to maintain and increase power in the world is to engage in international trade. 
U.S. economic power would be gained through close economic ties with other countries.
The liberal perspective of U.S. foreign policy, briefly stated, is that foreign trade 
is a conduit for world peace and higher standards of living among nations. The chapter 
draws upon traditional scholars of economic and social liberal thought. These liberal 
forefathers include, among the many. Immanuel Kant, Adam Smith. Woodrow Wilson. 
John Rawls and David Ricardo. The chapter then proceeds to discuss the views of 
current liberal thinkers and how their views relate to the interpretation of U.S. foreign 
policy decisions. Particular reference is given to U.S.-China policy.
Lastly, the radical paradigm is brought forward in the chapter. The philosophies 
underlying radical thought, which are founded in the works of Karl Marx, Frederick 
Engels and V.I. Lenin, are introduced and discussed within a foreign policy context. The 
chapter unfolds to discuss some of the major modem day followers of radical theory. 
Slight differences of opinion are found in the current radical literature. Most radical 
opinions, however, evince the fundamental Marxist/Leninist tenets of class conflict and 
imperialism. All three of these competing theoretical viewpoints, which will be more 
thoroughly considered in the literature review, have significant implications for U.S.-
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China policy and for U.S. trade and human rights policy in general. The third chapter 
consists of an historical view of the issue. The chapter is divided into two sections. The 
first section of the chapter details the evolution of U.S.-China trade policy, beginning 
with the first U.S. commercial contacts with the Mainland, in the 18th century, and 
ending with the 1994 Clinton administration decision to separate trade policy and human 
rights. The trade policies of U.S. presidential administrations, and the international and 
domestic political and economic events that had affected those policies are discussed.
The third chapter continues to provide an historical perspective of the 
relationship between trade and human rights in U.S. foreign policy. Major U.S. trade 
acts that have been linked to U.S. human rights policy throughout the centuries are 
brought forward in discussion. The chapter highlights the institutional mechanisms 
through which the United States has exercised economic leverage to further the progress 
of human rights. The chapter concludes with a synopsis of the decision making process 
and the major events that led up to the U.S. 1994 decision.
The first three hypotheses are empirically tested in the fourth chapter. The 
hypotheses include H1: The U.S. intent to sustain and increase power in the Asian 
regions influenced the 1994 U.S. decision to separate China’s human rights record from 
most-favored-nation status: H2: The U.S. intent to improve respect for human rights in 
China through economic engagement influenced the 1994 U.S. decision to separate 
China's human rights record from most-favored-nation status; and H3: Corporate 
influence is associated with the 1994 U.S. decision to separate China’s human rights 
record from most-favored-nation status. The hypotheses are placed and analyzed within 
one of the competing theoretical arguments. Each section begins with a brief description
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of the theory to be applied. The strengths and limitations of the theoretical findings are 
also discussed.
Chapter five analyzes and discusses the theoretical findings of the fourth 
hypothesis, which draws upon elements of past approaches while considering complex 
interdependence as a causal factor in the U.S. decision to delink trade from human rights 
in 1994. Elements of the first three hypotheses are synthesized, along with external 
factors that had affected the 1994 decision. Major transnational forces come into play 
and are addressed as part of the findings. These environmental influences include 
linkages between multilateral corporations, international organizations and cross­
national alliances between businesses and governments. The chapter highlights how 
economic interdependencies can influence political decisions.
Finally, the sixth chapter serves as a recapitulation and conclusion of the overall 
research findings. The chapter reviews the findings of each theoretical argument, 
offering further insights into the strengths and weaknesses of each argument. The 
chapter focuses on the implications of the research results. These include theoretical 
implications and implications for U.S.-China economic policy. The broader implications 
of the research findings are also discussed, with specific reference to the effects of U.S.- 
China policy on the global political economy and on universal human rights. 
Recommendations for U.S. trade and human rights policies are proposed, and some 
suggestions for future research are offered.




This thesis is an inquiry into the relationship between the economic 
interdependence of nations and the moral responsibilities of nations by examining the 
1994 decision by the Clinton administration to separate China's human rights record 
from most-favored-nation status. By employing this case study analysis, this study has 
attempted to gain insights into the complementary and conflicting issues of a ethical 
principles and global market forces.
Chapter two now examines the relevant literature by drawing on a wide variety of 
scholarly opinions that, for the most part, were representative of major theoretical 
traditions. A small but significant number of viewpoints did not fall exclusively into one 
theoretical tradition or another, but rather reflected a combination of traditional 
theoretical approaches, or perhaps even new approaches to discovery, particularly as they 
pertained to the post-1989 era. These views are briefly discussed.
The chapter focuses on literature that is relevant to the 1994 U.S. decision to end 
the linkage between international trade and human rights. The literature covers a broad 
perspective of U.S. foreign policy, with a particular emphasis on U.S. foreign economic 
policy. Opinions of analysts are derived from both political and economic areas, as both 
overlap and are ultimately intertwined into the making of U.S. foreign policy decisions.1
‘As Stephen D. Cohen emphasizes, "International economic policy by its nature overlaps 
the discipline of political science. Each tends to approach the broad field of international 
economic relations with certain preexisting instincts, knowledge and objectiveness...Few 
governments prefer to allow important economic decisions to be made purely by the 
invisible hand of the free market rather than by political process. In even the most free
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Because it is assumed that some moral imperative is involved when making 
decisions on human rights issues, moral considerations and their role in U.S. foreign 
policy are also reviewed in the literature. The literature review places the opinions of 
analysts within the context of the competing schools of thought of realism, liberalism 
and radicalism, with specific focus given to U.S.-China policy. A brief description of 
each theoretical school is provided at the beginning of each section. The strengths and 
weaknesses of these theoretical approaches are then evaluated.
REALISM
In realist theory, the central actors in a political system are the nation-states. 
“The function of states are similar, and distinctions among them arise principally from 
their varied capabilities.’*2 Political realism maintains that 'The primary obligation of 
every state~the goal to which all other objectives should be subordinated—is to promote 
the national interest, defined as the acquisition of power.”3 True to the Machiavellian
market oriented country, government macroeconomic monetary and fiscal policies, and 
regulatory policies, not the invisible hand of the marketplace, are the principal 
determinants of domestic economic activity.” However. Cohen qualified that “external 
factors, or global economic developments can enhance, alter, or disrupt a chosen 
domestic economic policy course ” Stephen D. Cohen. The Making o f  United States 
International Economic Policy, 3rd ed. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988): 23-24.
Kenneth N. Waltz. “Political Structures,” in Neorealsim And Its Critics, ed. Robert 0 . 
Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 92-93.
'Charles W. Kegley. "The Neoliberal Challenge to Realist Theories o f World Politics: An 
Introduction.” in Controversies In International Relations Theory, Charles W. Kegley, 
ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 4-5. See also Keohane and Nye, Power and 
Interdependence. 11, where Keohane and Nye define power as “the ability o f an actor to
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and Hobbesian concept that humankind is sinister by nature, the goal of the state is to 
survive by any means, such as by military might, war and the conquering of other states. 
Structural anarchy, or the absence of a central authority is assumed, and therefore a 
state's relative capabilities are a measure of survival within this anarchic system.4 It is 
also assumed in realist theory that states behave rationally “and are guided by the logic of 
the national interest.”5
Hans Morganthau, in his notable work. Politics Among Nations, professed that 
"the limitless aspiration of power drives all nations.”6 The economic policies of nations 
are therefore “judged primarily from the point of view of their contribution to national 
power.”7 Klaus Knorr underscored the importance of a nation's economic capabilities in 
terms of relative power gains, where he pointed to the fact that national economic 
capabilities can be used as a lever to gain advantage over another nation.* “Economic 
valuables. Knorr contended, can be used as direct leverage over the outside world.”9
get others to do something they otherwise might not do (and at an acceptable cost to the 
actor). Power can also be conceived in terms of control over outcomes.”
401e R. Holsti. “Theories of International Relations and Foreign Policy: Realism and Its 
Challengers.” in Controversies In International Relations Theory, ed. Charles W. Kegley, 
(New York: St. Martin's Press. 1995). 37.
■Ibid.. 37.
6Hans J. Morganthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle fo r  Power and Peace, 4th 
ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), 202.
7Morganthau. 29.
*KIaus Knorr, "International Economic Leverage and its Uses,” in Economic Issues and 
National Security, eds. Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager (National Security 
Education Program: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1977), 99.
9 Ibid.. 99-103
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After the Cold War, many realist scholars10 stressed the importance of 
maintaining the U.S. hegemony or the “unipolar moment.” Charles Krauthammer noted 
that *fthe immediate post-Cold War world was unipolar. The center of world power was 
the unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies.”11 From 
Krauthammer's point of view, U.S. foreign trade and investment was a means to sustain 
and increase U.S. power. In support of Krauthammer’s argument. Mastanduno12 referred 
to Stephen Walt's neorealist "balance of threat” theory, which held that the dominant 
state would deal with potential challengers in order to maintain the hegemonic position.12 
Specifically with regard to China. Mastanduno observed that increased U.S. interests in 
penetrating the China market explained U.S. efforts to mobilize for national economic 
competition against other major economic powers.14 In the realist sense, then. 
Mastanduno maintained that the U.S. policy of economic engagement with China was 
“threat” driven.
Similarly. Brzezinski warned that Russia continued to be a threat to U.S. security 
after the Cold War. and that former Soviet officials still desired to control the former 
satellite states.15 The emergence of a foreign military and economic superpower on the
l0Mastanduno. 66.: Krauthammer. 23; A.D. McLennan, “Balance. Not Containment: 
Geopolitical Take From Canberra.” The National Interest (fall 1997): 60-63.
"Krauthammer. 23.
"Mastanduno, 66.
"Mastanduno. 51. in citing Stephen M. Walt, The Origins o f  Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press. 1987).
"Mastanduno. 66.
"Zbigniew Brzezinski. “The End of The American Century: The Grand Chessboard: U.S. 
Geostrategy for Eurasia,” Harvard International Review 20 (winter 1997/98): 51.
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Eurasian continent must therefore be deterred through international economic linkages 
and convergence.16 True to his belief in a lingering post-Cold War communist threat, 
Brzezinski argued that China may grow economically, but may not democratize, thus 
posing a threat to the U.S. hegemony in the Asian region, and beyond.17
Affirming the opinion of Brzezinski. Mearsheimer18 warned of a Soviet return to 
expansionism, and Cohen19 cautioned of centuries of Russian imperial rule and the 
“Russification'’ of ethnic minorities. Concomitantly, McLennan argued that socialism on 
the Asian continent had not dissolved, and that newly privatizing states were no 
assurance that autocracy would abate or that democracy would ensue.20 In further 
explanation of U.S. foreign policy from the realist perspective. Haass argued that 
“alliances among like-minded governments and the support of liberal trade and 
multilateralism helped to assure the U.S. military and economic hegemonic position.”21
l6Brzezinski. 51.
l7Ibid.. 52-54.
lxJohn J. Mearsheimer. “Back To The Future.” International Security 15, no. 1 (1990):
55.
19Ariel Cohen. “Engaged Realism.” Harvard International Review 19. no. 1 (1996): 32- 
EOA.
20McLennan. 60-63.
21 Haass. 43-45. Haass further clarifies that "the real choice facing the United States is 
not between unilateralism and multilateralism, but between two versions of the latter: the 
U.S. leadership approach and neo-internationalism. What distinguishes them are matters 
of substance and style. Neo-internationalism places far more emphasis on harnessing
U.S. activism to formal institutions, especially the United Nations and standing regional 
alliances. U.S. leadership, by contrast, is based more on informal coalitions and 
arrangements that bring the United States together with other like-minded parties.” Ibid., 
57.
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With an underlying realist threat and its principle of relative power. McLennan 
noted that it was in the national interest of the United States to maintain strategic 
hegemony in east Asia.22 One way of maintaining the U.S. hegemony, was through 
economic ties with China while maintaining a cautious relationship in order to assure 
that U.S. national security interests would be protected.22 Such U.S. security interests 
included, according to Ross, the reform of China's economic system so that the system 
would allow for U.S. free market values, particularly as they affect U. S. economic 
policy.24
Following the realist school of thought. Segal asserted that the lack of balance of 
power stability”25 in the post-CoId War era was all the more reason China should be 
contained through "constrainment."26 More specifically, increased U.S. economic 
relations with China would decrease the possibility of China's economic ascendancy in 
the Asian region because China's leaders would be prevented from making economic 
decisions unilaterally.27
"McLennan. 62.
: ’Robert S. Ross. "Beijing As A Conservative Power,'' Foreign Affairs 76. no. 2 
(Mar./Apr. 1997): 43-45.
24Ibid.. 44-45.
25 Hans Morganthau defined "balance of power’ as "a policy, a state of affair, and 
approximately equal or any distribution of power.” Morganthau, 167.
26Segal. 107-109.
27Morganthau explained that "the actual interdependence of nations and the actual 
political, military and economic dependence of certain nations upon others may make it 
difficult or impossible for certain nations to pursue independent domestic and foreign 
policies.” Morganthau, 304.
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In the broader perspective, Stremlau28 proposed that U.S. economic relations with 
big emerging markets (BEM’s)29 would promote a convergence of U.S. national interests 
by creating jobs for citizens, by increasing domestic productivity and by reducing trade 
and fiscal deficits. Stremlau further noted that “U.S. foreign policy would increasingly 
revolve around commercial interests, and that economic diplomacy would be essential to 
resolving the great issues of our age.”30 Stremlau’s observation is evidenced in the 
increased emphasis on the U.S.-China commercial relationship in U.S.-China policy.
Contrary to the aforementioned viewpoints that considered U.S. economic 
relations with other countries to be an assurance of the U.S. hegemony after the Cold 
War, Muravchik disparaged U.S. economic relations with other countries at the expense 
of decreasing defense capabilities.31 Muravchik, for example, concluded that with regard 
to China, the U.S. favored economics over military and human rights issues to the point 
of "coddling China."32 Muravchik's opinion was indicative of the traditional realist 
principle that the primary means to obtaining national power is by the build up of a 
nation's military capabilities.^ Kagen. as did Muravchik. recommended increased U.S.
28John Stremlau. "Clinton's Dollar Diplomacy.” Foreign Policy (winter 1994/95): 22- 
24.
29 John Stremlau identified 10 Big Emerging Markets. They included China. India. 
Indonesia. Brazil, Mexico. Turkey. South Korea, South Africa, Poland and Argentina. Of 
these emerging markets, Stremlau identified China as the largest. Stremlau, 24.
30Stremlau, 18.
3lJoshua Muravchik. "Clintonism Abroad.” Commentary 100, no. 4 (1995): 38-40.
3:Ibid.. 39.
"  An underlying premise of realist theory is that a state must be in constant readiness for 
war. This concept is rooted in the Hobbesian principle that “Out of civil states, there is 
always war o f every one against every one.” Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Cambridge:
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military capabilities in the Asian region, as opposed to increased economic ties, to assure 
the U.S. hegemonic position after the Cold War.34
More specifically, Kagen argued that only tough U.S. trade sanctions against 
China would pressure China’s leaders to incorporate U.S. values into its economic and 
political system.35 Joseph S. Nye, in referring to Ledeen, wrote of the realist contention 
that "China is the one nation capable of mortally challenging the United States over the 
next ten or twenty years.”36 Engaging China (economically and militarily) while 
establishing alliances with Japan and South Korea, Nye believed, would further the U.S. 
security interest in the Asia-Pacific region.37
An extension of the realist school of thought is isolationism.3* or what is also 
referred to as protectionism. For isolationists, the economic independence of the state is
Hackett Publishing Company. Inc., 1994), 76.
54Robert Kagan. "What China Knows That We Don't.” The Weekly Standard (Jan. 20.
1997): 27.
35Ibid.. 27.
36Joseph S. Nye. "China's Re-emergence And The Future of the Asia-Pacific,” Survival 
39, no. 4 (winter 1997/98): 69. in citing Michael Ledeen. "A Scandalous Policy,” Wall 
Street Journal. 26 Mar. 1997, Dl.
37Joseph S. Nye, "The Case for Deep Engagement,” Foreign Affairs 74. no. 4 
(July/Aug. 1995): 99-102. Nye further asserted that “As interdependence grows, 
stronger transnational ties between the United States and the East Asian economies will 
make it difficult for East Asians to exclude us [the U.S.].”
J*Note that the school of economic conservatism runs parallel to the political realist 
school of isolationism. Gamble, in citing Friedrich von Hayek, observed that the school 
of conservative economics embraces nationalism, rejects free trade and competition and 
prefers national to international solutions, in Andrew Gamble, Hayek: The Iron Cage o f  
Liberty (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 102-107.
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threatened by trade with and investment in other countries.39 Realists who advocate 
isolationism believe that, ideally, a state’s economy should be self-sustaining, and that 
the interdependence of states increases the probability of conflict among them.40 
Deriving from these beliefs. Mastel and Szanosszegi argued that China’s increased 
wealth and technological knowledge gained from trading with the U.S. could be used to 
strengthen China's military, which could then threaten the United States.41
The isolationist perspective was further advanced by Hawkins in his policy 
statement that "China's trade surplus with the United States provided the country with 
the wealth to buy weapons, and that the revocation of China’s most-favored-nation status 
would help to deter the flow of U.S. dollars that could feed China’s aggressive military 
ambitions."43 Similarly, one author contended that greater U.S. commerce with China 
was an empty goal because it would assist China's rise to domination in the East Asian 
region.4"
Advancing the isolationist perspective. Caldwell and Lennon expressed that 
China's economic prosperity gained by trade with the U.S. would fuel China's military
j4Klaus Knorr. Power and Wealth: The Political Economy o f International Power (New 
York: Basic Books. 1973), chap., 4.
40Kenneth N. Waltz. "Conflict in World Politics,” in Conflict In World Politics, eds. 
Steven L. Spiegal and Kenneth N. Waltz (Cambridge: Winthrop, 1971), 454-474.
4'Greg Mastel and Andrew Szamosszegi, "China’s Growing Trade Surplus: Why It 
Matters.” Washington Quarterly 20, no. 2 (1997): 211.
4’William R. Hawkins. "For All The Tea In China.” Strategic Review (fall 1997): 11- 
13.
4j"A New China Strategy.” Mew Republic (Nov. 10, 1997): 9-10.
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growth which would eventually allow the country to threaten most parts of the globe.44 
The opinions of Caldwell and Lennon suggested that U.S. economic relations with China 
posed a threat to U.S. security, driven by realist underpinnings of the ever-present 
potential of war.45 Advocates of isolationism46 argued that subordinating the pursuit of 
security to the pursuit of trade, on the premise that increased trade with China would lead 
to democracy and improved human rights practices, was mistaken. Rather, the U.S. 
national interest should be the prevention of a potentially hostile power from usurping 
the U.S. hegemonic position. Isolationist theorists and practitioners therefore viewed 
U.S. economic engagement with China as a zero-sum proposition. Gains would be made 
for China only at the expense of U.S. security. Neorealists.47 on the other hand, viewed 
U.S. economic engagement with China as a means to assure U.S. economic and strategic 
hegemony in the Asian region.
Reflecting the realist perspective of morality, Morganthau. in Politics Among 
Marions, dismissed morality as a viable foreign policy tool because he believed that 
seemingly altruistic concerns for morality could conceal ulterior motives for actions in 
international politics.48 Morganthau maintained that "the state has no right to allow
44Colonel John Caldwell. USMC, and Alexander T. Lennon. "China’s Nuclear 
Modernization Program.” Strategic Review (fall 1995): 27.
45Neorealist Kenneth N. Waltz develops the thesis of states’ constant threat of war in his 
1979 classic. Theory o f International Politics (Reading: Addison Wesley. 1979).
46CaldweIl and Lennon. 27: Hawkins, 11-13.; Knorr. chap., 4.; Mastel and Szamosszegi, 
2 1 1 .
47Nye, “The Case For Deep Engagement,” 99-102; Ross, 43-45; Haass, “Paradigm Lost: 
From Containment To Confusion,” 43-44: Segal. 107-109; Mastanduno, 66.
48Morganthau. 224.
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moral concerns to interfere with successful political action of the national survival and 
the quest for relative power.”49 The earlier work of Hobbes.50 however, formed the basis 
of the realist view of morality. Hobbes defined the true worth of humankind in relative 
terms. That is to say, "The true worth of man is his price, or how much he would be 
given for the use of his power.”51
Similarly, Brzezinski52 did not view human rights as a positive force for the well­
being and betterment of humankind, but rather as a manipulative tool to sway other 
countries to act in the U.S. interest. Realism, in the contemporary world, was 
exemplified by Doyle, who ascertained that even today realist scholars doubt the basis 
for a "global cosmopolitan international morality.”53 George Kennan, one of the 
principal proponents of realist theory, for example, expressed that “the interests of the 
national society are those that only concern itself with military security, the integrity of 
its political life and the well-being of its people.”54 These needs. Kennan asserted, "have 
no moral quality.”55
49Morganthau defines relative power as "a continuing effort to maintain and to increase 
the power of one's own nation and to keep in check or reduce the power of other 




5jMichael W. Doyle, Ways O f War And Peace (New York: Norton, 1997), 434.
54George F. Kennan. “Morality and Foreign Policy,” in Morality and Foreign Policy: 
Realpolitik Revisited, eds. Kenneth M. Jensen and Elizabeth P. Faulkner (Washington, 
D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1991), 60-61.
55Kennan. 60.
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An underlying premise of Kennan’s viewpoint, as discussed by Little.56 was that 
there was nothing universal about morality because the concept of morality differed from 
society to society. "The moral claims of one culture, therefore, can be doubted by 
another.”57 Based on these traditional realist perspectives, morality and human rights 
concerns would not be an influential factor in U.S. foreign policy decision making.
The strength of the realist argument, in its emphasis on interstate power and 
military capabilities, is that it can readily explain U.S. behavior in actions pertaining to 
perceived or real security threats. Realism's premise that in order to achieve peace, it is 
necessary to prepare for war,58 has explained previous U.S. political actions, particularly 
during the bi-polar Cold War years.59 A weakness of the realist argument, however, is 
that it does not account for the present changing world of complex interdependence and 
geopolitical reordering. The post-Cold War global expansion of international 
organizations and transnational corporations make realist theory static as a singular 
explanation for U.S. policy choice.
56David Little. “Morality and National Security.” in eds. Kenneth M. Jensen and Elizabeth 
P. Faulkner. 3.
"Little. 3-6.
58Realist theory claims that a state must be in constant readiness for war. This concept is 
rooted in the Hobbesian principle that “Out of civil states, there is always war of every 
one against every one.” Hobbes. 76.
"Realist theory, for example, can easily explain the April 7,1950 national security policy 
ot NSC 68. which continued for three decades. The policy was based on the perceived 
Soviet threat. “For the authors of NSC 68, American interests could not be defined apart 
from the threat the Soviet Union posed to them. ‘Frustrating the Kremlin design,’ as the 
document so frequently put it, became an end in itself, not a means to a larger end.” John 
Lewis Gaddis and Paul Nitze, “NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat Reconsidered,” 
International Security 4, no. 4 (spring, 1980): 167.
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In its emphasis on states’ self-interests of survival, security, power and relative 
capabilities, realist theory overlooks that state behavior can be influenced by such critical 
factors as international law. economic interdependence, multilateral institutions and 
agreements, international regimes60 and/or non-governmental organizations (NGO’s). A 
further weakness of realist theory is that the intricacies involved in bureaucratic politics 
can undermine rational actions by key decision-makers.
Although the national interest is a major determinant of realist theory, it is often 
difficult to discern exactly what the national interest is in light of competing domestic 
interests. Moreover, realist theory overlooks the human dimension of ideas and values 
that are ingrained in the American people and in other peoples of the world.
Realist theory, as an explanation for U.S. behavior, fails to acknowledge that the 
power of human ideology and public opinion can influence the actions of states. 
Liberalism, on the other hand, though acknowledging the realist emphasis on the state 
system, paints a much different picture of global events and structures, as discussed in 
the following section.
“ "The regime challenges the traditional realpolitik ideal of the autonomous, hierarchical 
state that keeps its options open, but its information and decision-making procedures 
closed...the regime is a bridge to international cooperation in that it opens the flow of 
information to states.” Robert 0 . Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in 
the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 258-259.
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To the liberal school o f thought, economic relations61 among and between states 
is viewed as a pacifying force.62 Grounded in the theoretical and practical philosophies 
of Kant63 and Wilson.64 liberals envisage that the peace and prosperity of nations would 
be furthered by the removal o f economic barriers. As in realism, liberal thought extends 
across both political and economic spheres. Neoclassical economist David Ricardo
61 "To the liberal tradition, the key to world order is less the balance of military power than 
it is the form of economic exchange and balance of fiscal power...commercial liberalism 
proceeds from the belief that open trading systems, less than military might, influence the 
prospects for peaceful politics. Once a country opens its markets to the world, democracy 
follows, for as the standard of living rises, so does the thirst for democracy, and 
democratic states behave less militantly than do closed economic and political systems." 
Justin Rosenberg, "What’s the Matter with Realism?” Review o f  International Studies 
16 (Apr. 1990): 285-303.
62Immanuel Kant, philosopher and proponent of human freedom, sets forth the principles 
of liberalism in his renowned work, To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, 
(Indianapolis: Hacket. 1983). chaps. 1-3. Kant professed that democracies are less prone 
to engage in war with one another because the consent of the citizenry is required... that 
there is mutual gain for nations involved in trade and commerce, and that shared 
commercial interests among nations has a pacifying effect. John Stuart Mill later wrote 
that ‘i t  is commerce which is rendering war obsolete by strengthening and multiplying 
the personal interests which act in natural opposition to it. And it may be said without 
exaggeration that the great extent and rapid increase of international trade, in being the 
principal guarantor of peace in the world, is the great permanent security for the 
uninterrupted progress of...the human race.” John Stuart Mill, Principles o f Political 
Economy (London: John W. Parker and Sons. 1848). 582.
63Kant, chaps. 1-3.
WU.S. President Woodrow Wilson, envisioned a universal utopian liberal democracy. As 
a founding father of liberalism, Wilson outlined his famous idealist agenda in his 
Fourteen Points Plan, in January 1918, at the Versailles Peace Conference. That “peace 
would also be furthered by the removal, in so far as possible, of all economic barriers,” 
was one of the 14 points elaborated in Wilson’s plan.
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affirmed the ideologies of Kant65 and Wilson66 in his seminal work On The Principles o f  
Political Economy and Taxation:
Under a system of perfectly free commerce, each country naturally 
devotes its capital and labor to such employments as are most beneficial 
to each. This pursuit of individual advantage is admirably connected with 
the universal goof of the whole. By stimulating industry, by rewarding 
ingenuity, and by using most efficaciously the peculiar power bestowed 
by nature, it distributes labour most effectively and economically, while, 
by increasing the general mass of productions, it diffuses general benefit, 
and binds together, by one common tie of interest and intercourse, the 
universal society of nations throughout the civilized world.67
Within the framework of liberalism, a global human rights regime has emerged in 
the twentieth century. which has been witnessed in the evolution of such international 
governmental and non-governmental groups as the U.N. Human Rights Commission, the 
International Court of Justice. Amnesty International and other organizations that 
promote the cause of human rights throughout the world. From the liberal perspective, 
humanitarian values drive foreign policy.
With these liberal principles in mind. Simon noted that ‘“the United States, under 
President William Clinton, had formulated a new foreign policy; the enlargement of free- 
market democracies to replace the containment of Soviet communism as the centerpiece 
of U.S. foreign policy."68 Simon contended that the interests of all nations were met
65Kant. chaps. 1-3.
^Wilson, Fourteen Points Plan.
67David Ricardo. On The Principles o f Political Economy and Taxation, 2 vols. 
(Cambridge: The University Press For The Royal Economic Society, 1953), 133-134.
68Simon, 5.
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under liberalist principles.69 The promotion of free-market democracies, according to 
Simon, would enhance the welfare o f all nations by promoting peace and prosperity.70
In an empirical study of the impact of China's rapid trade growth on various 
countries for the year of 1992, for example, Amdt, Hertal, Dimaranan, Huff and 
McDougall71 demonstrated that welfare gains of 0.1% change were realized by North 
America as China's growth increased. Their findings reflected the liberalist economic 
principle that international commercial exchange increases the welfare72 of those 
countries involved in the exchange. In another statistical study. Solomon W. Polachek 
employed a cross-sectional and longitudinal regression analysis of countries, and 
concluded that "the fundamental factor in causing cooperation among countries was 
trade.”73 This is because. Polachek conceded, •'countries seek a peaceful means to 
protect the wealth gained through international trade.”74
The liberalist argument was further reflected by Berger, who wrote that "if a
69Ibid„ 5.
70Ibid.. 5.
7|Channing Amdt. Thomas Hertal. Betina Dimaranan. Karen Huff and Robert 
McDougall. "China in 2005: Implications for the Rest of the World.” Journal o f  
Economic Integration 12. no. 4 (Dec. 1997): 523-525.
^Welfare is defined as the quality of life of individuals in society, or a standard of living 
based on "disposable income,” or that which individuals may spend in accordance with 
their preferences, over and above income required for the necessities of life.” Abraham 
Edel, Elizabeth Flower and Finbarr W. O’Connor," Human Rights, Justice, and 
Welfare.” in Morality, Philosophy, And Practice, eds. Abraham Edel, Elizabeth Flower 
and Finbarr W. O'Connor (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989): 586-596.
7jSo!omon W. Polachek. "Why Democracies Cooperate More and Fight Less: The 
Relationship Between International Trade and Cooperation,” Review o f  International 
Economics 5. no. 3 (1997): 305-306.
74Polachek. 306.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
37
socialist economy is opened up to increasing degrees of market forces, a point will be 
reached at which democratic governance becomes a possibility.”75 Lampton affirmed the 
view of Berger76 in his assertion that U.S. trade sanctions against China would only 
alienate those political factions in China who were supporting political and economic 
reform.77
Liberalism's embracement of free market capitalism was emphasized by 
Caporaso and Levine, who noted that "the market is designed to free individual initiative 
and self interest while assuring that choice replaces coercion.”78 Historically, the views 
of Caporaso and Levine79 were epitomized in the work of Schumpeter, in his thesis that 
"the discipline of industry and the market train people in economic rationalism.”80 
Economic rationalism. Schumpeter asserted, also individualizes, and rational individuals 
demand democratic governance.81 Comparably, in present time. Donlan maintained that 
"the world's freedom requires open borders for business-that mass markets require
75See Peter Berger. The Capitalist Revolution (New York: Basic Books, 1986). Gabriel 
A. Almond also explains that "the relation between capitalism and democracy dominates 
the political theory of the last two centuries. Capitalism is positively linked with 
democracy, shares its values and culture, and facilitates its development. This case has 
been made in historical, logical and statistical terms.” in Gabriel A. Almond, "Capitalism 
and Democracy.” Political Science and Politics (Sept. 1991): 467-474.
76Almond. 467-474.
77David M. Lampton. "Ending The MFN Battle.” NBR Analysis 8 (1997): 7-8.
78James A. Caporaso and David P. Levine. Theories o f  Political Economy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 1992), p. 160.
TOIbid.
“ Joseph Schumpeter. Imperialism and Social Classes (Cleveland: World Publishing, 
1955). 68.
81 Ibid.
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consumer sovereignty and the freedom to choose products. The freedom of choice, then, 
becomes natural.”®2 With regard to U.S.-China policy, Harland83 and Simon84 
maintained that the most effective way to promote U.S.-China relations was through the 
reciprocal opening of markets and the freedom to conduct business in those markets. 
Following the liberalist tradition, Harding recommended that U.S. economic engagement 
with China was the most viable measure to promote political reform in China and to 
sustain U.S.-China bilateral relations.85 Increased economic relations with China would 
then serve as a catalyst for the expansion of China's political, human rights and 
economic reforms.86 The opening of peaceful relations among countries through 
economic exchange was also highlighted in the U.S.-China policy position of Laura 
D'Andrea Tyson, who argued that U.S. revocation of China's MFN status would impede 
the progress of China's democratic reform.87
The idea of freedom of choice through a free-market enterprise system is not 
new. however. In 1776. Adam Smith introduced the concept of free choice through a 
free market in his economic and moral treatise The Wealth o f Nations, where he 
professed that "commerce allows the exercise of moral liberty--the freedom to choose—in
82Thomas G. Donlan. “Playing Favorites: The World's Freedom Requires Open Borders 
for Business." editorial, Barron's. 2 June 1997.62.
“ Harland, 52.
“ Simon. 210.
“ Harry Harding. “Asia Policv To The Brink.” Foreign Policy 94 (spring 1994/95):
70-71.
86lbid.
“ Laura D Andrea Tyson. “Are Economic Sanctions An Effective Tool For Realizing U.S. 
Interests In China?” NBR Analysis 8 (July 1997): 42-44.
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a civil society.”88 More than two centuries later, James Lilley expressed that rapid 
economic growth and Sino-U.S. joint business ventures had done more to improve 
human rights in China than repeated threats and unilaterally-imposed conditions.89
Concurring with Lilley.90 Garten and Zoellick91 emphasized that U.S. trade with 
and investment in China would pave the way to private enterprise, free markets, and the 
rule of law in China. The authors called this the “soft power” approach because of the 
indirect effects of U.S.-China commercial interactions that reach beyond the control of 
government.92 Levine also accentuated the positive benefits of integrated markets in his 
opinion that deepened economic integration among countries created a “convergence of 
economic systems organized along similar lines and moving toward similar levels of 
development.'*93
An extension of the liberal paradigm was the globalization approach. Simply 
put. globalization94 entails the international expansion of laissez-faire95 capitalism, or
88Adam Smith, as discussed by Doyle. 233.
89Lilley. 37.
"Ibid.
9|Jeffrey Garten and Robert Zoellick. Riding The Tigers: American Commercial 
Diplomacy In Asia (New York: Council On Foreign Relations, 1998), 13.
92Ibid.
93Levine. 54.
"The meaning of globalization is nebulous and has been subject to debate in both its 
extent and definition. For the purpose of discussion, two definitions of globalization are 
provided; 1) globalization is a “deregulation of financial markets, international mobility 
of capital, the rise o f corporate mergers and acquisitions, integration of business activities 
worldwide, establishment of integrated operations abroad (including R&D and financing), 
global sourcing for components, strategic alliances, the rise of information technology, 
where technology is the primary catalyst, the equalization of global patterns, the
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"deepened” economic interdependence among nations.96 Drawing on the work of 
Ohmae. the major conduit of globalization was the multinational corporation. 
"Globalization, with its well-run multinationals, looks for good markets, good workers, 
and they bring in exchange not private deals for officials but the promise of a better life 
for the people.”97 As far back as 1916. however. Clark addressed the social obligations 
of corporations in noting that "the responsibility of business in a democracy was to 
uphold the social obligations which are defined by the whole community.”98
Similarly, in 1967. Kaysen posited that "the large business corporation is in many
diminished role of national governments and parliaments and designs for a new 
generation of rules and institutions for global governance, a transformation of a state- 
centered analysis of the integration of world societies into a global political and economic 
system led by a core power, socio-cultural processes as centered on ‘One Earth'...the 
'globalisf movement-planetary citizens.” W. Ruigrok and R. Van Tulder. "The Ideology 
of Interdependence.” Ph.D. dissertation. University of Amsterdam. Amsterdam, Holland. 
1993. in States Against Markets, eds. Robert Boyer and Daniel Drache (New York: 
Routledge. 1996). 66.: 2) globalization is "an increased global mobility of goods, 
services, capital and employers, and the subsequent increased international integration of 
markets for goods, services and capital.” in Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too 
Far? (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1997), I.
95 As illuminated by George Cho, the theory of laissez-faire is that "all participants benefit 
from specialization and exchange. Often, the term laissez-faire is used synonymously 
with free trade.” Free trade is defined as "that trade in which goods can be imported and 
exported without any barriers in the form of tariffs, physical quotas or any kind of 
restriction.” George Cho, Trade. Aid and Global Interdependence (New York:
Routledge. 1995), 125.
%Ohmae elaborated this view in his "Declaration of Interdependence Toward the World- 
2005.” in Kenichi Ohmae. The Borderless World: Power and Strategy In The Interlinked 
Economy (New York: Harper Perennial. 1991), 216-217. Ohmae's "Declaration of 
Interdependence” parallels the utopian vision of Woodrow Wilson, as in a unified global 
community united by free-market democracies.
970hmae. 195.
98J.M. Clark. "The Changing Basis of Economic Responsibility,” Journal o f Political 
Economy I Mar. 1916), 209-229.
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ways the characteristic institution of American society.”99 The corporation, Kaysen 
stipulated, reflected three underlying social features; 1) its open, egalitarian character. (2) 
the rationalization and transformation of production technologies, and (3) the growth of 
aggregate and per capita income, which together have created a mass middle class over 
the past generations.100 These American values are extended into the global market by 
way of the corporation. Kaysen asserted. More precisely, what is good for America is 
good for the rest of the world.
Based on the opinions of Clark101 and Kaysen.102 Garten recommended that firms 
serve as facilitators for improved human rights practices in countries in which they are 
located.103 Bernstein and Dicker, as well, underscored the positive role of corporations 
in promoting democratic values of individual freedom and human rights.104 The authors 
asserted that "Washington must press the corporate community to act on its claim that 
business can be a positive force for human rights.”105 In consonant, Graham found that 
most studies on the impact of national policy on globalization alluded to the potential 
benefits global firms could bring to societies, and that "national policies could even
‘'“’Carl Kaysen. "The Business Corporation as a Creator of Values,” in Human Values And 




'^Jeffrey E. Garten. "Business and Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 76, no.3 
(May/June 1997): 71.
104Robert L. Bernstein and Richard Dicker. "Human Rights First,” Foreign Policy 
(Sept. 1994/95): 43-47.
l0'Bemstein and Dicker. 45.
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disrupt or interfere with those benefits.'”06 As Ohmae noted, the age of the superpower 
has past and has been replaced with an economic interdependence107 of nations, which 
allows individuals access to the best and cheapest goods and services.108
One of the outcomes of market liberalization has been the deepening of U.S.- 
China economic relations through the U.S. private sector, as explained by Lardy.109 
Lardy discerned that over the past decade. U.S. corporations have exported advanced 
machinery and transportation equipment to China to help forward China's marketization 
and modernization plans. Reciprocally, China's industries have exported finished 
consumer goods to the U.S. at prices the average American consumer can afford.110 
According to the economic principles of the division of labor and specialization, 
professed by Adam Smith,111 the U.S.-China economic relationship is a win-win
106Edward M. Graham, Global Corporations and National Governments (Washington, 
D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1996). 42.
l07Robert O. Keohane defined interdependence as "situations characterized by reciprocal 
effects among countries or among actors in different countries. Interdependence most 
simply defined, means mutual dependence. Keohane contrasts the meaning of 
interdependence with the meaning of complex interdependence, the latter being a far 
broader issue because it involves the entire international arena and a network of 
multilateral institutions. Keohane and Nye. Power and Interdependence. 206.8.
108Ohmae. 216-217.
ll)9NichoIas R. Lardy. China in the World Economy (Washington. D.C.: Institute for 
International Economics. 1994). 116-117.
""Lardy. 116-117.
'"As Adam Smith proclaimed. "The greatest improvement in the productive powers of 
labour, and the greater part of the skill, dexterity, and judgment with which it is any 
where directed, or applied, seem to have been the effects of the division of labour.” Adam 
Smith, An Inquiry Into The Nature And Causes O f The Wealth o f  Nations (New York:
The Modem Library, 1994), 3-23. Much o f Smith’s economic philosophy was based on 
de Mandeville; "No number of men, when once they enjoy quiet, and no man needs to 
fear his neighbor, will be long without learning to divide and subdivide their labour.”
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proposition. Unlike realism, which claims that morality is relative and subject to the 
interpretations of different societies, morality in liberalism is thought to be absolute.112 
In Kant's first proposition on morality, he explained that an unqualified "good will” was 
sufficient by itself, and that it made no difference whether or not one’s actions of "good 
will" were a success or a failure.113 "Kantian moral theory assumes the existence of a 
single pattern of moral reasoning. The abstract rational process is presumed to bear a 
single and universal result, irrespective of different cultures.”114
The universalist conception of human rights was strongly illustrated in the work 
of John Rawls who held the opinion that human rights were of the civil and political 
kind.115 The basis for Rawls’ liberalist perspective on human rights was that he believed 
that "the most distinctive feature of human nature is our ability to choose our own
Bernard de Mandeville. Fable o f the Bees (1723). 335.
I12lmmanuel Kant. Kant on the Foundation o f Morality: A Modern Version o f The 
Grundlegung (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1970). 40-45.
1 'J”The moral merit of an agent of goodness of his character does not depend upon the 
achievement of the intended result. If an agent acts from good will, then he acquires just 
as much moral credit for his action, whether he fails or succeeds.” Kant, 41-45.
luAlison Dundes Renteln. International Human Rights: (Jniversalism Versus Relativism 
(Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1990), 50.
115Ben Rogers, "Behind The Veil: John Rawls And The Revival of Liberalism,”
Lingua franca 9. no. 5 (Jul./Aug. 1999):. 58. Rogers makes a distinction with regard to
the liberalism of Rawls... "Because Rawls insists that taking rights seriously means taking 
social equality seriously, he is, indeed, a more radical egalitarian theorist than is 
generally acknowledged, one considerably to the left of traditional welfare-state
liberals...” In Rawlsian liberalism, Rogers asserts, equal political and civil liberties 
overlap with a fair distribution of the wealth., p. 64. For a more precise argument on this, 
refer to John Rawls, The Theory o f Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University. 1971). chap. 3. where Rawls speaks of the “original position.”
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ends.”116 Rawls distinguished that "our most fundamental duty in dealing with our fellow 
citizens is to respect this capacity for autonomy.”117 In the tradition of Kant118 and 
Rawls."9 Doyle insisted that "the liberal priority of freedom sets the parameters for
global justice.”120
Jeffrey Isaac, in examining the political philosophy of Hannah Arendt. uncovered 
Arendt's liberal universalist perspective on human rights.121 Isaac explained that Arendt. 
in her discussion of the politics o f human dignity, theorized that “local, regional and 
global forms of citizenship were equally possible and equally real.”122 Isaac further 
observed that Arendt's vision of a global collective empowerment, central to such groups 
as the Helsinki Citizens Assembly123 and Amnesty International, would call attention to 
human rights abuses and would empower citizens to act collectively to further the 
expansion of universal human rights. Arendt's political theory, as interpreted by Isaac, 






121Jeffrey C. Isaac. “A New Guarantee on Earth: Hannah Arendt on Human Dignity and 
the Politics of Human Rights.” American Political Science Review 90. no. 1 (Mar.
1996): 71-72.
122Ibid.
123The Helsinki Citizens Assembly was formed in 1990 by links between East European 
dissidents and West European peace activists, after the 1975 Helsinki Accords. Ibid., p. 
71.
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Morality in liberal theory was further evidenced in the human rights position of Neier, 
who argued that press freedom, prohibition of detention without trial, and the right of all 
persons to be free from cruel and arbitrary punishment, were fundamental rights of all
human beings.'24
Van Ness, in speaking of human rights issues in Sino-American relations, 
recommended that policy-makers from the United States and China give the same 
priority to human rights issues as they do to economic and strategic issues.125 The author 
reflected the liberal universalist perspective that state governments comply with 
international human rights treaties in a collective effort to protect human rights 
throughout the globe.
Moral issues, of course, cross into the economic realm, as Adam Smith defined in 
his moral and economic philosophy. In his 1776 treatise. The Wealth o f  Nations, Smith 
addressed morality in his assertion that "free commerce allows the exercise of moral 
liberty."126 Smith's view on morality served as the foundation for those liberal scholars 
and practitioners127 who were of the opinion that free trade would lead to a freer people, 
and more specifically, that greater U.S. economic ties with China would hasten China's 
political and human rights reforms.
l24Aryeh Neier. “Asian's Unacceptable Standard.” Foreign Policy (fall 1993): 43.
’"5Peter Van Ness. “Addressing the Human Rights Issue in Sino-American Relations,” 
Journal o f International Affairs 42, no. 2 (winter 1996): 330-331.
126Adam Smith, as discussed by Doyle, 233.
l_7Lilley. 37; Schumpeter. 68; Doyle. 233; Donlan, 62; Harding, 70-71.
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Kidder discussed morality from the perspective of the market and concluded that 
the moral obligations of states in the future demand a focus on the way corporations and 
markets should be regulated, and that these regulations should lie in a body of 
international law that would encompass a '‘global code of ethics.”128 According to these 
liberal views, morality and its encompassing concern for human rights can influence U.S. 
foreign policy decisions.
The strength of the liberalist argument is that, in its principle that free trade leads 
to peace among nations, liberal theory reaches beyond the strictly power-based motives 
of realism. Liberal theory, in its focus on international institutions and economic 
interdependence opens the parameters for evaluating state behavior because it reaches 
beyond a state-centered analysis. The liberalist argument, therefore, with its focus on the 
economic and political interdependence of states, is useful in explaining decisions made 
by American policy-makers where international cooperation and multilateral solutions 
are required.
The liberalist argument may be useful in explaining U.S. policy decisions 
pertaining to pressing transnational issues as human rights violations, ethnic conflict, 
migration, environmental decay, refugee crises, as well as the personal security of 
individuals and groups. Such personal securities include the security of food, shelter, 
personal safety and employment. These personal securities, of course, can be considered 
universal to all societies. They extend across nations and across national borders.
'■sRushworth M. Kidder, “An Ethical Vision of Statecraft,” Foreign Service Journal 
71 (Dec. 1994): 34.
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U.S. policy-makers who base their decisions on the liberalist argument may have 
such idealistic notions in mind as the liberal tenets of a global village of peace, freedom 
and harmony achieved through the avenues of international economic exchange.
Through economic exchange, global consumers benefit from the freedom of choice of 
products and services. The products and services they choose effect which products 
corporations produce, suggesting that citizens, as consumers, are an influential part of 
the global market-driven economy. Liberalism, for example, because of its emphasis on 
international trade as a carrier of peace, may have strong utility in explaining U. S. 
decisions on foreign trade policy.
The weakness of the liberalist argument, however, is that it may underestimate 
the importance of the concern of survival as a motivation for state behavior. This 
survival would include perceived or real security threats. Thus liberal theory may lack 
explanatory power for U.S. decisions on national security. Further, as Morganthau129 
has warned, ulterior motives of some policy-makers may be hidden under the guise of 
liberal altruism. Additionally, liberal theory, because of its universalist foundation that 
“what is good for one is good for all,” may not fully be useful in explaining U.S. foreign 
policy behavior. The theory, for example, may be too idealistic in its belief that all 
nations have the same shared mutual interests and values. For example, who is to 
determine who is best for all? Not every country is democratic, nor wishes to be 
followers of the American free market version. As Haass explained:
I29Morganthau. 224.
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The active promotion of democracy is a luxury policy-makers cannot 
always afford. The United States has no choice but to overlook a lack of 
democracy with friends of the Persian Gulf, where energy and security 
take precedence. At the same time, a foreign policy predicated on 
spreading democracy can be difficult to implement vis-a-vis our foes, 
either because we lack the means to influence them or because we have 
more pressing concerns. Thus, a democratic North Korea would be nice, 
but in the meantime we had better focus on Pyongyang’s nuclear 
ambitions. Similarly, we would like to see China demonstrate greater 
respect for human rights, but for now we need China’s help with North 
Korea while we seek access to its enormous market. And even when it is 
agreed that promoting democracy should take precedence, the fact 
remains that engineering foreign societies is an always difficult and often 
dangerous business.130
Furthermore, economic and political liberalists may exaggerate the role of 
corporations in their ability to enhance the standard of living of global citizenries 
through economic exchange, or investment. The liberalist argument, for example, may 
overlook the fact that international economic exchange may not serve to enhance the 
welfare of all because of the macroeconomic policies of individual states that can effect, 
both positively and negatively, a state’s internal distribution of resources.
Richardson, for example, elaborated on this view. “Global commerce is 
undergoing a transformation as firms are becoming mobile, sharing technologies and 
management, and forming alliances with competing multinational corporations.
The liberal theory of international political economy has not confronted these new 
realities of corporate behavior.”131 Unlike the pacifying effect of commercial relations
L'°Haass. 46.
,JlNeil R. Richardson, “ International Trade as a Force for Peace,” in States or Markets? 
Neoliberalism and the Development Policy Debate, eds. Christopher Colclough and 
James Manor (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). Although, “Richardson 
vindicates the liberal vision, where he states that major commercial states are trying to 
collaborate, reflecting that collective management would be necessary for prosperity.”
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that the liberal theory espouses, “the new corporate patterns are occasionally interstate
rivalry and conflict.”132
RADICALISM
Grounded in sub-theories of class conflict, exploitation of labor, and imperialism, 
espoused in the teachings of Karl Marx, Frederick Engels133 and V.I. Lenin,134 followers 
of radicalism analyze U.S. foreign policy behavior from the classic Marxist-Leninist 
sense. Like the utopian world envisioned by Woodrow Wilson, radical thought also 
holds its own utopian vision. One in which there is a “socialist future of abundance, no 
markets, no money, no wages, and no production for exchange. The division of labor 
would be overcome, and the state would wither away. The administration of men would
Kegley. “The Neoliberal Challenge.” 249-250.
l32Richardson, Ibid.
lj3Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Communist Manifesto (New York: International 
Publishers. 1994), 3-44.
b4V.I. Lenin. Imperialism: The Highest Stage o f Capitalism (Moscow: Foreign 
Languages Publishing House, 1947), 107-109. Lenin labeled imperialism the highest 
stage of capitalism: “Imperialism is capitalism in that stage of development in which the 
dominance of monopolies and finance capital has established itself, in which the export 
of capital has acquired pronounced importance, in which the division of the world among 
international trusts has begun, in which the division of all territories of the globe among 
the great capitalist powers has been completed.” At this stage, Marx predicted the demise 
of capitalism. “The essential condition for the existence of capitalism is wage labor. The 
development of modem industry cuts from under its feet the very foundation on which the 
bourgeoisie produces. What the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, are its own 
grave diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable.” Marx and 
Engels. 21.
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be replaced by the administration of things.”135 Marx viewed international economic 
exchange as a form of exploitation of wage laborers [the proletariat] by the bourgeoisie:
It [the bourgeoisie] has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and 
in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that 
single, unconscionable freedom-Free Trade. In one word, exploitation, 
veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, 
shameless, direct, brutal exploitation.136
Economic relations among states, according to Marx, were nothing more than the 
satisfaction of ever-increasing wants that require the products of distant lands.137 Similar 
to the realist school of isolationism. Marx believed that international commerce destroys 
the foundation of national industries and the self-sufficiency of nations.138 Radical 
theory is guided by the relationship between capital and labor, whereby capital gradually 
displaces and usurps labor. Radical theorists believe that there is a constant struggle 
between labor and owners of capital which create class divisions and inequalities within 
an economic system.
David Shambaugh explained that **the primary focus of Marxian analysis is
lj5KarI Marx, as discussed by Alec Nove. “Some Thoughts on Plan and Market,”in State 
and Market in Development, Synergy or Rivalry?. eds. Louis Putterman and Dietrich 
Rueschemever (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 1992), 39.
l36Marx and Engels, 11.
I37lbid., 12.
lj8"In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have 
intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations...The bourgeoisie, by 
the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated 
means of communication, draws all nations, even the most barbarian, into civilization. It 
compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of 
production...creating a world after its own image.” Marx and Engels, 12-13.
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economic. The principal actors are monopoly capitalists and their multinational 
corporations, creating an international dominant elite class. And the main geographical 
targets of an imperialist agenda are the developing countries.*’139 Based on this view, 
radicals, for example, would view the U.S.-China economic relationship as exploitative, 
with China as a target of a U.S. imperialistic expansion in the search for more wealth by 
exploiting the Chinese labor force and subverting the Chinese regime.140
In accordance with radical theory, Streeten criticized liberalism in his contention 
that the predatory state inevitably acts in its own self-interest and that of powerful 
pressure groups; that there is no place for disinterested, benign, altruistic government 
policies; only the forces of the free market are capable of advancing the society.141 
Streeten denigrated market-based liberalism because he thought that in its own 
successful function, the market overlooks the inequitable distribution of resources and 
power.142 He referred to Amartya Sen to clarify his point, where Sen analyzed famines 
and concluded that even though total food supply was adequate, the purchasing power 
(or entitlements) of the poor had declined. “In those conditions the market was all too 
successful while the people starved.”143
Radical theory was discussed in the context of post-CoId War globalization by
L'9Shambaugh. 235.226-227.
140As Marx conveyed. “The cheap prices of its [the bourgeoisie’s] commodities are the 
heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the 
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Robinson.144 Robinson maintained that the United States, as the global hegemon, was 
leading an emergent transnational elite backed by the power of transnational capital 
concomitant with a decrease in state power.145 "Economic globalization generates 
pressures for integration into a single political regime. Polyarchy is the emergent global 
political superstructure.”146 Robinson further observed that this emergent superstructure 
provides the basis for a new world order patterned after the Gramscian147 model of 
hegemony.14* In the radical interpretation. U.S. foreign policy is predicated on 
competing elite groups that create a global structure of social inequalities and 
imbalances.
Radical theory was further conveyed by Rogowski.149 who. in applying the 




t47Robinson explains that Gramsci's hegemony is a “consensus protected by the 'armor of 
coercion.' and the political superstructures of a coherent social order always combine 
both coercive and consensual-based elements (whether authoritarian or democratic)...also 
that transitions to polyarchy do not involve eliminating coercive apparatus but 
subordinating that apparatus to civilian elites.” Ibid.. 628-629.
I48lbid.. 654.
149Ronald Rogowski. "Political Cleavages And Changing Exposure To Trade,” American 
Political Science Review 81, no. 4 (Dec. 1987): 1121-1122.
I50"ln 1944. Wolfgang Stolpher and Paul Samuelson examined the gains and losses from 
trade protection. "They showed that in any society, protection benefits-and trade 
liberalization harms -owners of factors in which that society is poorly endowed, relative 
to the rest of the world, and conversely, that protection harms-and trade liberalization 
benefits those owners of factors the given society holds abundantly relative to the rest of 
the world." Robinson, 1122. inciting Wolfgang Friedrich Stolpher and Paul A. 
Samuelson, ^Protection and Real Wages,” Review o f  Economic Studies 9 (1944): 58-73.
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domestic and political class cleavages. Rogowski defined his theory of political and 
class cleavages within regional areas. “The land rich and still underdeveloped economies 
of Latin America find that expanding trade displaces “populist” coalitions of labor and 
capital and bring renewed influence to the landed sectors. The areas of Asia and southern 
Europe that are economically backward and abundant only in labor, experience labor 
militancy, and in a few cases, revolutionary workers movements. The few economies 
rich in both capital and land-principal ly those of North America, Australia and New 
Zealand, experience class conflict and a suppression of labor as international trade 
increases.”151 Noam Chomsky also reflected the radical ideology of an international 
capitalist class as the dominant global power. An international class war and a north- 
south divide fueled by "supranational” corporations and financial institutions, dominated 
the world economy.152 In his thesis. "NAFTA: The Masters of Mankind,” Chomsky 
labeled supranational corporations and financial institutions as the "masters” that 
dominate the world economy, including international Unde regimes.153 Serving the 
interests of corporations and financial institutions, Chomsky contended, were the IMF. 
the World Bank, the Group of 7 industrialized nations, the GATT/WTO and various
Rogowski further points out that, in fact, the Stolper Samuelson theorem is an extension 
of Heckscher-Olin theorem, which states that ■'under free trade, countries export products 
whose manufacture uses locally abundant, and import products whose manufacture uses 
locally scarce factors intensively.” Rogowski. “Political Cleavages And Changing 
Exposure To Trade. 1134, note 1.
l51Rogowski. 1130-1131.
'"'Noam Chomsky. Notes on NAFTA: The Masters o f  Mankind, 2 September 1997, 
on-line, available from http:// daisy.uwaterIoo.ca/~alopez-o/politics/chomnafta.html.
,53Ibid.
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other institutions, all together shaping a new "de facto world government and a new 
imperial age.”154
Similarly. Bienefeld examined globalization during the post-Cold War era and 
concluded that globalist policy was "a new form of imperialism.”155 An imperialism that 
is '"dominated by a single hegemonic power seeking to establish a liberalized global 
economy, though, one in which the hegemonic power maintains the right to make 
exceptions when it so chooses.”156 Bienefeld qualified that the imperialism of the new 
world order gave the hegemonic power greater ability to supersede national 
sovereignty.157 The United States, therefore, as the reigning hegemon, in Bienefeld's 
opinion, would be seen as imperialistic in its foreign policy motives. Inimical to the free 
market tenets of liberal theory. Bienefeld condemned free market ideology, and thought 
that economies should be politically controlled.158 On the other hand. Silbey159 
emphasized that globalization was not simply a matter of a shift of jurisdiction from the 
nation-state to the globe, but rather *‘a change in how the collective life of individuals 
were to be governed-- a shift from politics to economics-- that all land, labor and 
resources be available for exchange through commodification and pricing."160 Like
,54Ibid.
l55Manfred Bienefeld. “The New World Order: echoes of a new imperialism,” Third 
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Robinson161 and Bienefeld.162 Silbey viewed globalization as a form of “postmodern 
colonialism” that undermined the social justice of individuals and the sovereignty of 
nations.163 In this same light, regarding U.S.-China policy, for example, Perez argued 
that U.S. trade pressures on China were a method of the U.S. ruling class to dismantle 
China's state-owned property and to allow the property to fall into the control of U.S. 
corporations.164
Wallerstein described the post-Cold War era as a "black period” for liberalists 
because the egalitarian promises of global liberalism were not kept. Rather, liberalism 
created a dominant elite, and excluded a large segment of the world’s population from 
sharing in economic and political beliefs.165 Similarly. Sweezy predicted the decline of 
American global power in the 1990's, and in its replace, a structure of competing trade
161 Robinson. 654.
162Bienefeld, 31.
16jSilbev defined postmodern colonialism as "an achievement of advanced capitalism and 
technological innovation seeking a world free from restraints on the opportunity to invent 
and to invest. It is a world in which size and scale in terms of numbers of persons (who 
can produce), and numbers of outlets (to disseminate and place the products), and capital 
(to purchase both labor and land) determine the capacity to saturate local cultures.” 
Silbey. 219-220.
164David Perez, "Behind U.S. trade sanctions against China.” Workers World (Feb.
16. 1995): 11.
165Wallerstein. 14. The author further clarified that the capitalist world economy had 
pursued the logic of its ceaseless accumulation of capital so unremittingly that it was 
approaching its theoretical idea, the commodification of everything.” Also relevant is that 
in 1993. Wallerstein wrote that “liberalism and its tenet of free-raarket enterprise had 
collapsed, in the Marxian sense, because of its very success...in Immanuel Wallerstein, 
"The World System After The Cold War.” Journal o f  Peace Research 30, no.l (1993): 5.
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and currency blocks, or "competing imperialisms.”166 Accompanying the decline of 
American imperialism would be. according to Sweezy, the end of imperialism’s guiding 
light, liberal capitalism.167
Radical theory was examined from the moral perspective by J. Philip 
Wogaman.168 Referring to Karl Marx, as the father of socialist thought, Wogaman 
concluded that Marx rejected any ideological thinking. Economic and social matters, 
according to Wogaman's interpretation of Marx, were fully scientific and therefore not 
dependent upon value judgment.169 Although, Wogaman qualified, this was not to 
negate that socialist philosophy did not have moral appeal. Marx’s theory of historical 
materialism was based on a very human concept-- that man should not be separated from 
the fruits of labor- which are the very "life essence.”170 In agreement, Graham thought 
that the Marxian quest to transform workers in society was not in itself a moral 
imperative, but that it was linked closely to morality because of its human concern.171 
Ryan also examined Marx from a moral point of view and concluded that "Marx both
166Paul M. Sweezy. "U.S. Imperialism In The 1990’s,” Review o f the Month (Oct. 16. 
1989): 15.
167This decline holds true to Marxist-Leninist theory, where Lenin labeled imperialism 
the highest stage of capitalism. It is at this stage that Lenin predicted the demise of 
capitalism.
I68J. Philip Wogaman. The Great Economic Debate: An Ethical Analysis (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press. 1977). 19.
169 Wogaman, 19.
170Ibid„ 59.
171 Keith Graham. "Morality, Individuals and Collectives,” in Moral Philosophy and 
Contemporary Problems, ed. J.D.G. Evans (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1988). 17.
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appeared to condemn capitalism as unjust and immoral, and at the same time disparaged 
all moral assessments as futile and intellectually worthless.”172
On the other hand, Edel, Flower and O’Connor regarded that in radical theory,
“no general principles could really be understood apart from the relations o f functions— 
the modes of production and distribution, material changes taking place in technology, 
the shift in social institutions and class struggle.”173 The writers clarified, however, that 
morality did exist in radical theory to the extent that whatever morals there were in a 
society were those of the ruling class— its concept of the good life, obligations and 
responsibilities.174 Similarly. Meyers noted that ethics existed in radical theory only in 
the context of class struggle, or in efforts to wipe out the bourgeois and their false 
notions of right and wrong.175 According to the radicalist argument, such moral 
concerns as human rights abuses, would play no role, or at best, a limited role in U.S. 
foreign policy.
The strength of the radical paradigm as an explanation for U.S. behavior is that it 
accounts for actions that may be overlooked by other theoretical approaches. The 
theory's focus on an emergent post-Cold War international capitalist class, for example, 
may account for ulterior motives in U.S. foreign policy decisions. With emphasis on the
172Alan Ryan. “Justice. Exploitation and the End of Morality,”in Moral Philosophy and 
Contemporary Problems, ed. J.D.G. Evans (New York: Cambridge University Press. 
1988). 117-127.
173Abraham Edel, Elizabeth Flower and Finbarr O’Connor, “Marxian Ethics,” in 
eds. Abraham Edel. Elizabeth Flower and Finbarr O’Connor. 391-393.
l74Edel. Flower and O’Connor. 393.
l75Meyers. 31.
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corporation as the carrier of the power of the capitalist class, radical theory may explain 
U.S. efforts to expand capital markets and corporations throughout the globe. 
Radicalism's strength may also be in its ability to explain U.S. foreign economic policy 
failures. Radical theory, for example, may more easily account for the widening national 
and global wage gaps between the bourgeois and the proletariat classes.176 In its 
principle of a purely equitable and classless society, radicalism may more readily predict 
and identify economic policy that creates social imbalances within the world system.
However, radicalism's premise that the behavior of capitalist states is solely 
guided by corporate interests and financial institutions is somewhat myopic. Radicalism 
neglects to consider such broader international interests as international regimes, 
international organizations, and above all. a global economic interdependence of nations 
that results in international cooperation rather than immisseration. As well, the radical 
version of hegemonic theory neglects to see that states are restrained from acting 
alone.177 and therefore, the domination of a single imperialist aggressor may be abated or 
challenged by another. Moreover, radicalism fails to acknowledge that governments
176As Chomsky illustrates. "The international class war is reflected in the United States, 
where real wages have fallen to the level of the mid-1960's...At the international level. 
Chomsky reported that "protectionist measures of the industrialized countries reduce 
national income in the South by about twice the amount of official aid to the region— aid 
that is itself largely export promotion, most of it directed to richer sectors (less needy, but 
better consumers). These practices, along with the programs dictated by the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank, have helped double the gap between rich and poor 
countries since 1960. Resource transfers from the poor to the rich amounted to more than 
$400 billion from 1982 to 1990.'’ Chomsky, Notes on NAFTA.
l77Morganthau explained that "the actual interdependence of nations and the actual 
political, military and economic dependence of certain nations upon others may make it 
difficult or impossible for certain nations to pursue independent domestic and foreign 
policies." Morganthau. 304.
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have the capacity, both domestically and collectively, to regulate corporations, and that 
even under the strictest "free market” mechanism, governments and corporations can and 
do work in synergy, and that there is, by nature, a check between the public and the 
private sectors.178 For example, Huszagh. Huszagh and Hanks179 noted that in the United 
States, there is a two-way interaction between the firm and the government. "Monetary 
policies are exercised by the Federal Reserve through controls over the money supply, 
interest rates and reserve requirements. The Congressional and Executive branches 
control fiscal policy through tax legislation and spending programs.”180 These individual 
and collective actions, along with free market policies, the authors argued, can influence 
industries, and in turn, industries can shape government policy.181
SUMMARY
U.S. trade policy toward China is complex. This chapter has considered 
competing theoretical perspectives which have provided a basis for analysis of the 1994
l78For further insights, see Robert A. Dahl, "Why All Democratic Countries Have Mixed 
Economies.”in Democratic Community, eds. John W. Chapman and Ian Shapiro (New 
York: New York University Press. 1998). 279. Here, Dahl states that "all democratic 
countries have not only rejected a centralized command economy as an alternative to a 
market economy, but have also rejected a strictly free market economy as an alternative to 
a mixed economy in which market outcomes are substantially modified by government 
intervention."
l79Sandra M. Huszagh. Fredrick W. Huszagh and Gwen F. Hanks, "Macroeconomic 
Conditions and International Marketing Management.” International Marketing Review.
9. no. 1 (1992): 6.
I8ulbid.
181 Ibid.
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decision regarding China’s human rights practices and MFN. The realist literature 
consisted of two perspectives. Those scholars and practitioners who advocated U.S. 
economic engagement with states, and those who advocated isolationism. Both realist 
perspectives were driven by the need to protect U.S. interests from outside threats, such 
as the threat of a resurgence of communism, or the threat of military’ aggression. The 
former realist perspective was based upon the notion that economic engagement with 
states would prevent states from acting unilaterally in economic decisions.
Alliances among like-minded governments and the support of liberal trade and 
multilateralism helped to assure the U.S. economic and military hegemony.182 The latter 
realist perspective of isolationism, which represented a much smaller school, was 
premised on the notion that trade with and investment in "rogue states” could provide the 
wealth that could fuel a state's military capabilities which, in turn, could potentially 
threaten the United States. Insofar as morality was concerned, moral considerations, in 
realist theory, were not an issue and therefore did not drive U.S. foreign policy.
Scholars of political and economic liberalism stressed that U.S. economic 
engagement with states would enhance the welfare of all. and would therefore hasten the 
pace of political and human rights reforms in China and elsewhere throughout the world. 
As opposed to realism, where morality played no role in U.S. foreign policy, morality 
was a significant factor in policies guided by liberalist principles. U.S. trade with China, 
for example, was considered to be the moral thing to do because it enhanced the lives of 
peoples of both nations and introduced the concept of freedom of choice, with the intent 
that the freedom to choose products in a ffee-market economy would pave the way for
l82Haass. 43-45.
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further individual political rights and freedoms. Whether labeled imperialism, neo­
imperialism, or neocolonialism, advocates of radical theory viewed the United States as 
the imperialistic aggressor toward developing countries. American monopoly capital and 
multinational corporations were at the root of the inequitable world order. The 
inequitable world order created an international capitalist class with the United States as 
the core capitalist power. Radicals viewed U.S. economic relations with states as 
avenues of exploitation. Multinational corporations were the culprits in their efforts to 
dismantle national industries and the self-sufficiency of nations. In the radical view, 
corporate interests are key to U.S. trade policy. Morality, as in realism, was not a factor 
in the radical argument.
In the final analysis, no singular school of thought can serve as an explanation for 
U.S. foreign policy decisions. The restructuring of states and the transnationalization of 
firms during the post-Cold war era have encouraged many scholars to reassess traditional 
approaches to the analyses of political and economic events. For example, Rodrik. 
follower of the neoclassical economic school.183 criticized those economists who 
advocated globalization because he believed that globalization did not assure a benefit to 
all. Globalization. Rodrik argued, had widened the global skill gap causing social 
tensions between highly-skilled groups and unskilled or semi-skilled labor groups.184
183 Rodrik. 3-7. Rodrik. in explaining his opinion, remarked that “When I mention 
economists. I am referring to mainstream economists, as represented by neoclassical 
economists, of which I count myself as one.”
184Rodrik pointed to the asymmetry between two groups that occur as trade and 
investment expand across national borders. “The first group consists of owners o f 
capital, highly-skilled workers and many professionals who are free to take their 
resources where they are most in demand. The second group consists of unskilled or 
semiskilled workers and most middle managers (who are not mobile) Thus globalization
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Rodrik suggested maintaining a balance between the market and society-- one 
that would promote private enterprise without undermining social cohesion.185 
Schlesinger, as well, did not see the utopian picture of the dedicated liberalist. Though 
not a self-proclaimed radical. Schlesinger predicted the decline of U.S. foreign policy 
driven by laissez-faire ideology because of the problems the market cannot solve. 
"Unbridled capitalism, with low wages, long hours, and exploited workers, excites social 
resentment, revives class warfare, and infuses Marxism with new life.”186 Schlesinger 
may not have been advocating the radical view, but rather an alternative form of 
humanized capitalism. In further emphasis of the transitional phase of theoretical 
schools, Ruggie noted that even Kissinger, "the master practitioner of the realist craft”187 
remarked that •'without the Soviet threat, realism by itself cannot suffice to frame U.S. 
foreign policy- that realism must be coupled with a vision that provided the American 
public with a sense of hope and possibility that are in their essence, conjectural.”188 
Chapter two has provided the theoretical framework which will serve as the 
foundation for more detailed analysis of the 1994 U.S. decision to delink China's human
creates a greater elasticity of demand for the services of individuals because large 
segments of the working population can be substituted with working groups across 
borders. This, for example, has increased the skill premium in the United States and has 
lowered the skill premium in China.” Rodrik. 4. 13.
I85lbid.
186Arthur Schlesinger. Jr.. "Has Democracy a Future?” Foreign Affairs (SeptVOct. 1997) 
1 1 .
l87John Gerard Ruggie. "The Past as Prologue? Interests. Identity, and American Foreign 
Policy.” International Security. 21, no. 4 (spring 1997): 92, in citing Henry 
Kissinger. Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 835.
I88lbid.
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rights practices from most-favored-nation status. The following chapter offers an 
historical perspective of the U.S.-China bilateral trade relationship and will establish an 
historical linkage between international trade and human rights in U.S. foreign policy.
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CHAPTER III 
THE EVOLUTION OF U.S.- CHINA TRADE POLICY
In the preceding chapter, the literature review placed U.S. foreign policy, in 
particular. U.S. foreign economic policy, in the broader perspective, discussing scholarly 
works within the context of traditional schools of thought. But to grasp more fully the 
1994 decision to separate most-favored-nation status from human rights, an historical 
view is necessary. In this chapter, U.S. trade policy toward China and the linkage of 
trade and human rights are discussed from the perspective of the past, leading up to the 
year in which the decision was made.
The chapter weaves a net through U.S. presidential administrations and their 
trade policies toward China, addressing international and domestic events that influenced 
those policies, both in the United States and China. In discussing the historical linkage 
of trade and human rights, the chapter explains avenues through which the United States 
has exercised economic leverage to advance human rights throughout the world. Finally, 
the chapter provides a synopsis o f the MFN/human rights debate and the immediate 
political events that surrounded the presidential decision to renew China’s most-favored- 
nation trading status without human rights conditions.
HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS
The United States and China have been engaging in trade, at least on a minimal 
scale, for centuries. U.S. commercial contacts with China began soon after
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independence from British rule. Barred from the prosperous “sugar triangle” trade with 
the British Caribbean islands, merchants of the U.S. eastern seaboard cities found the 
China trade, particularly tea from Canton, to be a partial replacement for the lost West 
Indies trade.1 As U.S. companies developed, they expanded to new markets in search of 
new and greater resources. From the early nineteenth century to 1948-49. at the time of 
China's takeover by the communist party. China was part of this expansion.2
The first U.S. investments in China were found in Canton, in the year 1786. two 
years after Canton was opened to American trade. U.S. enterprises, mainly from Boston 
and New York, took advantage of the opportunity to buy Chinese teas, cloths and silks in 
exchange for American furs, specie and such agricultural products as tobacco, maize, 
timber and peanuts.3 By 1870.4 U.S. firms had invested about seven million in the China 
trade, reaching the height of investment in 1930 of $129.3 million.5 U.S. businesses 
continued to operate in China even during the Japanese occupation of Shanghai, from 
1937 to the start of Word War II. After the War. U.S. entrepreneurs returned to China
'William Burke. The China Trade (San Francisco: Federal Reserve. 1972), 5.
:Mira Wilkins. “The Impacts of American Multinational Enterprise on American-Chinese 
Economic Relations 1786-1949" in America’s China Trade in Historical Perspective, 
eds. Ernest R. May and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 
259-265.
John W. DePauw. “The Potential for Military Trade,” in U.S.-China Trade: Problems 
and Prospects, ed. Eugene K. Lawson (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988), 247.
4 Among the major corporations in Canton and Shanghai by the 1870's, 1880’s and 1890's 
were American Tobacco. Columbia Phonographs, General Electric, International 
Harvester. Sherwin Williams. Singer Sewing Machine, Parke Davis and Standard Oil.
See Mira Wilkins, 263-266.
■'Department of Commerce. American Direct Investments in Foreign Countries 
(Washington. D.C.:Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, 1930), 26.
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with hopes to continue business, only to find disastrous conditions.6 When communism 
finally triumphed on the Mainland, on October 1,1949. and the People’s Republic of 
China was formed. U.S. export controls were tightened, so that by December 1950, all 
U.S. shipments to China were banned. The Truman7 administration had blocked or 
frozen all U.S. assets that were owned by Chinese nationals, as well as the assets of any 
U.S. residents in China. Exports to and imports from China were prohibited.8 At the 
same time, the Chinese communist party had officially taken control of all U.S. property 
and assets in China.
The total U.S. trade embargo against China actually culminated at the point of 
China's entry into the Korean War. in late 1950. when China posed a direct threat to the 
United States because of its military troop support to Korea.9 All doors to trade and 
investment between the U.S. and China, therefore, closed.10 The mutual isolation of the
"Wilkins. 275-284.
7John R. Garson clarifies that the U.S. trade embargo on China proceeds from the 
President's authority under the Export Control Act of 1949 and the Trading With The 
Enemy Act of 1917. The Trading with the Enemy Act was passed six months after the 
U.S. entry into World War I to prevent American sources from being used to aid the 
enemy and to create a fund from which American creditors of enemy aliens could be paid. 
The act prohibited unlicenced foreign trade and authorized the seizure of enemy-owned 
property in the U.S. as well as regulation by the President of transactions of foreign 
exchange. John R. Garson. The Origins o f The Embargo: A Short History (New York: 
Praeger Publishers. 1971), 7.24-25.
sAlexander Eckstein, introduction to China Trade Prospects and U.S. Policy by eds. 
Jerome Alan Cohen. Robert F. Demberger and John R. Garson, (New York: Praeger 
Publishers. 1971). xi-xxiii.
9Garson. 6-7.
l0It is noteworthy that during the 1950's and I960's. figures for international trade 
revealed that the United States had a comparatively low ratio of foreign trade to domestic 
economic activity. The U.S. ratio of total trade turnover (x + m/gdp) was below 10 
percent. Thus in terms of total domestic activity, foreign trade was not a major sector of
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two countries was not to be broken until efforts for rapprochement were taken by the 
Nixon administration. It was in the mid-1960's, however, that a change began to occur in 
the thinking of U.S. trade policy toward China. In March of 1966. eminent scholars John 
King Fairbank and Donald S. Zagoria testified before Congress:
Containment of China alone is a blind alley unless we add 
policies of constructive competition and international 
contact. Peiping’s rulers shout aggressively out of 
manifold frustrations. Isolation intensifies their ailment 
and makes it self perpetuating, and we need to encourage 
international contact with China on many fronts."
Our only hope to achieve a stable and tolerable 
relationship with communist China is to do all we can to 
promote not a change of the system —which can only be 
done by War -but a change within the system. The kind 
of evolution which is already transforming Russia and the 
East European communist countries will have to 
come...We can help to hasten its growth.12
the U.S. economy. However, because of its absolute size. U.S. trade accounted for 
approximately 15 percent of the total world trade during the late 1950's. For further 
explanation, refer to Cohen, Demberger Garson. eds.. 185.
"John King Fairbank. Director of the East Asian Research Center. Harvard University. 
"Testimony before the U.S. Congress.” 10 Mar. 1966. Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 
China: U.S. Policy Since 1945 (Washington. D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.,1980), 
161. "The hearings were triggered by the expansion of the Vietnam War and fear that the 
Chinese might intervene, as they had in Korea. The witnesses included virtually all o f the 
most prestigious China scholars in the U.S. Although divided on the Vietnam War itself, 
they were almost unanimous in their opinions that although the U.S. should try to 
"contain” China, the policy of isolation should be admitted to have failed and be dropped. 
In turn, it was argued that the U.S. should step up cultural, educational, and technical 
contacts with the PRC.” China: U.S. Policy Since 1945, 161.
"Donald S. Zagoria, Professor of Government at Columbia University, Testimony before 
the U.S. Congress. 21 Mar. 1966. Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 161.
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Domestic policies of the People’s Republic of China also precipitated the 
relaxation of U.S. economic restrictions toward China. In 1960, for example. China 
reversed its "lean to one side” policy13 of a close economic alliance with the Soviet 
Union. The Chinese communist party believed that Soviet communism was not adhering 
to the basic tenets of communism and therefore declared that "Chinese communism was 
the only pure form of communism. Mao. not Khrushchev, was the heir to the communist 
tradition. And Peking [Beijing], not Moscow, should be the rightful center of the 
communist world.”u
Future domestic events in China eased tensions between the U.S. and China. Ten 
years after the Sino-Soviet break, in April of 1970. the People's Daily, the Liberation 
Daily and the theoretical journal Hongqui. responded to Brezhnev’s invasion of 
Czechoslovakia. The journals published that "Brezhnev’s support of a socialist 
community based on the excusable grounds of the Brezhnev Doctrine,15 was nothing 
more than a synonym for a colonial empire with Russia at the center.”16 The editorials
l3Eckstein. xxi.
MCongressional Quarterly, Inc., 122.
l5The Brezhnev Doctrine, which was declared on September 16.1968, also known as 
"The Doctrine of Limited Sovereignty” stated that the world socialist community had a 
right to intervene when socialism came under attack in a fraternal socialist country, and 
denied that this had in any way violated Czechoslovakia’s ’real sovereignty.’” 
Congressional Quarterly, Inc.. 181.
,6Also. as explained by the Chinese leadership in the journal Hongqui, China’s purpose in 
opening ties with the U.S. was to “distinguish between the primary enemy (the Soviet 
Union) and the secondary enemy (the United States), allying itself with the secondary 
enemy in order to form a united front against Moscow.” Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 
200.
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concluded that the Brezhnev doctrine was indeed hegemonism.17 Tensions between 
China and the Soviet Union were further exacerbated by the growing Ussuri River 
clashes.18 To a great extent, then, the U.S.-China rapproachement was inherent in the 
Sino-Soviet split.19
The Sino-Soviet split was not the only factor that led to warmer relations between 
the United States and China. Global market forces accelerated the loosening of U.S. 
isolationist policies toward China. Although the nations of Western Europe are 
democracies and political allies with the United States, they are, at the same time 
economic competitors.20 While the U.S. had implemented stringent economic policies 
toward China, its western allies had not. Australia. Canada, Great Britain, West 
Germany and France accounted for approximately 3/4 of China's imports by the mid- 
1960's. Japan was China's major supplier of wheat and flour. Great Britain and West 
Germany together accounted for $50 million in Chinese exports.21 China's economic 
contacts with U.S. Western allies weakened the U.S. unilateral trade embargo against
l7Ibid.
18 The Ussuri river consists o f a 4.000 mile stretch of border between the Soviet Union 
and China. At a point in the river about 250 miles from Vladivostok is the tiny island of 
Damansjky. about a third of a square mile. In March of 1969, Chinese troops fired on a 
Russian frontier patrol group, killing 23 and wounding 14 Russians in 20 minutes.
Henry Kissinger. White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979),
166.
l9Kissinger. White House Years. 1052.
20Ibid.. 340.
-1 Congressional Quarterly. Inc.. 4-5. Among the 49 countries which recognized the 
communist Chinese regime (while the United States did not) were Denmark, Finland, 
France. Great Britain, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and West Germany. France was 
the first western European nation to recognize the PRC, in 1950. The aforementioned 
countries later began contact
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China while at the same time giving U.S. business competitors an edge in the China 
market. Moreover, by the late 1960s, U.S. businesses were looking to avert Japan's 
restrictive trade policies. By 1969, Japan’s exports to the U.S. far exceeded its imports 
from the U.S."
All of these micro-macro economic and political events triggered a U.S. 
gravitational pull toward China. By the time Nixon had officially taken office, in 1969, 
international and domestic forces had already been in motion to help forward the Nixon 
administration's goal of normalizing relations with China.
The first U.S. initiative at opening trade relations with China had taken place in 
March of 1969. when President Nixon’s then Assistant for National Security Affairs, 
Henry Kissinger.’3 requested that U.S. trade restrictions with Asian communist countries 
be re-examined. The assessment resulted in a slight relaxation of the U.S. trade embargo 
against China. The ban on travel by U.S. citizens to China was lifted, and U.S. tourists 
were permitted to purchase up to U.S. $100.00 worth of Chinese made noncommercial 
goods.24 By December of 1969. the U.S. government announced that subsidiaries and 
affiliates of U.S. firms abroad would be authorized to sell non-strategic goods to 
communist China and buy communist Chinese products for resale in foreign markets.25
"Kissinger, White House Years, 338.
“’Henry Kissinger was appointed Assistant for National Security Affairs under President 
Nixon from 1969-1973. From 1973 to 1977. Kissinger served as Secretary of State under 
President Nixon and President Gerald R. Ford. Ibid., xxi.
•4John W. DePauw. introduction to U.S.-Chinese Trade Negotiations (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1981), 3.
"Congressional Quarterly. Inc.. 7.
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From this point forward, further trade liberalization developed. In 1971, the 
selective licensing of U.S. goods for export to the PRC was authorized.26 Also during 
this time, the 1971 Peterson Report27 of the Nixon Council on International Economic 
Policy matriculated throughout the White House. The report disclosed America’s 
declining competitiveness and share of the world wealth, and recommended that major 
attention be given to U.S. commercial policy in order to enhance job creation.28
Previous to Nixon’s memorable trip to China. Kissinger had visited Beijing 
several times to meet with Premier Zhou En-lai to pave the way for Nixon's meeting. In 
his pre-trip trade speech of 1971. Nixon remarked "China was potentially one of five 
great economic superpowers and would determine the course of great events in the 
remainder of the 20th century...The very success o f our policy of ending the isolation of 
Mainland China will mean an immense escalation of their economic challenge not only 
to us. but to others in the world.”29
26Such U.S. goods that were authorized for export to the PRC included "farm, fishery and 
forestry products, tobacco, fertilizers and chemicals, coal, rubber and textiles, some 
metals, agricultural, industrial and office equipment, household appliances, some 
electrical appliances, consumer goods, road building and construction equipment and 
some relatively unsophisticated computers.” Congressional Quarterly. Inc.. 8.
:7,,The Peterson Report: Rationale of the New Economic Policy.” National Journal 
(November. 13,1971) as quoted by Pietro S. Nivola, “Commercializing Foreign Affairs? 
American Trade Policy After the Cold War,” in U.S. Foreign Policy After The Cold War, 
eds. Randall B. Riplev and James M. Lindsay (Pittsburgh: University' of Pittsburgh Press,
1997). 235.
28Nivola. 235.
29Richard M. Nixon, Speech to Midwestern News Media Executives attending a 
briefing on domestic policy in Kansas City. Mo.. 6 July 1971. Congressional Quarterly, 
Inc.. 332.
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Soon after Nixon's visit to China, on February 21, 1972, and the subsequent 
signing of the Shanghai Communique.30U.S.-China bilateral trade began to flourish. 
Beginning with no trade at all, the United States became, by 1983, China's third leading 
trading partner, and China, the United States' seventh largest trading partner.31 Table 3.1 
displays the magnitude and growth of U.S.-China bilateral trade. From 1972 to 1980. 
total U.S.-China trade increased from U.S.$.092 billion, in 1972, to $4.7 billion, in 1980. 
After the U.S. formally recognized the People's Republic of China, on January 1, 19793: 
and subsequently withdrew formal recognition of Taiwan.33 U.S.-China bilateral trade 
increased dramatically to U.S. $78.6 billion, by 1997.
jUThe Shanghai Communique, issued in Shanghai on February 27. 1972. was a joint U.S.- 
China agreement that established U.S. diplomatic relations with the PRC and subsequent 
trade relations between the two countries. An exert from the agreement is that "both 
sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived, and 
agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of 
the peoples of two countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of 
trade between the two countries.” Congressional Quarterly. Inc.. 323.
3lQi Hong Dong. "The Welfare Effects of the U.S. Extending Most-Favored-Nation Tariff 
Preference Treatment to the People's Republic of China: An Empirical Inquiry,” (Ph.D. 
diss.. Northern Illinois University, 1993. 32.
j2In 1979. President Carter looked to American business for help in gaining congressional 
approval of the 1979 U.S.-China trade agreement. Business lobbyists included the 
National Council for U.S.-China Trade which represented the banking, construction, 
transportation and other industries that were eager to enter the China market. Such U.S. 
corporations as Coca-Cola, Bethlehem Steel and Pan American Airways were among the 
early entrants to the China market. Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 68-70.
’’The United States and the People's Republic of China announced in a  joint 
Communique in Shanghai, on December 15,1978, that they would formally recognize 
each other on January 1.1979. and exchange ambassadors and establish embassies on 
March 1. At this time it was also announced that Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese Vice 
Premier would visit Washington. It was agreed by the two parties that the U.S. would 
withdraw recognition of Taiwan and would terminate its mutual defense treaty with that 
nation by the end of 1979. Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 39.
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Table 3.1
U.S.-China Bilateral Trade 1972-1997 (U.S. SBillions)
Years U.S. Exports U.S. Imports Total Trade U.S. Trade Balance
1972 0.06 0.032 0.092 0.028
1974 0.8 0.1 0.9 0.7
1976 0.1 0.2 0.3 -0.1
1978 0.8 0.3 1.1 0.5
1980 3.7 1.0 4.7 2.7
1982 2.9 2.2 5.1 0.7
1984 3.0 3.0 6.0 1.0
1986 3.1 4.7 7.8 -1.6
1988 5.0 8.5 13.5 -3.5
1990 4.8 16.3 21.1 -11.5
1992 7.5 27.4 34.9 -19.9
1994 9.3 41.3 50.6 -32.0
1996 12.0 54.4 66.4 -42.4
1997 12.8 65.8 78.6 -53.0
Source: Direction o f  Trade Statistics. Washington. D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 
(1980) (1985) (1990) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) Note: total trade = (x + m) trade
balance = (x-m).
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The U.S.-China trade, however, was ultimately solidified by the U.S. 
conditional34 restoration of most-favored-nation status to the PRC. on February 1,1980, 
during the Carter administration.35 After that, total U.S. trade with China increased from 
U.S. S4.7 billion in 1980 to U.S. $78.6 billion in 1997. U.S.-China economic relations 
grew to include the transfer of some technology as well. In 1980. for example. President 
Carter approved the U.S. transfer of the new U.S. Landsat photo reconnaissance satellite 
to China, and facilitated further scientific and technological exchanges between U.S. and 
Chinese scientists.36
Throughout the 1980's, the U.S.-China policy was to encourage a strong and 
stable China. A China that was independent of the Soviet Union and not vulnerable to 
Soviet military pressure.37 A combination of economic and strategic concerns formed 
the rationale behind President Reagan's economic policy toward China. In May 1983. 
Reagan expanded exports to China to include military products and products made with
^Conditions for MFN were first stipulated in the U.S. Trade Act of 1974. The conditions 
included (i) the conclusion of a bilateral trade agreement that included trade reciprocity,
ii) compliance with the Jackson-Vanik Amendment which was attached to the 1974 U.S. 
Trade Act. The Amendment stipulated that MFN can be extended to non-market 
economies only if its citizens are permitted the freedom of emigration. The continuation 
of MFN was contingent on a presidential waiver of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment on a 
yearly basis. Since the 1980 U.S. granting of MFN to China, however, such further 
conditions were added as China's progress on an array of human rights conditions, the 
ceasing of China's nuclear arms sales to third countries and piracy of U.S. copyrights.
■ 5 President Carter remarked that "Conclusion of this agreement is the most important step 
we can take to provide greater economic benefits to both countries from this 
relationship." De Pauw. 4.
36Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 260,263.
' 701in Wethington. "The Role of Technology Transfer,” in U.S. China Trade: Problems 
and Prospects, ed. Eugene K. Lawson (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988), 196-198.
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higher levels of technology.38 To help carry out his defensive trade strategy, Reagan 
directed that China be moved from a category P country group, which held strict export 
restrictions to communist countries, to a category V group, which included most non­
communist countries, thereby allowing a greater flow of high technology goods to be 
exported to the PRC.3q “Between October 1983 and September 1984. the U.S. 
government approved commercial export licenses of defense articles and services valued 
at about U.S. $72.6 million, practically six times greater than the preceding year."40 In 
comparison to total U.S. trade with the China, however, U.S.-China military trade was 
much less significant.41
U.S. trade liberalization with China was further opened in April 1984. On the 
second U.S. presidential visit to China, after Nixon's premiere visit of 1972, President 
Reagan and Premier Zhao Ziyang signed a joint Nuclear Nonproliferation Pact, and at 
the same time agreed to open the China market to U.S. industries for participation in a 
U.S. $20 billion contract for China's nuclear sector projects.42 Reagan's strategic 
economic policy brought the United States and China closer together than they had ever 
been before because the policy served the interests of both nations. The implementation
38Such exports included greater quantities of advanced machinery and instruments, 
aircraft. locomotives and avionics equipment.
^Wethington. 198.
40DePauw. U.S.-Chinese Trade Negotiations, 262.
4'Ibid.. 263.
42Cheung, 99; South China Morning Post, 28 Apr. 1984.
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of the Deng modernization reforms of 198243 was heavily dependent on China’s ability 
to acquire the technology and scientific knowledge it had lost during two tumultuous 
revolutions and centuries of isolation. U.S. exports to China thus helped fuel China’s 
plans to modernize.
Beyond the Cold War-based strategic trade policy o f the Reagan administration, 
U.S. trade policy was economically motivated by comparative cost advantage. The U.S. 
enjoyed a relative factor price advantage in physical capital and skilled labor, while 
possessing a disadvantage in unskilled labor. China, on the other hand, enjoyed a factor 
price advantage in unskilled labor.44 The comparative advantage for both countries 
further opened the doors to U.S. trade and investment, particularly as it pertained to 
Chinese labor-intensive goods.
Comparative cost advantage typically resulted in increased U.S. direct investment 
in China, which generated a growth in China's exports to the U.S. in the mid-1980's and 
throughout the decade of the I990's. More frequently than not. U.S. direct investment in 
China was targeted toward China's special economic zones (SEZ’s), where China's 
firms could import materials and components duty-free from U.S. firms, process them
43In 1982. Deng Xiaoping introduced to the Twelfth CCP Party Congress a series of 
market reforms with a goal to take China out of the status of a developing country by the 
year 2000. Deng's four modernizations include the development of I) agriculture, ii) 
science and technology, iii) industry and iv) the military. Richard Baum, "The Road to 
Tiananmen: Chinese Politics in the 1980's,” in The Politics o f  China 1949-1989, ed. 
Roderick MacFarquhar (Cambridge: Press Syndicate of Cambridge, 1994), 341.
^Robert E. Baldwin. U.S. And Foreign Competition In The Developing Countries o f the 
Asian Pacific Rim, Working Paper No. 2208 (Cambridge: National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 1987), abstract.
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into finished goods and export them back to the United States.45 In 1993. for example, at 
the height of U.S. direct investment in China. China’s exports from foreign funded firms 
grew 45.4 percent, while China’s total exports rose only 8 percent in comparison.46 A 
comparison of U.S. direct investment in China to U.S. imports from China is 
demonstrated in Table 3.2. From 1990 to 1997, U.S. FDI to China increased from U.S. 
$0.3 billion to $5.0 billion, while during the same time period, U.S. imports from China 
increased from U.S. $16.3 billion to $65.8 billion.47 As China’s exports to the U.S. 
increased, the U.S. bilateral trade deficit with China48 increased as well, which is 
reflected in the increased concentration of China’s labor intensive manufacturing 
structure.
45 As Lardy clarifies, "the value of these exports is the sum of the value of the 
imported components and the processing fee. International marketing is handled by the 
foreign firm that supplies the materials and components.” Lardy. China In The World 
Economy. 112-113.
46Ibid.. 112.
47U.S. import figures from China were utilized rather than China’s export figures to the 
U.S. because of the "discrepancies in bilateral trade statistics as reported by China and its 
trading partners, particularly with industrial countries. Trade with these countries is 
classified by China as trade with Hong Kong if it passes through Hong Kong ports.” 
Direction o f Trade Statistics Yearbook (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 
1997). 159. This method of statistical reporting remains consistent even after Hong 
Kong's 1997 reunification with China due to the fact that the 1984 Sino-British Joint 
Declaration stipulates that Hong Kong will retain its existing economic system for 50 
years after 1997.
48Lardy. 73-79.
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Table 3.2
Comparison of U.S. FDI49 to China, and U.S. Imports From China 







U.S. % of Total 
FDI to China
1990 0.4 16.3 3.4 11.8%
1991 0.3 20.3 4.4 22.7%
1992 0.5 27.4 11.0 4.5%
1993 2.0 31.2 27.5 7.3%
1994 2.5 41.3 33.8 7.4%
1995 3.0 48.5 37.5 8.0%
1996 3.4 54.4 41.7 8.1%
1997 3.2 65.8 45.3 7.0%
1998 4.0 71.2 45.5 8.8%
Source: Department of Commerce. Statistical Abstract o f The United States. Economics and 
Statistics Administration. Bureau of The Census. 1998.793.
Statistics for total and U.S. FDI to China, and 1998 U.S. Import Figure is taken from The U.S.- 
China Business Council. China Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, 
available on line at www.uschina.org; U.S. Import Figures from 1990 to 1997 are taken from 
the Direction of Trade Statistics (Washington. D.C.: International Monetary Fund, yearly 
reports); percent calculations by the present author.
*Note: The U.S. Department of Commerce defines U.S. investment abroad as "the ownership or 
control of one U.S. person of 10% or more of the voting securities of the incorporated foreign 
business enterprise or an equivalent interest in a unincorporated foreign business enterprise.”
wFDI Figures are Actual Amount Utilized, as opposed to Actual Amount Contracted by 
corporations. "Invariably a proportion of pledged investment is never actually absorbed 
because deals fall apart. However, because there is a lag between the time contracts are 
pledged and when the capital is actually contributed (utilized), some capital not absorbed 
in the year of the signing will be absorbed in later years.’’ Margaret M. Pearson, China’s 
Sew Business Elite: The Political Consequences o f Economic Reform (Los Angeles: 
University of California Press. 1997), 167.
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Increased trade liberalization along with expanded U.S. technology intensive and 
capital goods exports to China resulted in a change of commodity structure in the U.S.- 
China trade. In 1980. for example. U.S. exports to China consisted mainly of food and 
industrial supplies and only a small amount of capital goods.50 By 1985 and into the 
1990's, however. U.S. capital goods exports balanced those exports of food and 
industrial supplies to China.51 U.S. imports from China consisted of mainly food and 
industrial supplies in 1980, for example. However, by 1990. the commodity structure 
changed to increased U.S. imports of consumer goods from China.
Table 3.3 displays the changing trade structure with selected top commodities 
exported to and imported from China during the years 1980 to 1998. U.S. exports of 
wheat declined from U.S. $1,039 million, in 1980. to $426 million in 1996. And U.S. 
exports of technology intensive items, such as aircraft/ aerospace craft, increased from 
U.S. $155 million, in 1980. to $3,585 million, in 1998. On the other hand. U.S. imports 
of such finished consumer goods as toys, baby carriages and sporting goods increased 
from U.S. $3.0 million, in 1980. to $11.167 million, in 1998. Whereas U.S. imports of 
light industrial goods, such as radio receivers, increased steadily, but not as rapidly as 
imports of toys and garments.
“James Orr, "Evolution of U.S. Trade with China," Federal Reserve Bank o f  New York 
(FRBNY). Quarterly Review (winter 1991/92): 49.
51 Ibid.
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Table 3.3
U.S.- China Trade Structure, 1980-1998, Selected Commodities (U.S. SMillions)
U.S. EXPORTS TO CHINA
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
A 7 16 29 159 161 146 204 329 358 212
B 1.039 1.046 575 6 690 497 273 166 426 N/A
C 152 147 267 96 181 543 629 944 891 1,064
D 155 19 113 295 334 749 2,056 1.911 1.708 3,585
U.S. IMPORTS FROM CHINA
E 39.0 119.0 168.0 225.0 632 1,203 1.728 2,038 2.099 2228
F 0.3 20.6 130.0 699.0 1.073 2215 3.860 5.537 8,015 11,167
G 0.3 4.4 22.0 32.4 264 499 829 1.368 1.571 2.328
H 21.8 43.0 48.3 83.8 342 1,477 3.403 5259 6.392 8,008
A = Specialized Machinery for particular industries. B = Wheat, C = Fertilizers. D = Aircraft 
and associated equipment, spacecraft vehicles: and parts. E = Outer garments, women, girls 
coats, capes of textile fabric. F = Baby carriages, toys, games and sporting goods. G = Radio­
broadcast receivers. H = Footwear.
Source: United States Foreign Trade Highlights. (1980) (1982) (1984) (1986) (1988) (1990) 
(1992) (1994) (1996) (1998) available on line from Netscape @ 
www.ita.doc.gov/industry/otea/usfth/top80cty/china.cp.
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It is noteworthy that, during the 1980's, U.S. direct sales to China became 
increasingly difficult due to tighter controls placed by China on foreign exchange, and 
the Chinese government’s promotion of technology acquisition.52 During the period 
1982 to 1984, China’s foreign exchange was made available under the Deng (sixth) Five- 
Year Modernization Plan. In 1985, however. China’s foreign exchange5j rapidly 
depleted. Because of the lack of foreign exchange. China demanded more technology 
transfer and countertrade as part of U.S. sales.54
The strategic economic and political policies of the Bush administration were 
much like that of the Reagan administration. Like President Reagan, President Bush 
was motivated by the strategic concerns of the Cold War.55 Although Bush imposed a 
ban on China's high-level contacts with the United States in response to the June 4.1989 
Tiananmen Square pro-democracy massacre, only two weeks after the ban. he resumed
5:Carolyn L. Brehm. "Bilateral Trade: Countertrade, Offset. Coproduction, and 
Licensing.” in U.S.-China Trade: Problems And Prospects. ed. Eugene K. Lawson (New 
York: Praeger Publishers. 1988). 143.
5j,,U.S. firms frequently cite China’s foreign exchange controls and non-convertibility of 
the renminbi as the most significant non-tariff barrier to trade and investment.” 
Department of State. Country Reports On Economic Policy And Trade Practices 
(Washington. D.C.:GPO. 1992). 78.
MBrehm defines countertrade (duixiao maoyi) as "Various trade arrangements that 
contain a requirement to purchase products as a condition of sale. Among the various 
types of countertrade include: i)barter (yihuo maoyi): a one time exchange of products 
that does not involve cash; ii) compensation trade (buchang maoyi): an agreement to sell 
technology and/or machinery and equipment and to accept full or partial payment in the 
form of goods manufactured with the equipment; iii) counterpurchase (fangou mai): 
involves the same principle as balanced trade between the buyer and seller, but the 
Chinese side will offer goods that are not related to or manufactured by the items 
purchased from the foreign side.” Brehm, 149-151.
55James Mann. About Face (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), 216.
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contact with China by deploying the Snowcroft mission56 to Beijing, in efforts to resume 
the U.S.-China relationship to what it had been previous to 1989.
The motives for the Snowcroft mission were twofold. One motive was premised 
on China's potential as an economic ally for U.S. exports. The second motive was an 
effort to restrain the Soviet Union.57 With regard to U.S. trade policy, the 1989 Chinese 
government's suppression of pro-democracy activists did not arouse any contemplation 
to revoke China's MFN status. In fact, "each year of his Presidency after the Tiananmen 
Square massacre. President Bush was able to secure unconditional renewal of China's 
MFN status despite Congressional opposition."58
It should be noted, however, that the Bush administration was not totally blind to 
the mass display of totalitarianism in China, nor to the outrage expressed by American 
public opinion. Bush did. in fact, respond to the Tiananmen incident by suspending 
World Bank lending to China.56 China Programs of the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC)60 were also halted, the Trade and Development Program (TDP)61 for
56The Snowcroft Mission, comprised of National Security Advisor Brent Snowcroft 
Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and Secretary of State Baker, was 
created by Bush and was. at the time, a mission conducted secretly to try to "continue the 
U.S. security cooperation with China against the Soviet Union.” Two missions to China 
were made, one in 1989. and the other, in 1990. Mann. 208.
57Mann. 216.
58 Diane F. Orentlicher and Timothy A. Gellat, “Public Law, Private Actors: The Impact 
of Human Rights on Business Investors in China.” Northwestern Journal o f International 
Law & Business 14. no. 66 (1993). 76.
56 Lardy. 52-53
60OPIC (Overseas Private Investment Corporation) is a U.S. government agency that 
facilitates the participation of United States private capital and skills in the economic and 
social development of developing countries. It provides insurance against political 
risk for .American companies investing abroad by providing loan and loan guarantees for
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China was suspended, and sanctions were imposed on exports of U.S. weapons and 
munitions, as well.62 Although, by 1990. the U.S. reversed its position and no longer 
opposed World Bank loans to China.63
Not until the Clinton administration came to power was there a slight shift in 
U.S. economic policy toward China relative to the policy of previous administrations 
since 1972. Clinton came to the presidential campaign platform with economic 
considerations as the core of his foreign policy agenda. Secretary of State Christopher 
commented:
President Clinton has placed America's economic strength at the heart of 
our national security strategy in the post-Cold War world. Our 
Administration's foreign policy, like our country, stands for open 
societies as well as open markets. We are convinced that the two are 
inseparably linked.64
After the demise of the Soviet bloc. Clinton was free to focus on the build up of 
America's economic strength without having to consider strategic trade policies that 
were based on the Soviet threat and its ensuing military power strategies. U.S. controls
specific investment projects.
6lThe U.S. Trade and Development Program (TDP) is a government program that serves 
to fund feasibility studies by U.S. companies on major projects in countries that facilitate 
U.S. exports.
^President George Bush. Message From The President of The United States, "Report On 
Economic Sanctions Against China," 16 May 1990. Congress, House Document 101- 
192. (Washington. D.C.: GPO. 1990), 13.
63Lardy. 52-53.
64 Warren Christopher, “The U.S.-China Relationship: The Right Balance,” U.S. 
Department o f State Dispatch 5, no. 13,28 Mar. 1994, on line, available from 
gopher://dosfan.lib.vic.edu.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
84
on such technology intensive exports as computers and telecommunications equipment 
were further liberalized, as restrictions on COCOM65 limits were eased.66 The Clinton 
administration approved for the sale to China more advanced computer systems than the 
U.S. had previously been exporting, as well as the sale of advanced fiber optic 
communication systems. And, in 1994 several satellites made by Hughes Aircraft were 
authorized for sale.67
At the start of his presidency. President Clinton had focused on commercial 
diplomacy and free trade without considering human rights issues. Later in office, 
however, human rights considerations were added to his foreign economic policy 
agenda. Two distinct and opposing U.S. trade policies resulted. One policy in 1993, and 
another in 1994.
In 1993. it was the Clinton policy that human rights and trade were inseparable. 
"The core of our policy." the President said, "would be a resolute insistence on overall 
significant progress on human rights if MFN for China was to be renewed once again.”68 
The Executive Order was shaped in close consultation with Congress, business leaders
65"U.S. exports to China, as well as exports from other major Western industrialized 
countries have been subject to not only domestic export controls but also to a multilateral 
approval process known as COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export 
Controls). COCOM is an arrangement which includes the United States, its European 
allies, and Japan for the purpose of reviewing technology and commodity transfers to 
controlled destinations, principally the (former) Soviet Union and China. Wethington, 
196. COCOM controls have become increasingly relaxed throughout the decades in 
order to assist the progress of trade and investment liberalization.
66Lardy, 125.
67Ibid.. 124.
68 Warren Christopher. "The U.S.-China Relationship: The Right Balance.”
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and human rights activists, but was never officially legislated.69 On May 28,1993, 
President Clinton extended China's MFN for another year, but on the condition that 
China satisfy certain human rights improvements for renewal in 1994 based on a 
recommendation by the U.S. Secretary of State.70
Seven types of human rights were identified as measures for MFN renewal in 
1994. but only two were distinguished as being absolute requirements. The first 
mandatory stipulation was that China "will substantially promote the freedom of 
emigration objectives of the Trade Act of 1974. The second mandatory stipulation was 
that China comply with the 1992 U.S.-China bilateral trade agreement71 concerning 
China's prison labor.77 The other five non-mandatory conditions included 1) that China 
take steps to adhere to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 2) releasing and 
providing an acceptable accounting for Chinese citizens imprisoned or detained for the 
nonviolent expression of their political or religious beliefs. 3) ensuring human treatment 
of prisoners by allowing access to prisons by international humanitarian and human 
rights organizations. 4) protecting Tibet's distinctive religious and cultural heritage, and
69Ibid.
7nOrentlicher and Gelatt. 79.
71A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in regard to prison labor in China was agreed 
upon by the U.S. and China in 1992. The agreement facilitates U.S. inspections of 
Chinese prisons with the intent to establish the origin of Chinese exports to the U.S. that 
are produced with prison labor. In the event China refuses inspection of its prisons, U.S. 
customs may prevent the importation of Chinese goods suspected of being produced with 
prison labor. U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. “Chinese Prison Labor 
Exports” Fact Sheet. 17 June 1997. on-line, available from 
http://www.state/www/regions/eap/fs-china_prison_exp_970617.html.
^Orentlicher and Gelatt. 79.
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5) permitting international radio and television broadcasts into China.73 With regard to 
these non-mandatory human rights stipulations, "'overall significant progress” in these 
areas was to be determined by the Secretary of State.74 On May 26, 1994. Clinton 
reversed his previous economic policy toward China when he made the Executive 
decision to sever the linkage between human rights and MFN.
LINKING TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Throughout the past decades, the United States has imposed, or at least has 
threatened to impose, economic sanctions on the basis of countries' human rights 
practices. Such sanctions have taken the form of cutbacks in either aid (loan 
disbursements), trade or direct investment. Traditionally, respect for human rights has 
been addressed in the form of a country's labor standards, in particular, prison labor. For 
this reason, the terms human rights and labor (or worker) rights may be used 
interchangeably.
The U.S. linkage of trade and human rights occurred, for the most part, during the 
1970’s. Historically, however, the U.S. first linked trade and human rights more than a
7-Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights John Shattuck, Congress, House, 
Committee On Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees On Economic Policy. Trade And 
Environment. International Security, International Organizations And Human Rights, and 
Asia And The Pacific. China. Human Rights and MFN. hearing, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., 
24 Mar. 1994 (Washington. D.C.: GPO, 1994), 44-54.
74U.S. President. William J. Clinton, Executive Order 12850, “Conditions for Renewal of 
Most-Favored-Nation Status for the People's Republic of China in 1994, “28 May 1993. 
The ambiguous terminology of the phrase “overall significant progress” fueled further 
debate.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
87
century ago, through the Tariff Act of 1890 which banned imports of goods 
manufactured by convict labor.75 The trade and human rights linkage was further defined 
in the Treaty of Versailles of 1919, at the Paris Peace Conference (of which the United 
States was party) which stipulated that all nations “endeavor to secure and maintain fair 
and humane conditions of labor...in all countries in which their commercial and 
industrial relations extend.”76 The 1890 Tariff Act was broadened in Section 307 of the 
1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act.77 which increased the restriction of products imported to 
the U.S. that were produced by prison labor. In 1945. the United States called for an 
International Conference on Trade and Employment and established a preparatory 
committee to develop an agenda. The U.S. recommended the establishment of an 
International Trade Organization (ITO). and in March of 1948 drafted a document 
known as the Havana Charter of 1948. the precursor to the ITO.78
75Jorge F. Perez-Lopez. “Conditioning Trade on Foreign Labor Law: The U.S. 
Approach."Comparative Labor Law Journal 9 (1988): 254.
76R. Michael Gadbaw and Michael T. Medwig, “Multinational Enterprises and 
International Labor Standards: Which Way For Development and Jobs?.” in Human 
Rights, Labor Rights and International Trade, eds. Lance A. Compa and Stephen F. 
Diamond (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 142-143.
77,1 In addition to manufactured products, goods which were mined or produced by prison 
labor were also prohibited from being exported to the U.S. The prohibition also extended 
to goods produced by forced or indentured labor under penal sanctions. However, an 
exemption of the ban was provided for goods produced by forced labor if such goods 
were not produced in the United States in sufficient quantities.” Perez-Lopez,
254.
78Gadbow and Medwig, 242-243.
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Article 7 of the Havana Charter contained provisions for addressing employment 
and macroeconomic policies, such as the linkage between lair labor standards79 and 
trade.80
The members recognize that unfair labour conditions, particularly in 
production for export, create difficulties in international trade, and 
accordingly, each member shall take whatever action may be appropriate 
and feasible to eliminate such conditions within its territory.81
Although the ITO never came into existence, provisions for labor standards were 
minimally incorporated into Article XX(e) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), "permitting contracting parties to take measures to restrict products of 
prison labour."82 That the U.S. should address countries labor standards through a 
multilateral framework, was recommended by the Randall Commission of 1954.83
79 It is interesting to consider the position of T.N. Srinivasan. who argues that "the 
diversity in labor standards among countries is not only legitimate, but also does not 
detract from the case for free trade. In other words, such diversity, like diversity in tastes, 
technology and factor endowments, is a source for gainful trade based on comparative 
advantage." T.N. Srinivasan, "Trade and Human Rights.” in Constituent Interests and 
U.S. Trade Policies, eds. Alan V. DeardorfFand Robert M. Stem (Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press, 1998), 233. The neoclassical argument put forth here 
contradicts the ideology of U.S. sanctions based on violations of U.S. (and international) 
norms for labor standards or "sub-standard” wages of foreign countries.
80Perez-Lopez. 256.
81 Department of State. Pub. No. 3206. Havana Charter For An International Trade 
Organization (1948). 32.. in Perez-Lopez. 256. The author points out that" a proposal 
introduced at Havana by the United States calling for the condemnation of prison labor 
elicited no support” [from other countries], therefore Art. 7 of the Havana Charter was 
silent on the issue." Ibid.. 257.
82Perez-Lopez, 257.
83Ibid.. 258.
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Multilateral approaches to trade and labor rights included U.S. participation in 
such international conferences and organizations as the International Labor Organization 
(ILO) and the GATT.84 Eventual U.S. multilateral mechanisms for conditioning 
economic relations on human rights improvements included the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the IMF, World Bank, and the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Additionally, the U.S. has 
tied human rights issues to domestic financial institutions, such as, for example, the 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), and the Export-Import Bank 
(Eximbank).
By the 1970's, to a significantly greater degree than its western allies, the U.S. 
began to consider economic measures in the form of sanctions on development 
assistance or exports85 in order to pressure countries to respect human rights.86 In 1973. 
in response to Kissinger's realpolitik approach to foreign diplomacy and to the 
disinterest in influencing human rights abroad during the Nixon/Ford years. Congress 
enacted a series of statutes linking trade and foreign assistance to a country's human 
rights practices.
“ Ibid.
85 In 1969. for instance, the Export Administration Act was passed. The Act gave the 
Department of Commerce, with input from the Departments of State and Treasury, the 
authority to administer export controls on the license to businesses to sell various 
products for human rights purposes. As cited by Richard B. Lillich. “The Contribution of 
the United States to the Promotion and Protection of International Human Rights,” in 
The Dynamics o f Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy, ed. Natalie Kaufman Hevener 
(New Brunswick: Transaction Books. 1984), 301.
86"More and more members of Congress see trade and aid as part of a continuum of tools 
to affect performance on human rights.” Sandra Vogelgesang, “What Price Principle?
U.S. Policy on Human Rights,” Foreign Affairs\6 (1978): 819, as cited by Lillich, 296.
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One such action on behalf of human rights, taken by the United States, was a call 
to attention on four minimum international labor standards (MILS) at the September 
1973 Tokyo Round of Trade Negotiations.87 Such U.S. stipulations included, for 
example, attention to slave or forced labor, child labor, health and safety practices. The 
U.S. received scant support for these human rights concerns, with the exception of a few 
Scandinavian countries.88
Additional measures toward the advancement of international human rights 
standards were initiated in 1974 by the U.S. Subcommittee on International 
Organizations of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Investigative hearings 
culminated in a 1974 report entitled “Human Rights in the World Community: A Call for 
U.S. Leadership."84 The report contained a number of provisions and recommendations 
for “increasing the priority given to human rights concerns in the United States foreign 
policy process."40
With the passing of the Trade Act of 1974. signed into law on January 3.1975 
by President Gerald R. Ford, the U.S. instituted its most powerful economic lever to 
pressure international human rights improvements-- that of most-favored-nation (MFN) 
status. Attached to the Trade Act of 1974 was the Jackson-Vanik Amendment [Section 
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that country's allowance of its citizens the freedom of emigration.91 The continuation of 
MFN status was subject to an annual presidential waiver of the Jackson-Vanik 
Amendment. The U.S. Congress, however, may override the presidential waiver by a 
joint resolution of disapproval, which in turn can then be vetoed by the President.92 The 
Amendment, of course, did not apply to China until 1980. at which time the U.S. 
restored MFN status to the PRC on a conditional basis.
Under the U.S. Trade Act of 1974. the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP) was also established. Similar to the GSP under the GATT, the U.S. GSP granted 
the President to authorize duty-free treatment to certain merchandise imports from 
developing countries for a ten year period. The GSP served to create additional leverage 
to insure that internationally-recognized worker rights were followed.93 The United 
States could withdraw or suspend GSP to a beneficiary country if it was determined that 
the country did not meet internationally recognized worker rights. Section 502(a) of the 
1974 Trade Act identified the term 'internationally recognized worker rights'94 to include
91 The Jackson-Vanik Amendment was originally meant to allow for the emigration of 
Jews from communist bloc countries.
92Department of State. "Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) Treatment” Fact Sheet, 17 June 
1997. Bureau of Public Affairs, on-line, available from http:// 
wwAv.state.gov/www/regions/eap/fs-mfn_treatment-970617.
9-’Perez-Lopez. 266-270.
"Gadbaw and Medwig offer a point to contemplate in regard to internationally- 
recognized human rights. That is “the vast majority of workers in developing countries 
do not enjoy the labor standards listed under the U.S. Trade Act. Simply because the 
economies are too poor. If the choice is between subsistence needs and “decent” work 
hours, the work days will be very long. Or, if the choice is between child labor on the 
family farm or a smaller harvest, children will work long and hard in the fields. In other 
words, conditions that many labor/human rights advocates point to as 'abuses’ may really 
be less a function of [U.S.jpoIicy failure than the unavoidably harsh conditions of life in a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
92
"(i) the right of association, ii) the right to organize and bargain collectively, iii) 
prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor, iv) minimum age for 
the employment of children, and v) acceptable conditions of work with respect to 
minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health.”95 In 1985, U.S. 
allegations of misuse of labor rights were held against Chile. Guatemala. Haiti. Korea. 
Nicaragua. Paraguay, the Philippines, Romania. Suriname. Taiwan and Zaire, whereby 
GSP privileges were threatened to be suspended.96
Further linkages between trade and human rights were outlined in the 1976 
Foreign Assistance Act.97 which stated that "no economic assistance, such as exports of 
agricultural commodities. OP1C insurance, or Eximbank lending will be given to a gross 
human rights violator unless such assistance will directly benefit the needy people in 
such a country.”98 A case in point is the Eximbank.99 which in accordance with the
developing economy.” Gadbaw and Medwig. "Multinational Enterprises and International 
Labor Standards. 144-145. in citing Gary S. Fields. "Labor Standards. Economic 
Development, and International Trade.” in Labor Standards and Development in the 
Global Economy, eds. Stephen Herzenberg and Jorge F. Perez-Lopez (Washington. D.C.: 
Department of Labor. Bureau of International Labor Affairs, 1990), 19-20.22.
9SPerez-Lopez. “Conditioning Trade on Foreign Labor Law,” 266-270.
96Ibid.. 272-273.
97"The Foreign Assistance Act of 1976 defines internationally recognized human rights in 
civil and political terms, in particular, the act specifies the denial of the right to life, 
systematic use of torture and prolonged detention without trial, as human rights abuses.” 
Roberta Cohen. "Human Rights Decision-Making in the Executive Branch: Some 
Proposals for a Coordinated Strategy.” in Human Rights and American Foreign Policy, 
eds. Donald P. Kommers and Gilburt D. Loescher (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press. 1979), 227.
98Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Public Law 94-161. Lillich, 295-296.
"The Eximbank (Export Import Bank) is a U.S. government agency that lends low 
interest loans to foreign or developing countries that wish to engage in trade with the
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Evans Congressional Amendment,100 prohibited Eximbank financing of exports to the 
South African apartheid government, unless the buyer adhered to the rights stipulated in 
the Sullivan101 Principles.102
At about the same time. Congress introduced a series of bills that would prohibit 
U.S. direct investment in South Africa, only to have them vetoed by the Carter
United States.
looThe Export-Import Bank Act o f1945 provides that human rights factors are one of only 
four nonfinancial or non-economic reasons that the President can rely upon when 
ordering the Eximbank to deny applications for credit, as cited by Lillich, 298.
101 "Former civil rights leader and General Motors Board Member. Rev. Leon Sullivan, 
first introduced his voluntary codes of conduct for corporations operating in South Africa, 
in 1977. He continually updated them, until he eventually abandoned them agreeing with 
critics that they were ineffective. In 1992. a final version of the Sullivan Principles was 
adopted. The 1992 Sullivan Principles include: “Principle 1) Nonsegregation of the races 
in all eating, comfort, locker room, and work facilities: Principle 2) Equal and fair 
employment practices for all employees; Principle 3) Equal pay for all employees doing 
equal or comparable work for the same period of time; Principle 4) Initiation and 
development of training programs that will prepare blacks, coloureds, and asians in 
substantial numbers for supervisory, administrative, clerical and technical jobs; Principle 
5) Increasing the number of blacks, coloureds, and asians in management and supervisory 
positions: Principle 6) Improving the quality of employees’ lives outside the work 
environment in such areas as housing, transportation, schooling, recreation, and health 
facilities; Principle 7) Working to eliminate laws and customs that impede social, 
economic, and political justice.” Corporate Watch. Statement o f  Principles for South 
Africa, on-line, available from www.igc.org/trac/feature/humanrts/resources/safirica- 
principles.html. “This approach was replicated in the ‘MacBride Principles.’ a code of 
conduct issued in 1984 by the Irish Statesman. Sean MacBride, to influence the activities 
of U.S. companies conducting business in Northern Ireland. The code focuses on non­
discrimination and affirmative action programs to overcome antipathy between the 
Protestant majority and the Roman Catholic minority in the British-ruled territory.” 
Gadbaw and Medwig, 185.
l0‘The Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 was amended in 1977 ”to discourage exports to 
countries not observing human rights.” Public Law 95-143. 16 Oct. 1977, as cited by 
Bruno V. Bitker. “The United States and International Codification of Human Rights: A 
Case of Split Personality." in The Dynamics o f  Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy, ed. 
Natalie Kaufman Hevener. (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1984). 95.
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administration. Accordingly, at the objection of the Executive Branch, Congress enacted 
a trade embargo against Uganda, in 1978, in protest of the human rights violations of 
General Amin.103 Thus, the longstanding clash between certain factions of the U.S. 
Legislative branch and the Executive branch, regarding the application of trade policy to 
human rights concerns, is evident and ever present.
It was. however, under the Carter administration that human rights in U.S. 
foreign policy really began to take hold. In his 1978 speech, in Paris, to the Palais des 
Congress. Carter affirmed:
There is one belief above all others that has made us what we are. This is 
the belief that the rights of the individual inherently stand higher than the 
claims or demands of the state.104
Secretary Vance directed the policy planning staff to incorporate a broad human rights 
policy. Vance thought that economic and social rights should be considered in addition 
to civil and political rights, because reduction of aid packages could penalize the hungry 
and poor whose economic and social rights, such as the right to food, shelter, health care 
and education, deserve to be fulfilled.105 That a “more humane international economic 
order" should be established was the reasoning behind the Carter/Vance broad 
perspective on human rights.106 As such, economic assistance was to be granted to
l03Lillich. 301.
l04Bitker. 96.
l05Roberta Cohen. “Human Rights Decision-Making in the Executive Branch: Some 
Proposals for a Coordinated Strategy." in eds. Donald P. Kommers and Gilburt D. 
Loescher. 227-228.
l06Cohen. "Human Rights Decision-Making," 227-228.
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(non-communist) repressive regimes with the intent that the assistance would serve as a 
leverage to improve human rights.107
In total. Carter established a human rights bureaucracy by creating the very first 
Bureau of Humanitarian Affairs, by developing an inter-agency network to address 
human rights issues, and by insisting that annual human rights reports on countries 
receiving U.S. assistance be provided to Congress. However, Carters usage of 
economic leverage to pressure human rights improvements in other countries proved to 
be softer than his rhetoric. Carter, for instance, did not support the imposition of 
economic sanctions against the South African apartheid government, nor did he support 
a trade embargo (which was nevertheless enacted by Congress) against the repressive 
regime of Idi Amin, in Uganda.108 Despite the high priority given to human rights ideals. 
Carter neither promoted nor discouraged private foreign investment in countries that 
exhibited human rights violations. Carters economic policy was hands off toward the 
trade and investment decisions of U.S. corporations.109
President Carter’s actions were augmented by a reevaluation of U.S. economic 
policy and the structure of policy formation and implementation in 1979. U.S. exports as 
a percentage of world trade had fallen from 18 percent, in I960, to 11.2 percent, by 




1 l0American Enterprise Institute. Proposals to Establish a Department o f  Trade 
(Washington. D.C.: American Enterprise Institute For Public Policy Research, 1984), 
9-11.
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domestic and foreign U.S. markets. Foreign corporate competition prompted a re­
organization of U.S. foreign policy priorities. Because of America’s declining world 
trade position, proponents of reorganization argued that "America's foreign economic 
policy could no longer be subordinated to foreign policy.”111 The commerce department 
was therefore elevated to primary responsibility for the administration of U.S. trade 
policy, responsibility which had been previously held by the department of the 
treasury.112
Similar to Carter, Reagan opposed interference with private economic endeavors. 
Reagan did, however, advocate the use of economic leverage as a cold war weapon 
against communist countries.113 In short. Reagan focused his human rights policy on 
communist human rights violators, whereas '‘friendly” authoritarian regimes were not 
subject to U.S. human rights pressures.114 Unlike Carter, who did not coddle 
authoritarian dictators. Reagan was indeed diplomatically friendly to repressive leaders 
in Africa and South America.115 No economic sanctions were applied against these 
countries and their dictators. It was not necessary, therefore, to link the Eximbank or 
OPIC to international human rights issues, since no credits or insurance were permitted
111 Ibid. The first substantive proposal for a major reorganization of U.S. foreign policy 
priorities was a bill to create a new Department of Trade and International Investment, 
introduced by Senator William V. Roth. Jr. (R-Del.) and Senator Abraham RibicofF(D- 
Conn.) on February 7.1979.
"'American Enterprise Institute. Proposals to Establish a Department o f Trade.
"JDavid P. Forsythe, "Human Rights Policy: Change and Continuity, in U.S. Foreign 
Policy After The Cold fVarFeds. Randall B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press. 1997), 263-265.
114Forsythe. 266.
"Tbid.. 265
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to be given to Soviet countries or allies of Soviet countries,116 the only countries with 
which Reagan used human rights as a power leverage during the bi-polar Cold War 
structure.
It was the brutality displayed in 1989, in Tiananmen Square, however, that 
brought the relationship of trade and human rights to the fore of the U.S. Congressional 
agenda. As previously mentioned, aside from temporary cutbacks on OPIC, Eximbank, 
and some technology exports, only slight economic measures were taken by the White 
House in response to the oppression of pro-democracy activists in China. The 
Tiananmen Square incident and the U.S. public response to it. awakened a long and 
heated Congressional and Executive debate over international trade and its influence on 
human rights.
Although admitting that China fell short of its responsibilities to human rights. 
President Bush swept through the trade and human rights debate with a policy of 
comprehensive engagement with China, with most-favored-nation status as the 
foundation for engagement.117 Dialogue, not economic sanctions. Bush thought, was the 
best way to improve human rights in China. This meant "‘engaging China through 
democratic, economic and educational institutions.”118
When Clinton campaigned for President, he admonished Bush's soft stance on 
China, in particular his renewal o f MFN to China without conditions for human rights 
improvements. Influential to Clinton’s criticism of Bush’s policy was Winston Lord.
"6Ibid., 266.
ulCO Researcher 22. no. 44 (Nov. 27.1992): 1041.
"8Ibid.
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Assistant Secretary of State of East Asian and Pacific Affairs under both Bush and 
Clinton, and U.S. Ambassador to China from 1985 to 1989. Lord was a key originator of 
the get tough policy on human rights in China. As Lord asserted, "We will seek 
cooperation from China on a wide range of issues. But Americans cannot forget 
Tiananmen Square.”119 Staunch followers of the policy set forth by Winston Lord were 
Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell and Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi.120 Both 
Congressional leaders pressured Clinton to attach human rights stipulations to the 1993 
MFN renewal and were the impetus behind Clinton’s Executive Order 12850 of May 28. 
1993.
To add to the situation, a series of bureaucratic reports alluding to losses in U.S. 
economic strength were presented in the early half of 1993. In May of 1993, for 
example, the IMF produced a study that concluded that China’s economy was four times 
larger than previously estimated in terms of purchasing power parity.121 The study 
placed China as the world's third largest economy, "slightly smaller than Japan, but 
ahead of Germany.”122 The United States Trade Representative (USTR), as well, 
announced that "China was still using a variety of protectionist measures against U.S.
ll9Winston Lord, as cited by Mann. 277.
l20Joining them were Congressmen David Bonior, Pat Buchanan, Dan Burton, Richard 
Gephardt. Bemie Sanders, and Senator Alfonse D’Amato, among others.
I2I"PPP exists between two currencies when changes in the exchange rate reflect only 
relative changes in the price levels of the two countries.” Paul R. Gregory and Roy J. 
Ruffin, Basic Macroeconomics (Boston: Scott. Foresman and Company, 1989), 402.
l22Jim Rohwer. "The Titan Stirs,” Economist (Nov. 28,1992); Steven
Greenhouse. "New Tally of World’s Economies Catapults China Into Third Place,” New
York Times, 20 May 1993.1, as cited by Mann, 285.
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exports, and that the U.S. trade deficit with China for the year 1992 was $18.3 billion, 
second only to the U.S. deficit with Japan. Moreover, China was not adhering to the 
1992 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).”123 These reports culminated from an 
investigation on U.S.-China policy that was conducted by an interagency group of mid­
level officials from the Departments of State, Agriculture, the Treasury. Commerce and 
the USTR.124 The working group finally recommended that U.S. interests would best be 
served by cutting the linkage between MFN and human rights.125
Two groups emerged from opposing philosophies. Opponents of unconditional 
MFN to China argued that economic penalties126 would pressure the Chinese leadership 
to improve human rights by using the leverage of lost profits from trade.127 They 
included such groups as Chinese dissidents, the Sierra Club. Human Rights 
Organizations. Friends of The Earth. Freedom House. Organized Labor, and the Family
i:3Steven Greenhouse. "China Will Lower Barriers To Trade in Accord with U.S.”
New York Times, 10 Oct. 1992; David C. Morrison, "Capitalist Roaders,” National 
Journal. (May 29.1993): 1283. as cited by Vincent A. Auger. Human Rights and Trade: 
The Clinton Administration and China. Pew Case Studies in International Affairs, 
Instructor Copy 168 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy 
Publications. School of Foreign Service. Georgetown University. 1995). 1-11.
124Auger, l-l 1.
I25lbid.
l26”The revocation of MFN would mean the abrogation of the 1980 U.S.-China 
Agreement on which the entire structure of the economic relationship is based. It would 
also mean that duty rates on imports from China would rise to the rates established in the 
1930's under the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act. Tariff rates for Chinese goods would rise 
from about 6-8% to as high as 40 to 50%. Since MFN is extended on a reciprocal basis, 
China would respond by blocking access to U.S. goods and putting U.S. investment at 
stake. American Electronics Association, MFN Fact Sheet.
127Auger, 7-9.
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Research Council.128 Their views were best summarized by John Shattuck, Assistant 
Secretary of State For Human Rights And Humanitarian Affairs:
"We must not assume that a free market in goods can produce a free 
market in ideas. Nor can we abandon our responsibility to support human 
rights around the world. The character of our relationship with China 
depends significantly on how the Chinese government treats its people.
The American people would have it no other way."129
Among many Congressional human rights advocates, a "third way”130 was 
offered as a compromise. It was proposed that singling out the Chinese state sector for 
penalties for the disrespect for universal human rights values would avoid undercutting 
China's dynamic private sector"'31 On the part of the human rights groups, penalizing 
only the Chinese state sector served as a conciliatory measure in hopes of appeasing the 
general tide in Congress toward full delinkage of trade and human rights. However, 
targeting only China's state enterprises was considered to be unworkable by the Clinton 
administration, given the growing complexity of China's economy. The definition of a
,28Robert S. Sutter. U.S. Policy Toward China (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998). 
chap.. 4.
129Assistant Secretary of State For Human Rights John Shattuck. China. Human Rights 
And MFN. 44-54.
lj0The Peace/Pelosi Bill was introduced to Congress in June of 1992. as an 
alternative solution to the two extremes of total delinkage of human rights and trade, or 
total granting of MFN to China. The bill called for increasing tariffs on imports 
produced by state-owned enterprises in the PRC as an appropriate response to China’s 
violations of internationally-accepted norms in human rights, nuclear proliferation and 
distortion of trade. Congress. House. Committee On Ways And Means, Subcommittee 
On Trade. Additional Requirements On The Extension O f China’s Most-Favored-Nation 
Trade Status In 1993. hearing, 102nd Cong.. 2nd sess.. 29 June 1992 (Washington, D.C.: 
GPO. 1992). H.R. 5318. 4-26.
131 Bernstein and Dicker. 46.
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state enterprise was thought to be problematic because of the difficulty in establishing 
the point where private ended and state began. Many of China’s firms were thought to 
be "quasi-capitalist.”132
Advocates of unconditional MFN to China argued that increased trade with and 
investment in China would be a positive force toward respect for human rights in China. 
That "revoking MFN would only suppress those factions in China who supported the 
U.S. position on human rights reform.133 Proponents believed that trade with and 
investment in China would serve as the conduit for human rights reform. They included 
business coalitions from the U.S.. China134 and Hong Kong, independent political and 
economic analysts, and Clinton advisors. Among the Clinton advisors in favor of 
delinking China’s human rights record from economic exchange were former President 
Jimmy Carter, former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and Cyrus Vance.135
L,: Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs Arnold Kanter. “U.S. Policy Objectives 
and MFN for China.” U.S. Department o f State Dispatch 3. no. 27 (July 6. 1992): 551- 
554. Kanter further explains "The silk industry is illustrative in this regard. The degree 
of'state' control of silk production and marketing increases as the product moves up the 
production chain into cloth fabrication, but the basic raw material, the silk cocoon, is 
produced by individual farm families and collectives, while finished silk garments are 
produced by joint ventures and wholly owned foreign enterprises. These quasi-capitalist 
farm enterprises and joint ventures would be harmed as much, if not more, by MFN 
revocation, as the state silk industry.”
133Auger. 3-11.
U4As Auger points out. "The Chinese government exerted pressure on the United States 
to end conditional MFN status by awarding over U.S. $1 billion in contracts to U.S. 
corporations in April of 1993. and at the same time by warning the U.S. that economic 
competitors of the U.S., especially those business competitors in Japan and western 
Europe would eagerly snap up any contracts that the U.S. lost.” Auger. 5.
b5Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance 
wrote letters to President Clinton advising him to “sever the ties between trade and 
human rights in the case of China.” Aryeh Neier, “Watching Rights,” The Nation 259,
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Assistant Secretary of State for Asian Affairs Winston Lord,136 former National Security 
Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown. National Security 
Advisor Anthony Lake, Secretary of the Treasury Lloyd Bentsen and an array of 
"centrist” Congressional leaders from both Republican and Democratic parties.137 As 
James Mann emphasized, with regard to the MFN issue. "Clinton was follower as much 
as a leader."138
In March of 1994. John Shattuck and Warren Christopher traveled to China for 
consultation over the MFN/human rights question. The mainland government 
deliberately detained some political dissidents to demonstrate its uncompromising 
position on human rights pressures. Chinese government official Chiang Tse-min 
informed Christopher that "Some people in the west are not concerned about the interest 
and well-being of tens of millions of Chinese people, but about those few who attempt to 
subvert the Chinese government and destabilize China. This is essentially a political
no. 9 (Sept. 26. 1994): 1.
l36Since Lord was the originator of the "get tough stance” on human rights in China, this 
represented a complete reversal of opinion. "In mid July of 1993. "Lord argued in a 
classified paper that the [U.S.-China] relationship was on a downward spiral and urged an 
entirely new strategy of intensive engagement with Beijing in which incentives would 
substitute for threats.” Elaine Sciolino, "Clinton and China: How Promise Self 
Destructed,” New York Times. 29 May 1994. A8.
lj7These centrist leaders included "Senators Dole (R). Boren (D), Kerry (D), Baucus (D), 
Bradley (D) and Johnston (D), and Representatives Foley (D), Hamilton (D), Gibbons 
(D). Matsui (D). McDermott (D). Ackerman (D) and Leach (R). See David M. Lampton. 
"America's China Policy in the Age of the Finance Minister: Clinton Ends Linkage,” 
China Ouarterly\39 (Sept. 1994): 606.
,38Mann. 313.
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issue, a legal issue, rather than a human rights issue.”139 Premier Li Peng advised 
Christopher that “China and the U.S. have different perceptions of human rights,140 and 
that China will not accept America’s human rights concept.”141 And Wu Yi. Beijing's 
Minister of External Economic Trade, stated that "making MFN status contingent upon 
human rights is unwise and lacks strategic vision.”142
Shortly before Secretary of State Christopher’s arrival in China, Shattuck had met 
with one of China's most outspoken political dissidents. Wei Jingsheng. "Shattuck had 
asked Wei which U.S. policy was more important to improving human rights; (i) having 
the United States apply direct pressure on the Chinese government, or (ii) having the 
United States voice public support for Chinese dissidents? Wei’s opinion was that the 
pressure on the regime was more crucial, because without it. statements of public support 
for dissidents would never be allowed to enter or be broadcast into China.”143
China's reaction to the 1994 visits by Christopher and Shattuck was disdainful.
U9Zheo. Suisheng. "Clinton’s Human Rights Policy and Beijing’s MFN Status,” World 
Outlook 3. no. 22(1994): 22.
140 Article 51 of the Chinese Constitution states: "The exercise by citizens- of their 
freedoms and rights may not infringe upon the interests of the state, or society and the 
collective." Therefore, the State mandates and withholds individual rights. Of all the 
various human rights, the "right to development has the strongest vote of approval among 
China's leaders.” James D. Seymour. "Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Relations,” in 
China and The World: Chinese Foreign Relations In The Post-Cold War Era. 3rd ed., ed. 
Samuel Kim (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 205. As Giles further explains, in China, 
human rights are not seen as individual, but rather collective, to live for others- for the 
collective good, instead of living for oneself. Lionel Giles, The Analects o f  Confucius 
(New York: The Hermitage Press, 1970), xi.
141 Seymour, 205.
I42Ibid. and People’s Daily, 15 Apr. 1994.
,43Mann. 298.
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Jiang Zemin remarked that John Shattuck’s meeting with Wei Jingsheng was 
"ridiculous, and that it showed a lack of sincerity to improve relations with China.”144 In 
a special dispatch from Beijing, published in Hong Kong, Jiang Zemin was quoted as 
saying that “dealing with Mr. Christopher was child’s play, and that all Mr. Christopher 
wanted to do in China was to play tricks.”145 "Since we could not control Christopher.” 
Jiang Zemin said, "we controlled the dissidents.”146 On May 23.1994. Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher met with President Clinton to discuss the human rights 
conditions contained in the Executive Order 12850 of May 1993. Christopher reported 
that China had met the first two mandatory conditions, which were: 1) progress on 
emigration, and 2) compliance with the prison labor agreement stipulated in the Jackson- 
Vanik Amendment. The other five human rights stipulations, Christopher reported, had 
not been met. Christopher left the final decision to renew China's MFN status to 
President Clinton.147
President Clinton, on May 26.1994. announced that the end of the usefulness of 
the 1993 policy on China had been reached, and that in the future there would be no link 
between China's human rights record and most-favored-nation status.148 As the 
President stated. "Pursuant to the requirements of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, only
144Congressman Christopher H. Smith. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Subcommittee On International Security, International Organizations And Human Rights 
In China, China Human Rights And MFN. hearing, 103rd Cong.. 2nd sess., 24 Mar. 1994 
(Washington. D.C.: GPO. 1994). opening statement.
145Congressman Smith. China. Human Rights And MFN, opening statement.
I46lbid.
147Auger. Human Rights and Trade: The Clinton Administration and China; Mann, 299.
I48lbid.
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freedom of emigration would be considered in subsequent decisions on the MFN 
waiver.”149 U.S. House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt and House Majority Whip 
David Bonior responded to the decision by introducing legislation that proposed the very 
sanctions Clinton chose not to impose.
After Clinton reversed his 1993 policy, he increasingly transferred human rights 
responsibilities to U.S. corporations. President Clinton established, in 1994, a new 
human rights strategy. One in which U.S. corporations would help to advance the cause 
of human rights in China, and elsewhere, through voluntary codes of conduct.130 The 
President also stated that he would seek to multilateralize efforts to improve human 
rights in China through such mechanisms as the United Nations and Non-Governmental 
Organizations.131
The United States-China Act of 1994 (H.R. 4590). introduced in Congress by 
Representatives Nancy Polosi. David Bonoir and Richard Gephardt, asked that American 
businesses in China adopt the following commitments:
. To follow internationally recognized human rights principles:
. To adopt nondiscriminatory employment practices:
. Not to knowingly use prison labor;
l49Ibid.
150A business code of conduct "is a statement of principles a business agrees to abide by 
voluntarily over the course of its operations. Corporate codes of conduct have become 
relatively commonplace in the United States. Surveys in the late 1980's suggest that, at 
that time, as many as 77% of large U.S. corporations had some sort of corporate code of 
conduct." Craig Forcese. Commerce with Conscience? Human Rights and Business 
Codes oj Conduct (Montreal: International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic 
Development. 1997). 14.
151Kerry Dumbaugh. China's iVtFN Status: Implications o f  the 1994 Decision, CRS 
Report for Congress (Aug. 15.1994), 5.
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. To recognize the rights of workers to organize and bargain collectively;
. To discourage mandatory political indoctrination in the workplace.152
But even before Clinton’s promotion of human rights through the private sector, several 
U.S. corporations had already responded to international human rights abuses. One such 
company was Reebok International, which adopted a set of human rights principles, in 
1990, to be utilized in operations overseas, including business operations in China.153 
The Reebok principles, exhibited in Table 3.4. underscore such basic democratic tenets 
as freedom of assembly and association.
Other U.S. corporations adopted similar codes of ethical conduct. In 1992, Levi 
Strauss & Co.. for example, withdrew from China when it was discovered through 
corporate avenues that its suppliers were utilizing prison labor. At the same time, Levi 
Strauss ceased all direct foreign investment in China, pending on the improvement of 
human rights conditions, and also withdrew from Myanmar when its military regime 
silenced a human rights movement. Timberiand Corporation also bans business relations 
with countries that violate basic human rights.154 A 1996 survey, conducted by the U.S. 
Department of Labor, of 42 major U.S. apparel manufacturers, department stores and 
mass merchandisers, as measured by 1995 annual sales, found that 36 firms had adopted
l52Dumbaugh. 5.
l530rentlicher and Gelatt, 108.
154 Amy Borrus and Joyce Bamatham. “Staunching the Flow of China's Gulag Exports.” 
Business Week (Apr. 13. 1992): 51-52. as cited by Lance A. Compa and Tashia 
Hinchliffe Darricarrere. “Private Labor Rights Enforcement Through Corporate Codes of 
Conduct.”in Human Rights, Labor Rights, and International Trade, eds. Lance A. Compa 
and Stephen F. Diamond (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 190.
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Reebok International Human Rights Policy / 1990
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1. Reebok will not operate under martial law conditions or allow any military presence
on its premises.
2. Reebok encourages free association and assembly among its employees.
3. Reebok will seek to ensure that opportunities for advancement are based on 
initiative, leadership and contributions to the business, not political beliefs.
4. Reebok will seek to prevent compulsory political indoctrination programs from 
taking place on its premises.
5. Reebok reaffirms that it deplores the use of force against human rights.
Source: Diane F. Orentlicher and Timothy A. Gelatt. "Public Law, Private Actors: The 
Impact.of Human Rights on Business Investors in China.” Northwestern Journal o f  
International Law & Business 14 (1993): 108.
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Table 3.5
U.S. Department of Labor Survey Results
Labor Right Number of Firms
Freedom of Association 2 5%
Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively 2 5%
Prohibition of Forced Labor 27 73%
Prohibition of Child Labor 29 78%
Non-discrimination in Employment 19 51%
Safe and Healthful Work Environment 22 59%
Fair Wages 8 22%
Working Hours and Overtime 12 59%
Sources: Craig Forcese. Commerce with Conscience? Human Rights and 
Business Codes o f Conduct (Montreal: International Centre for Human Rights 
and Democratic Development. 1997). 21. Department of Labor. The 
Apparel Industry and Codes o f Conduct: A Solution to the International 
Child Labour Problem? (Washington. D.C. U.S. Department of Labor.
1996).
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some form of human rights policy.155 Table 3.5 displays the breakdown for firms by 
labor or human rights. The largest percentage of those firms (78 percent) prohibited 
child labor, and the next largest percentage (73 percent) prohibited forced labor.
Freedom of association, the right to organize and bargain collectively, and fair wages 
were among the lowest percentages, at 5 percent, 5 percent and 22 percent, respectively. 
In another survey, roughly 10 percent of U.S. multinationals had overseas guidelines on 
human rights.156 "Human rights codes of conduct are becoming increasingly popular 
among U.S. firms, particularly those firms selling consumer products. At the same time, 
these codes suffer from several shortcomings, particularly in the area of monitoring and 
enforcement.”157
SUMMARY
U.S. economic policy toward China has changed very little since the late 1960's. 
Minor changes in the motivation behind trade policy toward China did exist, however, 
between Cold War and post-Cold War presidents. The impetus for opening trade with 
China during the Cold War years was not only to expand markets for U.S. products, but 
also to weaken Sovietism by befriending its communist ally. The most staunch advocate
l55Forcese. 21-22; Department of Labor, The Apparel Industry and Codes o f  
Conduct: A Solution to the International Child Labour ProA/emPf Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Labor, 1996).
l56"This Boston-based pollster focused on major U.S. retailers and brand nam e goods 
manufacturers. Simon Billenness, Franklin Research and Development, personal 
communication of Feb. 1997 by Craig Forcese. Forcese, 20.
,57Forcese. 30.
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of U.S.-China trade induced by the Soviet threat was, of course, President Reagan, who 
had taken Kissinger’s realpolitik approach toward China to its greatest degree. With the 
end of the Cold War, and with it the Soviet threat, Clinton was free to focus on economic 
issues, which became the centerpiece of his campaign platform.
The single thread that was indicative of United States presidential 
administrations, since 1972. was that all administrations condoned the opening of trade 
with China and took steps, through legislation and diplomacy, to increase trade with and 
investment in China. Presidents Nixon. Ford. Carter. Bush, Reagan and Clinton all 
followed a similar pattern of trade liberalization.
Despite questionable human rights practices in countries with which the United 
States has engaged in aid, trade or direct investment, the most outspoken human rights 
advocate. President Carter, did not use economic sanctions as a leverage to improve 
human rights. By 1994, the Clinton administration combined both public and private 
sectors in recommending that U.S. corporations, voluntarily, provide measures to assure 
that internationally recognized human rights are not violated in countries where U.S. 
business is conducted.
The trade and human rights linkage is not new to U.S. foreign policy. More than 
one hundred years ago. with the passing of the U.S. Tariff Act of 1890, trade and human 
rights were inexplicably linked. Economic and political strategies may have altered 
slightly during the past decades. But overall, the U.S. trade policy toward China, and the 
linkage of trade and human rights has been consistent throughout history.
Even after the 1994 decision, however, the relationship between trade and hum an 
rights continued to be a major issue of contention among U.S. policy-makers. By
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assigning much of the moral and social responsibility to U.S. corporations, the linkage 
between economic and social considerations has remained a vital issue. The prospect of 
China's entry into the World Trade Organization has not yet lessened the debacle of 
trade and human rights in U.S. foreign policy.
The following chapter will discuss the U.S. 1994 decision, in detail, and will 
place each of the first three stated hypotheses into a competing theoretical argument, 
offering further insights into the motivations behind the 1994 U.S. decision to end the 
connection between China's human rights practices and MFN.
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CHAPTER IV 
DELINKING TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
The previous chapter advanced that there had been relatively little change, 
historically, in the U.S.-China trade and economic policy of past U.S. presidential 
administrations since 1972. The linkage of trade and human rights was shown to be 
evident for over a century in U.S. foreign economic policy-making. Respect for 
individual human rights was a consistent part of U.S. ideology, in principle, when 
engaging in economic relations with countries. Respective or irrespective of human 
rights, it was concluded that the U.S. policy of economic engagement with China had 
been historically consistent since 1972. The significance of the 1994 Executive decision, 
however, was that the decision and public decree of the separation of trade and human 
rights meant that MFN. clearly the single most powerful U.S. economic lever, officially 
and legally, could no longer be used as a vehicle, in terms of either threat1 or action to 
improve human rights in China.
To review, the purpose of this study is to establish a relationship between the 
economic interdependence of nations and the moral responsibilities of nations by 
examining and analyzing the U.S.-China case of the 1994 decision by the Clinton 
administration to separate China’s human rights practices from most-favored-nation 
(MFN) status. By investigating the U.S.-China bilateral relationship, this research will 
attempt to provide insights into explanations for the motivations of U.S. government
'"In U.S. international economic policymaking, the threat of a congressional action can 
affect the substance of executive branch policy and its international negotiating efforts.” 
Cohen. The Making o f United States International Economic Policy, 109.
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leaders who were involved in the 1994 U.S. decision, while gaining a greater 
understanding into the broader relationship between market forces and ethical principles.
This chapter examines the U.S.-China case, in detail, by applying competing 
theoretical paradigms in order to discern more thoroughly the motives for the 1994 U.S. 
decision. The chapter is divided into three major sections. Each section focuses on one 
of the three-stated hypotheses presented in the first chapter. Following each section is a 
critical evaluation of the theoretical argument put forth.
NATIONAL INTERESTS
As indicated in chapter one. the first hypothesis, premised on realism, was that 
the U.S. intent to sustain and increase power in the Asian region influenced the 1994 
decision to separate China's human rights record from most-favored-nation status. The 
realist argument espouses that "the primary obligation of every state— the goal to which 
all other objectives shall be subordinated— is to promote the national interest, defined as 
the acquisition of power."2 The economic policies of nations are therefore judged 
primarily from the point o f view of their contribution to national power.3
According to the tenets of realism, the superior economic capabilities of a state 
can be used as direct leverage4 over the "outside world.”5 National security6 interests
:Kegley. "The Neoiiberal Challenge,” 4-5; Keohane andNye, II.
JMorganthau. 29.
4Klaus Knorr defines leverage as "one actor using a lever to gain advantage over another
actor. National economic capabilities that afford international leverage can be used for
four distinct purposes. The first is coercion. A can withhold or threaten to withhold
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were the impetus behind U.S.-China policy. U.S. economic strength at home and 
abroad, particularly in the Asian-Pacific region, would be enhanced and expanded by 
fully engaging China.7 Therefore, it was in the U.S. interest to grant most-favored- 
nation status to China without attaching human rights conditions- conditions that were 
viewed by proponents of unconditional trade to impede the process of trade liberalization 
and diplomatic relations between the two countries.
something of value to B in order to make B comply with some specified form of 
behavior. The second purpose is to extract monopoly profit from market control over a 
highly valued product. Thus, A announces to all states that they can buy a particular 
commodity only at high prices substantially exceeding marginal production costs. Third, 
is to have direct impact on another state's economic security, welfare, and capabilities 
without any attempt at compelling it to behave in a specified way. The desired impact 
can be harmful or beneficial. A may withhold certain commodities, financial aid, or his 
market from B in order to weaken him economically or in some other way. Thus, in 
times of military conflict [such as the United States action with the former Soviet Union]. 
A may refuse to export to B certain goods that are expected to enhance B's military 
capabilities. On the other hand. A may give financial aid or other economic valuables to 
B in order to strengthen him economically or in some other way. The fourth purpose is 
being pursued when a government gives economic valuables to another country in order 
to gain a position of general influence over it. For example, beginning in 1956. the 
Soviet Union gave economic aid to Egypt and other Arab countries to achieve influence 
over them. Similarly, the United States has extended aid to Latin American countries in 
order to maintain or increase its regional influence.'’ Knorr further explains that “the four 
purposes of using economic leverage are, of course, analytical distinctions. In the real 
world, some of these purposes may be combined in a particular policy ."[emphasis added] 
Klaus Knorr. “International Economic Leverage and its Uses.” in Economic Issues and 
National Security, eds. Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager (National Security Education 
Program: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1977), 99-101.
5Knorr. 99.
6"The term ‘national security' needs to have its definition broadened to include economic 
strength and stability along with military strength and deterrence. A strong domestic 
economic base is therefore a critical pre-requisite, at least for a democracy, for assuming 
superpower status.” Cohen. The Making o f United States International Policy, 27.
7A s Richard Haass contended, “...the support of liberal trade and multilateralism helped 
to assure the U.S. military and economic hegemonic position,” Haass, 43-45.
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Table 4.1
A Comparison Of (GDP) Growth Rates In Real Term 
Of Major Developed Countries/Regions of The World 1988-1992 
(Annual Change in Percent)
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
World 4.3 3.3 2.3 0.1 l.l
Developed
Countries
4.3 3.3 2.4 0.6 1.7
Japan 6.2 4.7 5.2 4.4 2.0
United States 3.9 2.5 0.8 -1.2 1.9
European Union 4.0 3.5 3.8 0.8 1.4
Germany* 3.7 oo 4.5 0.9 1.8
United Kingdom 4.3 2.3 1.0 -2.2 -0.8
France 4.5 4.1 2.2 1.2 2.2
Source: World Economic Outlook 1992 (Was tington. D.C.: International
Monetary Fund. 1993).
*Note: Data through 1990 apply to West Germany only. 
*Note: Data for 1992 were estimates
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To begin, there were international macroeconomic conditions that influenced the 
U.S. national interest in forming closer economic ties with China. Starting in 1991, there 
was a slowdown in the growth o f the world economy. The Japanese high growth 
“bubble economy” of the I980's had burst. At the same time, western European nations 
were experiencing sluggish GDP growth rates together with high unemployment. Table 
4.1 reflects that in the developed countries and in the world, GDP growth rates dropped 
considerably in 1991. In particular, in 1991, both the United States and the United 
Kingdom experienced negative growth rates o f-1.2 percent and -2.2 percent, 
respectively, while the total world growth rate declined from 4.3 percent, in 1988, to 0.1 
percent, in 1992. The demise of the Soviet Union and the socio-economic complications 
of a newly- reunified Germany intensified the economic stagnation in western Europe.
The slowdown in the world economy, in 1991, affected the growth rate of the 
volume of total U.S. exports to the world, which increased 83 percent from 1986 to 
1991, but then decreased considerably to a 9 percent growth rate between 1991 and
1994.8 The decrease in the U.S. volume of exports, in turn, negatively affected the 
growth rate of U.S. jobs, particularly jobs in the high technology industries. From 1991 
to 1994, the decline in the growth rate of jobs was concentrated in three high technology 
industry groups: 1) electronic components, 2) computing equipment and 3) aircraft 
engines, parts and equipment9
8Lester A. Davis, Office o f International Macroeconomic Analysis, Office of the Chief 
Economist U.S. Jobs Supported by Goods and Services Exports 1983-94 (Washington, 
D.C.: Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration, 1996), 12.
9Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
117
Table 4.2
Top Ten U.S. Exports To and Imports From China 
During The Year 1993 ($U.S. Million)
Industry V alue A m ount
Top T en  E xports T o C hina








Data processing equipment 167
Heating and cooling equipment 160
T op T en Im ports F rom  C hina
Footwear 4,520
Baby carriages, toys, games, sporting goods 4,459
W omen's and g irl's  coats/capes, etc (textile) T TV)
Other articles o f  apparel 1.599
Trunks, suitcases, vanity cases, briefcases 1.321
M ens/boys'coats. jackets (textile) 1,126
Articles o f  plastic 969
Telecommunications equipment 917
Radio broadcast receivers 914
Misc. articles, candles, umbrellas 912
Source: Congressional Quarterly 4. no. 14 (Apr. 15, 1994): 318.
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Table 4.3
Ten High-Technology* Individual Industries with the Highest Number of U.S. Jobs 
Supported Directly and Indirectly* by Goods Exports in 1994 
(1,000's of Jobs in Decreasing Rank)
Industry Number of Jobs
Computing equipment 128.9
Aircraft 111.7
Solid state semi-conductors 93.2
Other electronic components 83.9
Other aircraft parts & equip. 73.7
Other non-elec. measuring inst. 59.3
Aircraft & missile engines 55.7
Medical instruments 33.5
Industrial inorganic chemicals 32.0
Telephone & telegraph eq. 28.2
Source: Lester A. Davis. Office of International Macroeconomic Analysis. Office of the 
Chief Economist. U.S. Jobs Supported by Goods and Services Exports 1983-94 
(Washington. D.C.: Department of Commerce. Economics and Statistics 
Administration. 1996). 14. 38.
*Note: There are ten (10) industrial groups that are defined as “high-technology" 
industries by the U.S. Department of Commerce in terms of the 1987 SIC (Standard 
Industrial Classification of the United States) DOC-3 definition. They are: 1) Industrial 
inorganic chemicals: 2) Plastic materials & synthetic resins, rubbers & fibers: 3) Drugs 
& medicines: 4) Ordinance & Accessories; 5) Engines, turbines & parts; 6) Office, 
computing & electronic components; 7) Communication equip. & electronic 
components: 8) Aircraft & parts; 9) Guided missiles & spacecraft; 10) Professional & 
scientific instruments.
*Note: U.S. jobs supported directly and indirectly include jobs upstream in the 
production process and jobs downstream in the production process. Upstream jobs 
(production-oriented) include: Research & Development. Design, Purchasing, 
Manufacturing. Downstream jobs (to move the product through the market) include: 
Marketing, Selling. Distribution and Service. Source: George S. Yip, Total Global 
Strategy (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1992), 105.
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Between 1991 and 1994, U.S. jobs in the high technology sectors supported by 
goods exports decreased by 138,000.'° The greater part of the job decrease was in the 
aircraft industry, which experienced a 34 percent lower volume of jobs in 1994 than in 
1991." In recent years, the U.S. commercial aircraft industry had supplied 95 percent of 
China's total aircraft purchases.12 Table 4.2 demonstrates that of the total U.S. high 
technology exports, the aircraft industry represented to the U.S. the highest value amount 
in exports to China, totaling $2.2 billion for the year 1993. In terms of all U.S. high 
technology industries, the U.S. aircraft industry represented the second largest employer 
supported by goods exports, creating nearly 250.000 U.S. jobs (including aircraft parts 
and missile engines) in 1994, first only to the computing equipment industry, which 
accounted for 128,000 jobs supported by exports, as indicated in Table 4.3.
While the United States. European and Japanese economies were stagnating. 
China was experiencing an average GDP growth rate of 12.3 percent between 1991 and
1993. and by 1993. 13.7 percent.13 Figure 4.1 indicates China's rapid economic 
ascendancy, where the absolute GDP increased from U.S. $391.1 billion, in 1985 to $630 
billion, in 1994. China represented to the U.S. a fertile and growing economy for 
exports, imports and investment. The sluggish economic growth of the U.S. domestic
,0Ibid.. 13.
"Ibid.
l2Jan Prybyla. “How Should the U.S. Handle Trade Issues with China?” East Asian 
Executive Reports (Apr. 1993): 13.
"World Bank, Global Economic Prospects And The Developing Countries 
(Washington. D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1995). 
78.
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economy would be reversed by opening the China market through the permanent 
granting of MFN. thereby increasing the U.S. competitive position in the Asian-Pacific 
region, and in the global economy. In his first presidential debate, Clinton emphasized 
the importance of United States economic security:
”In order to keep America the strongest nation in the world, we need 
some continuity and change. We have to face that fact that in this world, 
economic security is a whole lot of national security.. .”14 The importance 
of the United States’ economic security was exemplified in Clinton’s new 
“economic model.” Clinton created the National Economic Council 
(NEC), patterned after the National Security Council (NSC), dating back 
to the Truman administration.15 “While pledging to continue to pressure 
Beijing on human rights. Clinton couched his change of heart in 
economic and geopolitical terms, citing U.S. interest in profiting from 
Asia's economic boom and thwarting North Korea's nuclear weapons 
program."16
14 Washington Post. “Campaign *92: Transcript Of The First Presidential Debate.”
12 Oct. 1991. A16.
l5David Rosenbaum. “In a Dissonant White House. The Economics Team Hums,” New 
York Times. 27 May 1994. Al. Clinton’s economic team included Lloyd 
Bentsen Secretary of the Treasury, Leon Panetta Budget Director. Laura Tyson 
Chairwoman of the Council of Economic Advisers, Ron Brown Secretary of Commerce, 
and Jerry Rubin, who headed a new coordinating structure called the National Economic 
Council.
l6Daniel Williams. “U.S. Stress On Rights Gives Way,” Washington Post, 27 May 1994, 
Al.
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In 1994, after the formation of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). Clinton sought to liberalize trans-Pacific trade. As Clinton remarked:
"By taking the courageous steps of opening trade in our own hemisphere, 
we have the economic, the political and the moral standing to make the 
case that ought to be done throughout the world, that America is serious 
about lowering trade barriers and promoting growth in our country and 
throughout the globe.”17
Human rights considerations became increasingly subordinated to concerns for U.S. 
economic expansion in the Asian region. In April of 1994. one month before the 
decision to end the ties between human rights and trade, an informal debate had taken 
place in the White House among the President and his top aids. When National Security 
Advisor. Anthony Lake, recommended some partial sanctions the U.S. might have 
imposed on China in the event of human rights violations, he was interrupted by 
Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown who asserted;
"This is not what we ought to be talking about.”18 
Secretary Brown challenged the moral superiority of those worrying about human rights 
in China more than economic growth in America.
l7Karl Schoenberger and Leslie Helm. "Clinton Targets Pacific Rim for Trade Crusade,” 
Los Angeles Times. 9 Nov. 1993. Al. A3.
l8Robert S. Greenberger and Michael K. Frisby, “Clinton’s Renewal of Trade Status for 
China Followed Cabinet Debates. Congress’s Sea Change.” Wall Street Journal, 31 May
1994. Al 8.
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Secretary Brown further articulated during the course of the meeting;
“Look at some of these inner cities; take a ride over to Anacostia (a 
section of Washington. D.C.). What about their human rights?”19
Madeleine Albright, then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, replied;
“How can you be so insensitive to human rights in China?”20
Secretary Brown assured the American Chamber of Commerce that politics would no 
longer be a detriment to foreign competitors in the China market.21 Brown wanted to 
“tilt the field” in favor of U.S. businesses, even if it meant a revival of low cost credits to 
help U.S. firms compete with European and Japanese interests in China. A prevailing 
factor that had influenced the 1994 decision was the growing U.S. trade deficit with 
China, which was thought by U.S. officials to impede U.S. domestic and international 
economic strength by its negative effect on U.S. producers, consumers and workers.
Table 4.4 verifies that, in 1994, the U.S. trade deficit with China was U.S. $-32 
billion, the second highest after the trade deficit with Japan, at $-65.7 billion. U.S. 
officials accused China of having a mercantilist trade regime, imposing high tariff rates 
and protectionist policies on U.S. goods and investment, thereby contributing to the 
U.S.-China skewed trade relationship. As shown in Figure 4.2. the United States 
experienced a rapidly growing trade deficit with China beginning in the year 1986, at
,9Ibid.
20Ibid.
*'Lincoln Kaye. "Commerce Kowtow: Human rights concerns lost in rush of U.S. deals,” 
Far Eastern Economic Review (Sept. 8.1994): 16-17.
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Table 4.4
Comparison of U.S. Trade Balance With Selected Asian Nations 
During The Year 1994 ($U.S. Billion)
U.S. Exports U.S. Imports Balance (x-m)
Japan 53.4 119.1 -65.7
China 9.3 41.3 -32.0
Hong Kong 11.4 9.7 1.7
South Korea 18.0 19.7 -1.7
Taiwan 17.1 26.7 -9.6
Singapore 13.0 15.3 -2.3
Source: United States Foreign Trade Highlights. 1994 ed.
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U.S. $-1.6 billion and increasing to $-32 billion by 1994. By 1994. U.S. imports 
from China, amounting to $41.3 billion, far exceeded U.S. exports to China, at $9.3 
billion. The eminent regard for U.S. power and hegemony on the Asian continent 
through the attainment of superior economic capabilities was articulated in the 
statements and discussions of U.S. government officials and analysts. In February of 
1994, for example, three months before the Executive decision was made to end the 
connection between trade and human rights. Arnold Kanter. Under Secretary For 
Political Affairs, underscored a U.S.-China economic policy that was driven by U.S. 
national interests, specifically the maintenance and enlargement of the U.S. position as a 
global economic power. Kanter testified before the United States Senate:
“This committee knows better than anyone that the economic future of the 
United States depends upon the strong, competitive position of American 
firms in all regions of the world.”22
The U.S. interest for power in the Asian region was illustrated through public 
statements that were articulated in the Congress about China's threat as a rising 
superpower in the Asian region.23
"Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Arnold Kanter. Congress, Senate, 
Committee On Finance. Extending China's MFN Status, hearing, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., 
30 July 1992 (Washington, D.C.: GPO. 1992). 16.
2j A s  Senator Charles S. Robb of Virgina stated, "I would submit that it is in our 
national strategic interest to engage mainland China now and in the future, 
notwithstanding the breadth and scope of disagreements that may arise between our two 
countries. Not doing so risks, if not in the short term, a major rupture in relations in the 
long term with the most powerful nation in east Asia at the very time the so-called Pacific 
Century approaches.. .  In crafting an approach on China’s MFN status these next few 
weeks. I would encourage the administration to keep in mind our larger priorities...” 
Senator Charles S. Robb, Congress, Senate, Committee On Foreign Relations, U.S.
Policy Toward China, hearing, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., 4 May 1994 (Washington, D.C.:
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For example, in a conversation before the House between Congressman Gary Ackerman 
of New York and former U.S. Ambassador to China, James Lilly. Ackerman expressed 
concern for China’s economic leverage over North Korea: Congressman Ackerman;
”If China was not fully engaged on an economic basis with North Korea, 
would they cease to have influence on that government?”24
Mr. Lilley;
•‘My sense is that when you use leverage like this, it is not a zero sum 
game. It is a game of what we call China’s ‘wearing the small shoes,’ 
pinching slow water torture, pushing your target in a certain direction, 
moving somebody, let’s say. 20 degrees in one direction.”25
Congressman Ackerman:
"This is Asian Philosophy?”26
Mr. Lilley:
GPO. 1994). 2.
24Congressman Gary L. Ackerman of New York. Congress. House. Committee On 
Foreign Affairs. Subcommittees on Economic Policy. Trade And Environment, 
International Security. International Organizations and Human Rights. And Asia And The 
Pacific. Future o f United States-China Policy. hearing, 103rd Cong.. 1st sess.. 20 May 
1993 (Washington. D.C.: GPO), 10-12.
25Ambassador James Lilley, Congress, House, Committee On Foreign Affairs, 
Subcommittees on Economic Policy. Trade And Environment. International Security, 
International Organizations and Human Rights, And Asia And The Pacific, Future o f  
United States-China Policy. hearing. 103rd Cong.. 1st sess., 20 May 1993 (Washington, 
D.C.: GPO). 10-12.
26Congressman Ackerman, Future o f  United States-China Policy, 10-12.
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■'•Wearing small shoes’ is a Chinese expression. But they feel that what 
the Chinese are trying to do is walk a line between using their leverage to 
get certain advantages which are in their interest, namely to enhance their 
position in the world, to get good trading relationships with the South, 
and keep the buffer zone in North Korea.”27
And. in another question addressed to Mr. Lilley by Congressman Smith;
"Is it a long-term goal on the part of the Chinese in terms of
hegemony?”28
Mr. Lilley;
"When you deal with China, you are dealing with contradictions. Look at 
the history of their support for insurgency in southeast Asia. They were 
pouring money into all kinds of insurgencies while they maintained 
friendly relations with the governments involved. The answer was. we 
have friendship with governments but we support the international 
proletarian movement... We cannot isolate China. For 5.000 years they 
lived under authoritarian rule. We must engage them. It is too easy to go 
back to authoritarian rule and isolationism for China”29
Thomas W. Robinson. President of the American Asian Research Enterprises further 
articulated the threat of China as a global power "China will never again be a weak 
country. It is becoming, in fact a global power, eventually a superpower. Growing
:7Ambassador Lilley, Future o f United States-China Policy. 10-12.
^Congressman Christopher H. Smith of New Jersey. Congress. House, Committee On 
Foreign Affairs Subcommittees on Economic Policy, Trade And Environment, 
International Security. International Organizations and Human Rights, And Asia And The 
Pacific, Future o f United States-China Policy, hearing, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., 20 May 
1993 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993), 44.
29 Ambassador Lilley, Future o f  United States-China Policy, 10-12.
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Chinese power can be ignored for a few years or more, but eventually China will project 
its power even more and in every regard.*’30 And in another example: Senator Larry 
Pressler to Ambassador Lord;
“Regarding India, in December, an Indian official told me of the Chinese 
intent on regional dominance. Is this concern justified?”31
Some U.S. policy-makers thought that withdrawing or conditioning China’s 
MFN on the basis of China's human rights conditions, would mean a loss of 
competitiveness for U.S. firms in the China market. Loss of competitiveness would also 
mean a loss of U.S. national power because of a weakened private sector. “Japan, 
Taiwan and the EU would supplant the United States and it would take the United States 
years to regain its current position as China's major western trading partner.”32 Former 
U.S. Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and Cyrus Vance publicly commended the 
1994 Clinton decision for this reason:
°President of American Asian Research Enterprises Thomas W. Robinson. Congress. 
House Committee On Foreign Relations, Subcommittees On Economic Policy, Trade 
And Environment, International Security. International Organizations and Human Rights. 
And Asia And The Pacific, Future o f United States-China Policy, hearing, 103rd Cong., 
1st sess., 20 May 1993 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993). 89.
Jl Senator Larry Pressler of South Dakota. Senate, Committee On Foreign Relations. 
Subcommittee On East Asian And Pacific Affairs, U.S. Policy Toward China, hearing, 
103 rd Cong.. 2nd sess., 4 May 1994 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994), 27.
■’2 Assistant U.S. Trade Representative Ira Wolf, Congress, Senate, Committee On 
Finance, Extending China s MFN Status, hearing, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., 30 July 1992 
(Washington. D.C.: GPO. 1992), 19.
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"President Clinton made a difficult but correct decision. America's 
broader interests in Asia require a reasonable relationship with the 
region’s emerging superpower. European, Japanese and other 
businessmen would have rushed to fill the resulting vacuum. America 
would have been isolated.”33
In many respects, the U.S. national interest did drive the U.S. economic policy of 
delinkage, in 1994. Withdrawing or conditioning MFN would have been a call for 
disaster to U.S. workers, consumers and employers. For American workers, it may have 
meant the loss of jobs. Of the 250.000 total jobs supported by U.S. aircraft exports to 
foreign markets, a percentage of those jobs that depend on the China market for sales and 
profits would be put at risk. Moreover. U.S. aircraft exports, of which the U.S. enjoyed a 
monopoly in the China market, may. for example, have been lost to foreign competitors, 
such as. for instance, the European Airbus consortium.34
U.S. jobs would also have been maintained and increased in the agricultural 
sector through unconditional MFN to China. U.S. fertilizers and wheat accounted for 
U.S. $567 million in 1993. as displayed previously in Table 4.2. U.S. farmers could 
have potentially lost millions of commodities sold to China annually and would also 
have lost the opportunity of future food and fiber sales to one of the most populous 
countries in the world.35 For U.S. manufacturers and importers of consumer goods,
33Henry A. Kissinger and Cyrus R. Vance. “The Right Decision on China,”
Washington Post. 6 June 1994. A19.
j4Hobart Rowen, "Administration in Disarray On China Trade Policy.” Washington 
Post. 20 Mar. 1994. HI.
^President of the American Farm Bureau Federation Dean Kleckner, Regarding Clinton’s 
Renewal o f  Most Favored Nation Status for China, 1997, on-line, available from 
www. fb/news/nr/nr97/nr0519.html.
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conditioning or revoking MFN would have led to billions of dollars in lost retail goods 
in the event that China retaliated with higher tariffs and other types of trade sanctions on 
finished goods. By the early 1990's, China supplied 48 percent of the toys in the U.S. 
market. 14 percent of imported garments and 15 percent of the footwear sold in the 
United States.36 The mark-up on prices would have negatively affected middle and 
lower income Americans who would have been compelled to pay higher prices for 
consumer goods produced in China because of higher import tariffs. Cheaper prices for 
consumers would create an increased demand for goods in the U.S. market. The 
increased demand for finished goods would in turn generate an increase in U.S. jobs in 
the importing and retailing sectors of the economy.37
Table 4.5 indicates the tariff rates with and without MFN on major U.S. imports 
from China. As shown. U.S. import tariffs on Chinese goods would have risen 
substantially were MFN to have been revoked. Footwear would increase from 6 percent 
to 35 percent. Various garments would increase from 6 percent to 60 percent, and toys
6.8 percent to 70 percent.
j6Ambassador and Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Michael H. Moscow, Congress, 
House. Ways And Means Committee, Subcommittee On Trade. Additional Requirements 
On The Extension O f China's Most-Favored-Nation Trade Status In 1993, hearing, 102nd 
Cong., 2nd sess.. 29 June 1992 (Washington, D.C.: GPO. 1992), 42.
■7Ambassador Moscow, Additional Requirements On The Extension O f China s Most- 
Favored-Nation Trade Status In 1993.42.
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T able 4.5
C om parison  o f  T a r if f  R ates W ith  an d  W ithout M FN  
on M ajor U .S . Im ports F rom  C hina
Product M FN  T ariff N on-M FN  T a rif f
Footwear (uppers over 
90% plastic)
6% 35%
Sweaters, shorts & vests 6% 60%
Toys, garments, baby 
carriages, etc.
6.8% 70%
Luggage (outer surface 
man-made fibers)
20.8% 65%
Luggage (outer surface 
ramie, ju te)
6.5% 40%
Gloves, Mittens (leather) 3.5% 45%
Leather Belts 5.3% 35.%
Cordless Phones 6% 35%
Christmas Tree Lights 8% 50%
Source: Testimony o f  the Fashion Accessories Shippers Association.
Congress. House. Committee On Ways and Means. U.S.- China Relations. 
hearing. 102nd Cong.. 2nd sess.. 29 June 1992 (W ashington. D.C.: GPO. 1992).
147.
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Were U.S.-China trade restrictions to have been removed and MFN to have been 
granted unconditionally, U.S. exports would have risen, in part, because of China’s 
demand for high technology goods, goods in which the United States holds a 
comparative advantage. China’s demand and a more open market for high technology 
and capital intensive goods would serve to heighten the demand for skilled human 
capital in the U.S. labor market.38 China's demand for high technology and capital 
intensive goods would increase U.S. demand for jobs in high technology industries, both 
directly and indirectly, in the service support industries. U.S. jobs in the high technology 
industries that had been declining between 1991 and 1994 would then begin to rise.
U.S. interests in future revenue streams generated by China's increasingly 
prosperous market could be capitalized on by U.S. firms.39 U.S. firms, in their desire to 
be first to gain competitive market share in China, either through FDI or exports, saw 
great future profits from China’s potentially immense and growing consumer market. In 
total. U.S. firms, skilled workers and consumers would benefit by further opening of the 
China market through unconditional MFN. The granting of unconditional MFN to China 
would create a growing and healthy U.S. domestic economy. A healthy domestic 
economy would then ensure and increase the U.S. national security which would be
j8Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky stated: “We have a historic 
opportunity to expand our trade relations with China and to help create hundreds of 
thousands of high-wage jobs here in the United States through increased export. We have 
a great stake, not only from a global strategic perspective, but also from a domestic 
perspective in opening China’s markets and ensuring that China plays by the rules.” 
Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky, Congress, House, Committee On 
Ways And Means. Subcommittee On Trade. H.R. 4590 United States-China Act O f1994, 
hearing, 103rd Cong.. 2nd sess., 28 July 1994 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994), 103.
39Prybyla, 11-12.
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further enhanced by a strong U.S. presence in the Asian-Pacific region. Finally, it was 
in the U.S. national interest not to revoke or condition human rights on trade because of 
the rippling affect it would cause in the Asian region. A significant amount of U.S. trade 
with and investment in China is dependent on Hong Kong and Taiwan, which are 
heavily invested in China, and serve as economic segways to and from the Mainland for 
U.S. investors, importers and exporters.
Not only, therefore, would China have been affected by trade sanctions, but so 
would have the entire tri-lateral economic relationship of Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
China. Impediments to trade in the Asian region would not have been in the best 
interests of the United States because it would have deterred economic and diplomatic 
relations.411 Politically, revocation of MFN to China would have only weakened the U.S. 
influence on the policies and practices of the Chinese government by isolating China 
from U.S. commercial contacts. "If trade was disrupted, cooperation on other issues 
would probably have disintegrated/’41
40This position was forcefully advanced by U.S. Ambassador to China Winston Lord: 
"The President and others in the administration have emphasized on several occasions the 
importance of a stable and prosperous China for U.S. interests... Open societies do not 
attack each other, therefore, you have a more secure Asia, a more secure world.. . ” 
Ambassador Winston Lord. Congress, Senate. Committee On Foreign Relations. 
Subcommittee On East Asian And Pacific Affairs. U.S. Policy Toward China, hearing, 
103rd Cong., 2nd sess., 4 May 1994 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994), 6,25.
41 Williams. A28. Also, in 1991, China’s Vice Foreign Minister, Liu Huaqiu, was quoted 
as saying “if most-favored-nation status is revoked or the United States attaches 
conditions [to the extension], this will exert a very serious influence on U.S.-China 
relations...that there would be “an unprecedented decline in trade, a heavy blow to the 
1.300 U.S.-Chinese joint ventures and wholly owned U.S. companies operating 
here..serious restrictions on all exchanges and contacts and a major retrogression in the 
political relations between the two nations.” Don Oberdorfer and Lena H. Sun, “Chinese 
Warn U.S. About Trade Status,” Washington Post, 16 June 1991, A18.
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That the national interest was the driving force behind U.S. policy displayed 
some shortcomings, however. To begin, U.S. policy-makers who denounced the Chinese 
regime for supporting mercantilist trade practices may not have considered China’s total 
world trade. On the whole, trade statistics reflected that China was not a surplus country. 
Between the years 1980 and 1994, inclusive. China had been a net deficit country with 
the exceptions of only five years out of the fifteen total years, as shown in Figure 4.3. In 
1993. China had been running a negative trade balance with the world at $-12.2 billion. 
With more imports than exports. China's total world trade pattern revealed that it was 
not engaging in mercantilist practices.
The unfavorable U.S. trade balance with China that U.S. policy-makers 
frequently cited in policy debates, was (and is) in part, due to direct foreign investment 
through U.S. firms. Much of China’s exports accrue from foreign money investment 
going back to the United States. As earlier mentioned, in chapter three, in 1993, when 
U.S. inflows to China increased to $2.0 billion. China’s exports to the U.S. increased by 
9 percent from the previous year.42 By the early 1990’s, almost half of China's exports 
were processed or assembled and contained 80 percent foreign intermediate or final 
parts. From these processed exports, China earns only twenty cents on the dollar.43
42Refer to Table 3.2.
4jSung Yun-wing. The China-Hong Kong Connection: The Key to China’s Open-Door 
Policy> (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 301.
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In U.S. trade data, however. China is calculated as having earned the full dollar. 
This calculation, in effect, misrepresents China’s actual export earnings. U.S. direct 
foreign investment does not enter into official U.S. trade data reports even though a 
significant portion of U.S.-China trade occurs through FDI avenues. The nationalist 
argument faulting China for the U.S. trade deficit evidenced some deficiencies. For one. 
was the role of Hong Kong as entrepot. In 1990. for example, two thirds of China’s 
exports to the U.S. were first being sold to Hong Kong and then re-exported to the U.S. 
Indirect sales of U.S. goods through Hong Kong are not counted in U.S. official data, so 
that U.S. exports to China appear somewhat less than in reality.
Table 4.6 indicates the adjusted and unadjusted trade balance before and after 
accounting for re-exports through Hong Kong for both the U.S. and China. For the year 
1993. for example. U.S. data show a bilateral trade balance of U.S. $-29.5 billion, while 
China's data show a bilateral balance, for the same year, of $-7.5 billion. After 
adjusting for China's re-exports through Hong Kong, however, the trade balance figures 
became closer in number, at $-25.8 billion, according to U.S. data., and $-29.1 billion, 
according to China's data. Additionally, U.S. economic policy-makers who disparaged 
China for unfair trade advantages may have overlooked that China’s trade surplus with 
the U.S. may be cyclical, rather than a “contrived neobullionist phenomenon.” which 
will adjust itself through increased Chinese imports as China develops its vast 
infrastructure and technology upgrading program, and when the Chinese demand for 
quality consumer goods increases.44
^Prybyla. 11-12.
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Table 4.6










Fung and Lau 















1989 -6.2 +3.5 -4.9 -3.7
1990 -10.4 +1.4 -9.1 -7.8
1991 -12.7 +1.8 -11.0 -9.9
1992 -18.3 +0.3 -15.9 -15.4
1993 -22.8 -6.3 -19.5 -24.9
1994 -29.5 -7.5 -25.8 -29.1
1995 -33.8 -8.6 -28.9 -31.2
Sources: K.C. Fung and Lawrence J. Lau. “The China-United States Bilateral Trade 
Balance: How Big Is It Really?’’ Pacific Economic Review 3. no. 1 (1998): 36: China's
Customs Statistics. General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of 
China, various years. Hong Kong External Trade, Hong Kong Census and Statistics 
Department, various years: U.S. Foreign Trade Highlights, various years.
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Beyond the problem of differing trade calculation methods and cyclical patterns, 
obstacles to U.S. exports to China may have been self-imposed. For example, the U.S. 
places restrictions on exporting technologies to China. If these restrictions were to be 
removed, then U.S. exports would substantially increase because of China’s demand for 
technology and capital goods. Additionally, the nationalist argument that U.S. jobs 
would have been lost by sanctioning trade on human rights, was deficient. The China 
trade, for example, did not affect American jobs at aggregate levels, but only jobs in 
certain key industry sectors.45 True, 250.000 U.S. jobs may have been dependent on total 
U.S. exports of aircraft and aircraft parts. But only a small percentage of those jobs were 
dependent specifically on the China market. For example. Figure 4.4 demonstrates that 
the total U.S. jobs dependent on goods exports to China for the year 1994 amounted to
138.000 jobs.
Of those 138.000 jobs. 106,000 jobs were dependent on manufactured exports to 
China.46 Still, of those 106.000 jobs, the aircraft industry, the largest U.S. exporter to 
China in terms of value amount, would have accounted for an even smaller percentage of 
those 106.000 jobs.47 Figure 4.5 indicates that only 13.5 percent of U.S. jobs were in the 
high-technology manufacturing sector in 1994. of which the aerospace and defense
45These industries included aerospace exporters, agricultural producers, 
telecommunications and construction industries. Also refer to Table 4.2
46Davis, 34-37. Export related jobs figures (full time equivalent civilian U.S. jobs, 
including self-employed) were arrived at by “multiplying the export-related output of 
each industry by the appropriate ratio for the FTE jobs per unit of output for that industry 
for the year being estimated.”
47It was quoted that 40,000 U.S. jobs were dependent on exports of aircraft, parts and 
components to China. President of the U.S.-China Business Council Donald M.
Anderson, Future o f  United States-China Policy, 97-101.
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industries would be included. The greater part of U.S. jobs supported by goods exports 
were in non high-tech manufactures, at 35.1 percent, and services, at 40 percent for the 
year 1994. For the most part, U.S. jobs generated by exports to foreign markets in 1994, 
as Figure 4.4 earlier displayed, were dependent on the foreign markets of Canada, at
1.460.000 jobs, the EU, at 1,133.000 jobs, and Mexico, at 729.000 jobs.
Moreover, as demonstrated in Figure 4.6. between the years 1986 and 1994, the 
largest increase in U.S. jobs dependent on foreign export markets was to the Mexican 
market, at an increase of 479.000 jobs. The China market represented the least increase 
in U.S. jobs supported by key foreign markets, amounting to a 74.000 job increase. In 
total. U.S. jobs that were supported by goods exports to China represented very little in 
the total U.S. labor market. The impact that revoking or conditioning China's MFN 
would have on U.S. jobs would only be in key industry sectors, but not in aggregate 
employment, however.
In this respect, the nationalist position, espousing that the United States would 
lose thousands or hundreds of thousands of jobs by conditioning trade on human rights, 
was exaggerated. In further weakness of the nationalist argument, that U.S. consumers 
would have been compelled to pay higher prices if MFN were to have been revoked, may 
not have been totally exact. As the economist Jagdish Bhagwati clarified, “’The costs to 
the U.S. economy were much exaggerated by advocates of unconditional MFN to China. 
If MFN to China were to be denied. U.S. retail prices would have risen only temporarily, 
until American companies began manufacturing in other low-wage countries, such as




























































India, Indonesia, Malaysia, or the untapped African continent”48 Lastly, the nationalist 
policy position that China, as a rising superpower, would be a potential threat to U.S. 
security interests, revealed some deficiencies. The China market, for instance, may not 
have been as large as the proponents of unconditional MFN had claimed it to be. To 
begin. China had been a continuing net debtor nation. China had consistently increased 
its external borrowing to facilitate the transition from a command to a market economy, 
and therefore has increased its foreign debt. Figure 4.7 demonstrates that China’s 
external debt grew from U.S. $16.7 billion, in 1985. to $69.3 billion, by 1992.49 By 1996. 
China’s external debt had increased to $129 billion, ranking it as the 4th highest foreign 
debtor nation in the world, after Brazil. Mexico and Indonesia, consecutively.50
Unlike many of the commonly-held conceptions. "China is not like Japan, which 
held a chronic global surplus. China is more like Mexico and Indonesia or Korea which 
through their early decades of development borrowed capital from the rest of the world 
and ran global trade deficits.”51 Moreover, the 30 to 40 million absolute poor in rural 
areas in China continue to live on the margin of subsistence. Many poor rely on China's
48Jagdish Bhagwati. as quoted by John Berlau. "Lobbyists spin MFN for Beijing,” Insight 
on the News 13. no. 26 (July 21. 1997): 16-20.
49Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 1993); International Financial 
Statistics 1996. 1997 ed.
“ Economist. Pocket World In Figures (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1999), 36.
5lDirector of the Institute For International Economics C. Fred Bergsten, Congress, 
House. Committee On Ways And Means, Subcommittee On Trade, United States-China 
Trade Relations. hearing, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., 24 Feb. 1994 (Washington, D.C.:
GPO. 1994). 241.
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grain relief system, which provides minimal grain provisions. Peasants are required to 
pay high fees for basic services,52 and also high taxes to provincial and local governments 
at the same time the government is giving them lOU's as payment for their grain.53 There 
had also been reports that if parents can’t pay, their children are prohibited from attending 
school.54 As central and local government funds decreased in the process of market 
reform in China, the financial burdens transferred to the peasants.55 the largest segment of 
China's population who could ill afford it. As Figure 4.8 denotes, the rural population of 
China comprise over 70 percent of the population. One quarter of the rural workers are 
now wage earners, yet still lack the labor insurance coverage that is offered to urban 
workers.56
Aside from the problem of rural poverty, there is an increasing "floating 
population" of migrant workers in China who represent a growing poverty group In 
1993. for example, there were 60 million roaming Chinese workers without social safety 
nets, largely due to China's transition from a plan to a market economy.57 The income 
disparities between the coastal region and the hinterland have been widening, and only a
52 World Bank. World Development Report-From Plan to Market (Washington, D.C.: 
Oxford University Press. 1996). 78-80. By 1998, “Chinese economists put the ratio 
of urban to rural income at 12 to 1. Urban per capita disposable income for the year 1998 
was $656. while rural per capita net income was $261.” Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices 1999.2000 ed., China sec.


















































small segment of the population have been able to profit and benefit from the economic 
growth.58 It had been pointed out, as well, that the IMF report that was submitted to the 
Executive Branch, in 1993, overestimated the per capita income of China, which was 
estimated to be about U.S. $340.00 by the World Bank,59 whereas the IMF report 
estimated nearly three or four times as much. "That still gives China a total economy of 
U.S. $1 trillion, which would put it in the top five or six in the world. But it is nothing 
like the second or third largest economy.”60 As Bergsten further commented:
"China is not going to be as big as the United States in economic terms for 
at least half a century or maybe more, and it is not going to have anything 
like the per capita income of the United States, even if they grow twice as 
fast as we do for another couple of centuries. This is only to say that 
China, though big. is still a poor country. It is a developing country. Its 
per capita income is low. and we have to think of it in those terms rather 
than thinking of it as a big. new economic superpower on the order of the 
United States or Japan."61
58Publisher of China Focus Liu Binyan. Congress. House. Committee On Foreign Affairs. 
Subcommittees on Economic Policy. Trade and Environment. International Security. 
International Organizations And Human Rights, Asia And The Pacific. Future o f  United 
States-China Policy, hearing, 103rd Cong.. 1st sess.. 20 May 1993 (Washington. D.C.: 
GPO. 1993). 113-119.
59Bergsten. United States-China Trade Relations, 238-245. The $1,000 per capita 
1990 estimate was that of Dwight H. Perkins. China's Economic Boom and the 
Integration o f the Economics o f East Asia, (Washington. D.C.: Institute For International 
Economics, 1992); Robert Summers and Alan W. Heston estimated China’s per capita 
income in 1990 to be $2,598, in Robert Summers and Alan W. Heston, "An Expanded 
Set of International Comparisons, 1950-1988,” Quarterly Journal o f  Economics 106, no.
2 (May 1991): 352; while the World Bank estimate was $370.00. World Bank, China: 
Strategies for Reducing Poverty in the 1990's (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank,
1992); Lardy. China in the World Economy, 15.
“ Bergsten. United States-China Trade Relations, 240.
61 Ibid.. 239.
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The U.S. hegemonic position in the Asian-Pacific region was indeed a critical 
variable in the 1994 decision, which was evidenced in the rhetoric of U.S. leaders. The 
realist argument, in part, did account for the 1994 policy decision. Given the weaknesses 
uncovered in the realist argument, however, the U.S. national interest was only partially 
able to account for the motives behind the 1994 Clinton administration decision to delink 
China's human rights practices from trade. U.S. economic engagement with China 
premised on the threat of China’s emergence as an economic hegemon in the Asian 
region is weakened given China's internal structural economic and political impediments 
and the realities of the vast and transient global marketplace, where corporations and 
capital are footloose, and where workers can be substituted within and across borders.
HUMANITARIAN VALUES
The second hypothesis, premised on liberalism, was that the U.S. intent to 
improve the respect for human rights in China through economic engagement influenced 
the 1994 decision to separate China's human rights record from most-favored-nation 
status. To review, followers of the liberal school of thought envisage that the peace and 
prosperity of nations would be advanced by the removal of economic barriers. United 
States trade with China, therefore, is viewed as a catalyst for democracy and the 
alleviation of political repression in China. U.S. corporations, by way of their products 
(that would enable individual choice), management techniques and production practices, 
would serve as pathways to democracy and human rights reform in China by reaching
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beyond government constraints, directly to the people.62 It was President Clinton who 
argued, in 1994, that human rights in China would best be improved through economic 
engagement, or that corporations would help democratize China. As the President stated:
"To those who argue that in view of China’s human rights abuses, we 
should revoke MFN status, let me ask you the same question that I have 
asked myself; will we do more to advance the cause of human rights if 
China is isolated or if our nations are engaged in a growing web of 
political and economic cooperation and contacts?”63
Many positive social and economic reforms had taken place in China since 1989. 
For example, "more VCR's and satellite dishes were available, stores were filled with 
television sets. Beijing was marked with construction cranes, and facsimile machines 
were available to send word of political arrests in Beijing across the nation.”64 The years 
preceding the 1994 decision, from 1990 to 1993, bring out that China’s standard of living 
had risen as measured by key consumer durables.
Table 4.7 indicates that consumption of such consumer goods as bicycles, sewing 
machines, color TV sets and washing machines had risen steadily in both rural and urban 
geographical areas. It was further expressed in the U.S. Congress that China was 
approaching its "fourth revolution.” meaning that there had been systematic change in the 
standard of living of the Chinese people, that patterns of information flow were
62Garten. 71: Bernstein and Dicker. 43-47; Clark. 209-229.
6-'President William J. Clinton, as quoted by Thomas L. Friedman, “Clinton Votes For 
Business." New York Times. 27 May 1994, Al.
wSenator John Kerry of Massachusetts, as quoted by Greenberger and Frisby, A18.
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Table 4.7
China’s Standard Of Living As Measured By Consumer Durables (items per 100 
households)
Urban
1990 1991 1992 1993
BICYCLES 188.6 158.5 190.5 197.2
MOTOR CYCLES n/a n/a 2.8 3.5
SEWING MACHINES 70.1 66.4 65.9 66.6
COLOR TV SETS 59.0 68.4 74.9 79.5
MONOCHROME TV SETS 52.4 43.9 37.7 35.9
ELECTRIC FANS 135.5 143.5 146.0 151.6
WASHING MACHINES 78.4 80.6 83.4 86.4
REFRIGERATORS 42.3 48.7 52.6 56.7
Rural
BICYCLES 118.3 121.6 125.7 133.4
MOTOR CYCLES 0.9 1.1 1.4 2.1
SEWING MACHINES 55.2 55.8 57.3 61.3
COLOR TV SETS 4.7 6.4 8.1 10.9
MONOCHROME TV SETS 39.7 47.5 52.4 58.3
ELECTRIC FANS 41.4 53.3 60.1 71.8
WASHING MACHINES 9.1 11.0 12.2 13.8
REFRIGERATORS 1.2 1.6 2.2 3.1
Source: Euromonitor. Consumer Asia 1996.
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increasing, and that political and economic decentralization was taking place.65 Section 
402 of the Trade Act of 1974, noted earlier in chapter three, was the Jackson-Vanik 
Amendment. The Amendment stipulated that the renewal of a country’s MFN status 
would be contingent upon that country’s allowance of its citizens the freedom of 
emigration. In his June 2.1994 communique to Congress. Clinton had affirmed that 
China’s Foreign Minister. Qian Qichen. in keeping with the promise to Secretary of State 
Christopher, to "resolve all pending emigration ("blocked passport'*) cases the United 
States Government pressed upon them for the pending year [1993].“
The President continued to assure, in his communication to the Congress, that 
some of the individuals who were released from prison were relatives of prominent 
dissidents, some of whom held government jobs in China with access to politically 
sensitive information. The principal barrier to the departure of ordinary Chinese, the 
President concluded, was the inability to secure a visa, and that record numbers of U.S. 
visas were issued worldwide to tourists and business visitors from China, an approximate 
90 percent increase over the previous year [1993].67
President Clinton’s position, in 1994. that ending the connection between MFN 
renewal and human rights would further the cause of human rights in China, was 
supported by major U.S. government Executives. Under Secretary of State For Political
“ Asian Studies Program Director Gerrit W. Gong, Ph.D. Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, Congress, Senate, Committee On Foreign Relations, Subcommittee 
On East Asian And Pacific Affairs. U.S. Policy Toward China, hearing, 103rd Cong., 2nd 
sess., 4 May 1994 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994), 51.
“ U.S. President, William J. Clinton, letter to Hon. Thomas S. Foley, '‘Continuation of 
Waiver Authority.” 2 June 1994.
“ Ibid.
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Affairs. Arnold Kanter, affirmed that "the renewal of MFN without conditions continues 
to influence those policies that permit tens of thousands of Chinese every year to choose 
to leave China permanently and to travel abroad and gain exposure to the outside 
world.”68 Kanter further claimed that the economic growth that China has experienced 
since the implementation of economic reforms and economic engagement with the United 
States has improved the lives of ordinary Chinese by increasing household incomes 
through the expansion of agricultural and industrial production.66 China's economic 
growth had given Chinese citizens newly found freedom over their lives:
"Since 1978. there has been a dramatic change. Chinese are free to travel 
domestically, purchase foreign-made consumer goods and wear Western 
or traditional dress. Non-govemmental-controlled media are available in 
China today than ever before, including cable TV in parts of China, 
satellite dishes and American TV programs.”70
The second human rights stipulation, specified in Clinton’s 1993 Executive Order, 
was a mandatory condition for MFN renewal in 1994. This mandatory condition was that 
China comply with the 1992 U.S.-China bilateral Agreement on Prison Labor.71 Winston
6SUnder Secretary of State For Political Affairs Arnold Kanter. Congress, House, 
Committee On Ways And Means. Subcommittee On Trade, Additional Requirements On 
The Extension o f China's Most-Favored-Nation Trade Status In 1993. hearing, 102nd 
Cong.. 2nd sess., 29 June 1992 (Washington. D.C.: GPO, 1992), 30.
66Ibid.. 33.
70 Ibid.
7lThis agreement was a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU of 1992), which 
facilitates U.S. inspections of Chinese prisons with the intent to establish the origin of 
Chinese exports to the U.S. that are produced with prison labor. In the event China 
refuses inspection of its prisons, U.S. Customs may prevent the importation of Chinese 
goods suspected of being produced with prison labor. U.S. Department of State, Bureau 
of Public Affairs, "Chinese Prison Labor Exports,” Fact Sheet.
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Lord. Assistant Secretary For East Asian And Pacific Affairs, reported in February of 
1994, that the Chinese indicated a willingness to cooperate with meeting the agreements 
of the 1992 Memorandum of Understanding regarding China’s prison labor, and that 
China had acquiesced to additional visits of prisons requested by the U.S. Customs.72
Secretary Lord recognized that although there had been areas of "slippage" in 
some areas of human rights stipulated in the 1993 Executive Order, there had been some 
progress. “Some dissidents had been released from jail prior to completion of their term, 
either unconditionally or on medical leave.”73 China had also provided an initial response 
and readiness to discuss the possibility of release of a list of prisoners Assistant Secretary 
Shattuck had provided to them in October of 1993. China had discussed with the 
International Red Cross the possibility of visits to prisons and suggested further human 
rights dialogue.74
U.S. government leaders who advocated the granting of unconditional MFN to 
China believed that only through the use of capitalist tools, could freedom and human 
rights reforms take place in China, because "free commercial contacts change the way 
people interact with each other.”75 Private enterprise would be the catalyst for societal 
change in China. U.S. corporations in China, for example, have insisted that they be
^Ambassador Winston Lord. Congress. House, Committee On Ways And Means, 
Subcommittee On Trade, United States-China Trade Relations. hearing, 103rd Cong.,
2nd sess., 24 Feb. 1994 (Washington. D.C.: GPO, 1994), 76.
73 Ibid.
74Ibid.
75Congressman Jim Kolbe of Arizona, Congress, House, Committee On Ways And 
Means. Subcommittee On Trade. United States-China Trade Relations, hearing, 103rd 
Cong.. 2nd sess.. 24 Feb. 1994 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994), 26.
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given the right to interview and to choose their own employees, as opposed to receiving 
government assignees. Free and unhindered interviews by U.S. corporations changed the 
relationship between the government and the university labor market because students 
were given a choice of working for a U.S. company or working for a state-owned 
enterprise to which they might otherwise be automatically assigned.76 U.S. government 
and business leaders who advocated unconditional MFN to China felt that trade sanctions 
and liberty were incompatible. Conditioning or revoking China's MFN would only harm 
those factions in China who were encouraging political reform. U.S. leaders who held 
this opinion believed that economic sanctions •‘were really a *feel good’ approach to 
promoting human rights without any chance of being effective.”77 Sanctions would only 
antagonize the Chinese government and further radicalize those officials already in 
power. According to the opinions of some U.S. policy analysts and business Executives, 
human rights concerns did influence the 1994 U.S. policy decision to delink trade and 
MFN. They believed that trade and corporate engagement with China would produce a 
rising middle class in China that would insist on democratic social and political values.
CRITIQUE
The liberalist argument that human rights was the driving force behind the 1994 
trade policy decision, revealed some weaknesses. Many U.S. policy-makers, human
76Congressman Kolbe. United States-China Trade Relations, 26-28.
Barnes A. Dom. “Trade and Human Rights: The Case Of China,” Cato Journal 16, 
no. 1 (spring/summer 1996): 79, in citing Bruce Bartlett, What's Wrong with Trade 
Sanctions?. Policy Analysis No. 64 (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 1985), 10.
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rights groups and public citizens believed that MFN should be contingent upon human 
rights improvements in China. Concerns had mounted in Congress for the numerous 
reports of continued repression in China. In a poll taken in December of 1993 by NBC 
News and the Wall Street Journal. Americans across the country were asked their 
opinions about U.S. trade with China. Nearly 29 percent said "we should maintain good 
trade relations with China, despite disagreements we might have with its human rights 
policies.” Whereas 65 percent of the respondents endorsed the statement "we should 
demand that China improve its human rights policies if China wants to continue to enjoy 
its current trade status with the United States.”78
On March 1. 1994.276 members of the House signed a letter to Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher that demanded China meet its human rights conditions.”  Human 
rights advocates inside and outside of government expressed that overall significant 
progress in China's human rights had not been met in accordance with the 1993 
Executive Order. It was argued that despite the U.S. yearly renewal of MFN to China, 
since 1980. the human rights situation (particularly since the 1989 Tiananmen democracy 
movement) had only worsened. U.S. officials, human rights advocates and public 
citizens articulated that MFN should be conditioned on the improvement of China’s 
human rights practices. They supported the past presidential policies of attaching human
78Karlyn H. Bowman. "Public Attitudes Toward the People’s Republic of China,” in 
Beyond MFN: Trade with China and American Interests, eds. James R. Lilley and 
Wendell L. Wilkie II (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1994), 150.
” Peter Beher. "U.S. Business Waged Year-Long Lobbying Effort on China,” 
Washington Post. 27 May 1994. A28.
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rights conditions to the U.S. yearly renewal of MFN to China. In the words of a major 
human rights group. Asia Watch:
We believe that the continuing attention to MFN for China is crucial for 
maintaining pressure on the Chinese Government and the need has never 
been greater.80
Additionally, human rights advocates agreed that American engagement and 
corporate involvement, through a voluntary code of conduct based on the model of the 
Sullivan Principles, could play a positive role in bringing about human rights reform and 
societal change in China, but that corporate initiative, alone, was not enough.81 It was 
expressed, however, that no other measure would substitute for MFN in terms of its 
power as a bargaining tool to pressure China to respect basic human rights. Moreover, 
the delinkage of MFN and human rights was thought by major human rights groups to 
hinder the safety of dissidents and reformers in China and damage the credibility of U.S. 
policy on human rights issues across the globe.82
Specifically, in 1993 and 1994, some liberal factions in the U.S. government 
believed that MFN should be conditioned on China's improvement and progress in all 
seven human rights items addressed in the 1993 Executive Order issued by the President.
“ Washington Director Human Rights Watch/Asia Mike Jendrzejczyk, Congress, House, 
Committee On Ways And Means, Subcommittee On Trade, Additional Requirements On 
The Extension o f Most-Favored-Nation Trade Status In 1993. hearing, 102nd Cong., 2nd 
sess.. 29 June 1992 (Washington. D.C.: GPO. 1992). 92.
81 Washington Director Human Rights Watch/Asia Mike Jendrzejczyk. Congress. Senate. 
Committee On Foreign Relations. Subcommittee On East Asian And Pacific Affairs, U.S. 
Policy> Toward China, hearing, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., 4 May 1994 (Washington, D.C.: 
GPO. 1994). 78-79.
82Ibid.
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Human rights stipulations in all seven categories, specified in the 1993 Executive Order, 
had not improved enough (or at all), according to many opinions articulated in 
government. Senator Feingold articulated to Secretary Lord:
"1 lend my support to the administration's past emphasis on linkage, 
particularly in Asia, where we have very real economic and human rights 
concerns. And I urge you, Secretary Lord, not to subsume human rights to 
other concerns. I think it is second to nothing, and what America stands 
for. And we would be abdicating our role as a superpower if we were to 
shy away from that concern.”83
Representative Neil Abercrombie reiterated Senator Feingold's value-based 
position:
It has been said that [human rights] is an internal matter for China and that 
our insistence on human rights improvements constitutes interference in 
China's internal affairs. This line of argument turns the truth on its head.
The decision whether to grant or withhold MFN status is an internal affair 
of the United States. We are obliged to frame our national policies in 
terms of the Constitution, which forms the basis of our national 
government, and the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, to 
which we are a signatory.84
Amnesty International USA, a leading human rights NGO in the U.S. and 
throughout the world, was of the opinion that humanitarian values did not drive U.S. 
policy choice on China. Immediately after the Clinton decision was made, for instance, 
the influential NGO alluded to the inconsistency in U.S. human rights policy regarding
8jSenator Russel D. Feingold of Wisconsin. Congress, Senate. Committee On Foreign 
Relations. Subcommittee On East Asian and Pacific Affairs. U.S. Policy Toward China. 
hearing. 103rd Cong.. 2nd sess.. 4 May 1994 (Washington. D.C.: GPO. 1994), 8.
^Congressman Neil Abercrombie of Hawaii, Congress, House, Committee On Ways 
And Means. Subcommittee On Trade, United States-China Trade Relations, hearing, 
103rd Cong.. 2nd sess., 24 Feb. 1994 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994), 38-41.
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China. As stated by Amnesty International before Congress in July of 1994, “It remains 
unclear today what constitutes the administration’s human rights policy toward China and 
Tibet.”85 While Amnesty International did not take a position on linkage, the 
organization stated:
In renewing MFN trade status to China. President Clinton announced 
certain actions that would be part of a human rights policy, including 
increased support for Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in China, 
increased radio broadcasts into China, and working with businesses to 
establish a voluntary code of conduct. While we welcome efforts by 
offices and individuals of the U.S. Government to develop such human 
rights initiatives, many have not yet been attained, and in no way can they 
be regarded as constituting a human rights policy. Furthermore, these 
efforts taken collectively do not assure the significant position that human 
rights deserves in overall U.S. policy.86
Thus, the nature of the policy-making process vis a vis China, in 1994. was such 
that there were different actors involved, and those actors reflected a wide range of 
opinion on how human rights in China should be approached. Some actors wanted to 
continue to liberalize trade between the two countries and delink MFN and human rights, 
while other actors wanted to maintain the linkage, or felt that the U.S. did not take human 
rights seriously enough in its policy-making. In short, there was no unified liberal view 
on how to improve human rights in China. Even among human rights groups, there had 
not been a consensus on how to instill human rights in U.S. foreign policy. For example, 
the human rights group. Asia Watch, clearly expressed that MFN should be conditioned
85Estrellita Jones. Amnesty International USA. Congress, House, Committee On Ways 
And Means, Subcommittee on Trade. HR. 4590. UnitedStates-China Act o f1994, 
hearing. 103rd Cong.. 2nd sess.. 28 July 1994 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994), 171.
“ Ibid.. 172.
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on China's human rights practices, whereas Amnesty International did not take a position 
on linkage. Because of these discrepancies within the liberal argument, the desire to 
advance human rights in China through increased trade did not entirely shape U.S. 
foreign policy choice in 1994.
CORPORATE INFLUENCES
The radical paradigm formed the underlying premise for the third hypothesis, 
which was that U.S. corporations influenced the 1994 decision to end the relationship 
between China's human rights record and MFN status. This economically-determinist 
perspective suggests that corporations maintain a considerable amount of influence on 
U.S. foreign economic policy. In this case. China is considered to be the main 
geographical target of the corporate expansionist agenda, backed by monopoly capitalists.
In the years preceding the 1994 decision. U.S. corporations became more vocal in 
the public arena in expressing their views on U.S.-China policy. The growing appearance 
of business lobbying groups in Congress gave evidence of the increasing attempts by 
business groups to influence the 1994 policy decision. Scenarios of business lobbyists 
pointing to the losses of jobs and profits that would result if MFN were to be revoked 
became increasingly present and vocal on Capital Hill. Business and agricultural groups 
argued that the increase in tariff rates, that both the U.S. and China would apply if MFN 
were to be revoked, would harm U.S. exporters, importers and consumers who were able
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to purchase products at cheaper prices. The National Retail Federation (NRF), for 
instance, claimed that there were an “estimated 170,000 jobs87 created by exports to 
China, that Chinese imports helped to sustain 2.4 million jobs in the service sector, and 
that revoking MFN would cost American families $300 a year in higher prices of such 
popular Chinese imports as toys.”88 Similarly, before 1990. farmers had been largely 
absent from the U.S. Congressional scene. By 1991. however, the National Association 
of Wheat Growers was one of the major business groups that lobbied for unconditional 
MFN.89
Chief Executive officers of major U.S. corporations involved in trade and 
commerce with China spoke privately with Clinton's cabinet secretaries about the 
potential jobs and profits that could be lost if MFN to China were to be withdrawn.90 A 
vast array of statistics, statements and overstatements were thrown in the public arena, 
together with private contributions to U.S. political parties and officials on behalf of the 
MFN and human rights delinkage.
87Estimates of job losses claimed by various corporations, in lieu o f MFN revocation, 
were anywhere from 130.000 to 250.000. These numbers were not consistent.
88Berlau. 15-16.
89Gary Lee. "After Intense Lobbying Fight China Trade Status Vote Likely Today,” 
Washington Post. 23 July 1991. A5.
"Susumu Awanohara, "Breathing Space: Clinton Delays on Conditions to China’s MFN 
Renewal.” Far Eastern Economic Review 13 (June 10, 1993): 156.
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Table 4.8
U.S. Aerospace and Defense Firms:
Signatories of the May 13, 1994 Letter to President Clinton 
Asking for the Delinkage of Human Rights and MFN
















Source: Defense Daily 83. no. 33 (May 18, 1994): 265.
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In February of 1994, three months before the decision was made, U.S. business 
lobbyists and coalitions91 came to the forefront of the Congressional agenda to plead their 
cases for the termination of the linkage of MFN and China’s human rights practices.
What solidified many thousands of small firms to large multinationals, however, 
was the Business Coalition for U.S.-China Trade. Formed in 1991. the coalition was 
created to support the position of President Bush, that MFN be extended to China without 
conditions.92 The coalition began with over 75 major trading groups and by 1994 had 
grown to include over 800 corporations and trade associations. The goal of the Business 
Coalition was to speak with a single voice to influence Congress and the Executive 
branch to permanently delink MFN and human rights.93
The hypothesis that U.S. corporations influenced the 1994 policy to end the 
relationship between human rights and MFN did show some validity'. Many business 
lobbyists in 1994 represented key industries and corporations that were specifically
91 Among the many U.S. corporations who testified in favor of delinkage were the 
American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong, the Emergency Committee for 
American Trade, the American Association of Exporters and Importers. Mattel. Inc., the 
Fashion Accessories Shippers Association. Inc.. the National Retail Federation (NRF). 
the U.S. Association of Importers o f Textiles and Apparel, Kamm & Associates, Ltd.. the 
U.S.-China Business Council, the Washington State-China Relations Council.
McDonnell Douglas Corp.. and The Fertilizer Institute. Congress, House, Committee On 
Ways And Means. Subcommittee On Trade. United States-China Trade Relations, 
hearing. 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., 24 Feb. 1994 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994), 163,
170.180.188.243.248.254.
92Sutter. 57. in citing Peter H. Stone. "Big Business Favors China Trade,” Legal Times.
27 May 1991.
9jSutter. 44-46. in citing Caiman Cohen, chair of the Business coalition for U.S.-China 
Trade and President of the Emergency Committee for American Trade (ECAT). Interview 
by Tricia N. Cortez. March 6, 1996, in Tricia N. Cortez, “Cash, Clash and Compromise,” 
thesis, Princeton University, 1996.
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engaged in the China trade, as importers, exporters or manufacturers in China. A prime 
example was the U.S. Aerospace Industries Association94 which had written a letter to 
President Clinton, on May 13,1994, asking for the extension of most-favored-nation 
trading status and a "halt to the linkage of human rights with trade.”95 Table 4.8 lists the 
U.S. corporate aerospace and defense signatories, whose sales to China collectively 
represented $2.2 billion in 1993.96 Fear of profit and market loss was certainly a motive 
for the writing of the letter.
Concerns of loss of market share to foreign business groups were even more 
pressing to such U.S. aircraft manufacturers as Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, whom 
had maintained a "monopoly on China's purchases of foreign aircraft, accounting for 76 
percent of all Chinese purchases.”97 In a testimony to Congress by Boeing/McDonnell 
Douglas Corporation, for example, it was articulated:
"Boeing and McDonnell Douglas are currently well positioned in the 
Chinese market, but Airbus— as well as Russians— are waiting to quickly 
take advantage if the relationship between the United States and China 
deteriorates. Already. [European] Airbus took 50 percent of new orders 
last year...
""On some issues, the technology industry will ride to the rescue of business as a 
whole.""America's business lobby: Who speaks for Main Street?,” Economist (June 26.
1999): 75-76.
95Defense Daily 83. no. 33 (May 18. 1994): 265.
^Refer to Table 4.2.
97U.S.- China Business Council President Donald Anderson, Future O f United States-
China Policy. 97.
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As the nation’s largest exporter, with more that 60 percent of revenues 
from non-U.S. customers, Boeing is one of many American companies 
whose future clearly depend on access to global markets.”98
In addition to the aerospace industry, the Leather Apparel Association Industry, 
comprised of 125 companies involved in the manufacture, importation and retailing of 
leather apparel products voiced their dependency on cheap Chinese labor and quantity of 
labor output. They expressed that “clearly no other location in Asia, other than China, 
could “produce the quantities necessary at the price points and quality essential to success 
in the U.S. market.”99 The Toy Manufacturers of America (TMA), top importers of 
finished goods that are produced in China, which amounted to $4.4 billion in 1993.100 
expressed that if “U.S. producers and importers cannot take advantage of the China 
market, foreign competitors from Japan, Germany and elsewhere will have free reign in 
the quickest growing market in the world."101
Other business interests also expressed their opinions in the China/MFN and 
human rights debate. For example, the U.S. agricultural industry was represented by The 
Fertilizer Institute (TFI). The Institute contended that “China buys 80 percent o f its
98Boeing/McDonnell Douglas. Inc.. Congress, House, Committee On Ways And Means. 
Subcommittee On Trade. United States-China Trade Relations. hearing, 103rd Cong.. 
2nd sess.. 24 Feb. 1994 (Washington. D.C.: GPO. 1994), 304.
"Leather Apparel Association. Congress, House, Committee On Ways And Means, 
Subcommittee On Trade. United States-China Trade Relations. hearing, 103rd Cong., 
2nd sess., 24 Feb. 1994 (Washington, D.C.: GPO. 1994). 313.
100Refer to Table 4.2.
101 President of the Toy Manufacturers of America, Inc. David A. Miller, Congress, House 
Committee On Ways And Means. Subcommittee On Trade, United States-China Trade 
Relations. hearing, 103rd Cong.. 2nd sess.. 24 Feb. 1994 (Washington, D.C.: GPO,
1994). 322.
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fertilizer from the U.S., approximately 16 percent of total U.S. fertilizer exports.”102 The 
application trade of sanctions would have meant a loss of those exports to China. 
Statements expressed by U.S. business lobbyists indicated that competition existed 
among cross-national corporate groups for economic control of the China market.
U.S. businesses were determined to influence U.S. government leaders to the 
point of utilizing inflated statements and economically unsound arguments. One such 
example was uncovered, during a Congressional session, by Representative Tom Lantos 
in his questioning of Donald Anderson, president of the United States-China Business 
Council. Anderson had stated that “withdrawing or conditioning MFN would mean a loss 
of $8 billion in U.S. exports.”103 
Representative Lantos questioned this assertion:
“You mean that what you are saying is that withdrawing or conditioning 
MFN would mean $8 billion in lost exports...the size of our total 
exports?" I04[to China]
l02Fertilizer Institute, Congress, House, Committee On Ways And Means, Subcommittee 
On Trade, United States-China Trade Relations, hearing. 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., 24 Feb. 
1994 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994). 308-309. It was stated that China purchases 
its remaining needs from Morocco. Jordan and Europe.
"b Anderson. Future o f United States-China Policy. 10.
l04Congressman Tom Lantos of California, Congress, House, Committee On Foreign 
Affairs. Subcommittees on Economic Policy, Trade and Environment. International 
Security. International Organizations and Human Rights and Asia and the Pacific, Future 
O f United States-China Policy, hearing, 103rd Cong.. 1st sess.. 20 May 1993 
(Washington. D.C.: GPO, 1993), 21.
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Mr. Anderson:
"No sir. that is an over-statement.”105
Mr. Lantos;
"It is a lie. Mr. Anderson. It has no relationship to reality. You ought to 
be ashamed of yourself. You prepared this statement on behalf of the 
United States-China Business Council and in the opening paragraph that is 
not tangentially related to the truth. As a matter of fact. I predict to 
you...that despite the fact there will be a conditioning of MFN to China, 
there will be an increase in American exports to China next year and the 
year after and the following year. Because China is a growing economy 
and they desperately need the things it buys from us.”106
Corporate attempts to influence the 1994 decision constituted more than just 
public rhetoric. Before Clinton signed the Executive Order of 1993 granting the extension 
of MFN status to China for another year, he received a letter signed by 298 companies 
and 37 trade associations requesting that conditions not be attached.107 During the same 
time. 50 companies gave soft money contributions, averaging at about $30,000. to the 
Democratic National Committee.108
105 Anderson. Future O f United States-China Policy, 21.
"“Congressman Lantos. Future O f United States-China Policy, 22.
107John Kruger and Charles Lewis. “Bill’s Long March.” Washington Post. 7 Nov. 1993, 
C3.
lt)8Ibid.
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Table 4.9
Political Contributions of Selected U.S. Companies Who Lobbied to Extend MFN Status 
for China for the Year 1995 (U.S. SThousands)
COMPANY TO DEMOCRATS TO REPUBLICANS AMOUNT
United Parcel Service 370,729 641.240 1,011.969
AT&T 309,963 596.470 906.433
Lockhead Martin 161,100 343.850 504.950
Northrop 142,650 333,050 477,200
Bell South 137,100 332,317 469.917
Ameritech 125.542 324.123 450.665
Federal Express 133.000 306,225 440.500
Philip Morris 118.750 321.225 440,475
Union Pacific 45.300 339,518 384,818
General Electric 115,350 223.500 339.350
WMX Technologies 82.500 250.200 332.950
General Motors 101,009 205,588 308,597
CSX 59,750 228.850 291,350
JP Morgan & Co. 104.500 181,500 286,000
Nations Bank 144.700 159.300 273,500
Totals: 1.872.943 4,786.956 6,659,899
Sources: Tiffany Danitz. "MFN Players Take Position.” Insight On The Mews 13, no. 21 (June 9.
1997): 22-24: Center For Responsive Politics. Washington, D.C.
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In anticipation of further Congressional debates on MFN conditionalities, U.S. 
corporations involved in commercial relations with China also gave soft money 
contributions to both Democratic and Republican parties in attempts to influence the 
extension of MFN in 1995. Table 4.9 demonstrates that total corporate contributions to 
both parties amounted to approximately $6.6 million.
CRITIQUE
There were some shortcomings to the claim that corporate influence was the 
principle motive for the 1994 decision. U.S. corporate interests were not the sole 
influence on the formulation of U.S.-China policy in 1994. As noted above, U.S. national 
interests were critical to the decision. A strong U.S. private sector and corporate growth 
in the China market would serve to increase the national welfare and create a strong U.S. 
economic presence in the Asian region. For this reason, the 1994 decision was supported 
by key U.S. officials. As former President Bush asserted in 1990. “the United States has 
a long-term stake in maintaining and developing its economic relationship with China.”109 
As well, former Secretary of State Eagleburger confirmed that Americans benefit from 
the inexpensive imports they receive from China.110 These views were also expressed by 
President Clinton in his statements that were made, earlier in office, on the reasoning for
"NU.S. President. George Bush, report to Congress, “Report On Economic Sanctions 
Against China.” 16 May 1990, House Document 101-192.
110Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger. Congress, House, Committee On Foreign 
Affairs. Renewal O f MFN Trading Status For The People's Republic o f China, hearing, 
102nd Cong.. 1st sess., 26 June 1991 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1991), 70-72.
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the delinkage.111 Another major weakness of the radical argument was that there had not 
been a unified corporate position. Not all corporations advocated for MFN and human 
rights delinkage. One such major and influential rival of delinkage was the American 
Textiles Manufacturers Institute (ATMI), collectively accounting for over eighty percent 
of total textile mill activity in the United States, and ranging in size from "small family- 
owned enterprises to publicly-owned billion dollar corporations with several thousand 
workers.”" 2 The Institute's Director of International Trade expressed:
ATMI believes that most-favored-nation status for China should not be 
renewed beyond its scheduled expiration on July 3 of this year and that 
there are compelling reasons for it not to be renewed. From ATMI's 
perspective, a decision whether or not to continue China's MFN status 
should be equally conditioned on China's conduct as a trading partner. In 
this regard, the record is clear. It is an understatement to say that China's 
conduct has been deplorable. To say that it has been resolutely criminal 
would be more to the point and more in accordance with the facts...
Whether it be false declarations to the U.S. Customs Service for the 
purpose of evading tariffs, mislabeling of merchandise, or transshipping 
through third countries in order to evade bilateral quota agreements, there 
is not a single type of customs fraud that the Government of China and its 
agents have not engaged in repeatedly during the past several years."3
In addition to the sentiments expressed by corporations opposing or condoning 
U.S. trade with China, there were also groups within American society that expressed the
'"Note Presidential Candidate William Clinton’s statement during the first presidential 
Campaign, in 1991: "economic security is a whole lot of national security.” Washington 
Post. "Campaign *92. Transcript of the First Presidential Debate.” A16.
1 l2Director of International Trade of the American Textile Manufacturers Institute 
Charles V. Bremer. Congress. House, Committee On Ways And Means, Subcommittee 
On Trade. United States-China Trade Relations, hearing, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., 24 Feb. 
1994 (Washington. D.C.: GPO. 1994), 251.
"3Ibid.. 248.
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traditional American values of free trade. Representative Jim Leach, for example, 
expressed that historically, several key points have stood out in U.S. foreign policy.
"One, we stood for the open door, and that implies opening China to the West. In 
addition, for a number of years, very progressive elements in American society pressed 
for political and economic normalization [with China].”114 That freer bi-lateral trade 
with China would hasten political and human rights reforms in China represented many 
of the traditional American values that linked free trade to peace and democracy.
Because of the inconsistencies in corporate opinion and the influence of other opinions 
beyond those of the corporate sector, the radical argument that corporations influenced 
the 1994 decision, did not fully explain U.S. policy choice.
SUMMARY
This chapter tested each of three hypotheses within the context of competing 
theoretical paradigms. The first hypothesis was that the U.S. intent to sustain and 
increase power in the Asian region influenced the 1994 decision to separate China's 
human rights record from MFN. The U.S. national interest, defined as the “acquisition of 
power”" 5 was evident in the rhetoric of U.S. government leaders. U.S. economic 
engagement with China was thought to be a means to influence the actions and policies of
'"Congressman Jim Leach of Iowa. Congress. House. Committee On Foreign Affairs. 
Subcommittees On Human Rights And International Organizations. Asian And Pacific 
Affairs, and International Economic Policy And Trade, Most Favored Nation Status For 
The People's Republic o f China, hearing, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., 29 May 1991 
(Washington. D.C.: GPO, 1992), 90.
"5Kegley. “The Neoliberal Challenge,” 4-5.
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the Chinese regime in order to gain influence in the Asian region. This threat-driven 
policy was apparent in the concern, among U.S. officials, for China’s capability to 
become a hegemon in the Asian region.
The nationalist argument displayed some drawbacks, however. The evidence 
suggested that U.S. policy-makers overestimated China’s economic wealth and power. In 
world aggregate figures. China was not in a position to be a hegemon in the Asian region 
due to internal structural impediments that were, in part, caused by economic and political 
transition. China, on the whole, had incurred a trade deficit with the world, coupled by a 
large national external debt. Also, when looking at aggregate levels, it was determined 
that China was not a major source for U.S. jobs in 1994. when compared to other foreign 
markets.
Additionally, for U.S. producers, it was found that conditioning MFN on China's 
human rights record would not deter their profits and success in the long term. The low- 
cost labor of China could be easily substituted in other countries, which could then offer 
U.S. consumers the same affordable products as were manufactured in China. Therefore, 
the national interest could not fully account for the motives of the 1994 decision.
The second hypothesis, that the U.S. intent to improve the respect for human 
rights in China was the motive for the decision was, in some respects, confirmed. That 
economic freedom, gained through contact and exchange with U.S. corporations would 
pave the way to human rights reform in China was the opinion of many U.S. government 
leaders and human rights groups during the time of the decision. The argument was valid 
to a certain degree. Some human rights reforms were evident in China. A number of 
Chinese political dissidents, particularly dissidents who were on the U.S. list of “known”
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political prisoners, were released according to both U.S. and Chinese officials. And many 
Chinese were permitted to emigrate in accordance with the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.
Notwithstanding, it was also realized in the argument that U.S.-China bilateral 
agreements on human rights were not being met on the part of China, nor were the rights 
stipulated in the Universal Declaration. For the few prisoners who were released, many 
more were imprisoned for their political beliefs, or behavior that was judged by the state 
to be in subversion of the state. It was also discerned that China’s prison conditions were 
inhumane, that torture was practiced, and that no fair system of justice was evident.
Moreover, the evidence suggested that the entirety of the 1992 Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) between the U.S. and China, in regard to prison labor, was not 
being adhered to by the Chinese government. Numerous prisons that operated as 
factories were found under the auspice of China’s "reform through labor” program, where 
products were destined for both the domestic and foreign markets. Additionally, it was 
disclosed that the major human rights condition for the 1994 renewal, which was the 
condition of emigration provided for in the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, had not been 
obliged.
It was discovered that political dissidents and their families were forbidden to 
emigrate or were deterred from emigrating through bureaucratic methods. Because of 
these inherent weaknesses in the liberaiist-based argument, the hypothesis that the U.S. 
intent to improve the respect for human rights in China influenced the 1994 decision, 
proved to be limited. The third proposed hypothesis was that the influence of U.S. 
corporations was the motive for the 1994 decision. The findings suggest that U.S. 
corporate Executives did indeed attempt to influence U.S. officials in the Congressional
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and Executive branches of government. Testimonies by lobbying groups on behalf of 
U.S. corporate groups engaged in trade with and investment in China were numerous 
throughout the years preceding the 1994 policy decision. U.S. corporate Executives 
believed that conditioning or withdrawing China's trade on the basis of human rights 
concerns would prevent firms from gaining and maintaining market share and leadership 
in China, and that foreign competitors would seize the opportunity of lost U.S. business.
Although there were significant attempts by U.S. corporations to convince U.S. 
Congressional and Executive leaders to vote for the delinkage of MFN and human rights, 
a major weakness of the radical argument was that there was no unified corporate 
position. Many U.S. corporations felt that MFN and China’s human rights record should 
continue to be linked because of China's unfair trade practices and forced labor 
conditions. There was also evidence for delinkage beyond the U.S. corporate influence. 
U.S. national interests exhibited a strong positive influence on the policy of 1994. 
Economic power and influence in the Asian region was found to be in the interest of the 
U.S. government leadership.
U.S. economic gains from trade with and investment in China would help to build 
a stronger America, both at home and abroad. Security interests were also at stake. 
China's position as a rising regional hegemon in Asia, conflict on the Korean Peninsula, 
and the political and economic instability in Cambodia and in the nations of the South 
China Sea. were major U.S. security concerns. In light of these findings, the third 
hypothesis, that corporations were the sole influence on the U.S. decision to separate 
MFN and China’s human rights practices, proved to be too narrow a formulation.
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In conclusion, each theoretically-based proposition was limited in explaining the 
motives for the decision to separate trade and China’s human rights practices in 1994. In 
the following chapter, therefore, an alternative hypothesis is proposed that considers 
elements of the first three hypothesis, while introducing further complexities that factored 
into the 1994 decision to end the association between human rights and trade, regarding 
China.




Chapter four presented and tested alternative hypotheses within the context of 
three major competing theoretical perspectives. These included the traditional theoretical 
perspectives of realism, liberalism and radicalism. It was determined in the previous 
chapter that because of theoretical deficiencies in the drive for policy choice, each 
hypothesis, alone, could not serve as an explanation for U.S. foreign policy behavior 
regarding the 1994 decision to separate China’s human rights record from MFN renewal. 
Chapter five will summarize and synthesize the major findings from the previous 
hypotheses and proceed to introduce a fourth, alternative hypothesis that may more fully 
explain the policy motives for this decision.
HYPOTHESES AS PARTIAL TRUISMS
The first hypothesis, the U.S. intent to sustain and increase power in the Asian 
region was true, in partiality, as an influential factor in the 1994 decision. It was 
determined that it was in the U.S. interest to deepen economic engagement with China in 
order to gain increased access to the China market. A competitive U.S. economic 
presence in China would enhance the U.S. influence in the Asian region and would 
increase the economic strength of the U.S. domestic economy through job creation in the 
technological, importing and service sectors of the economy. China’s demand for capital 
and technological goods would expand U.S. exports and would create a demand for
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skilled labor in the U.S. market. The nationalist position claimed that the economic 
strength and competitiveness of the U.S. private sector would have been weakened by 
the relationship of MFN and human rights. For example, it was in the U.S. interest to 
protect its agribusiness sector, which complained of the future loss of food and fiber 
sales to the world's most populous market.
The U.S. interest in protecting its domestic aerospace industry was also a 
contributory factor in the decision to delink trade and human rights in 1994. Some U.S. 
officials were sympathetic to the cause of aircraft and space producers. They argued 
before Congress that foreign competition would mean a loss of U.S. sales, should China 
turn to foreign aircraft producers for purchases, such as the European Airbus consortium, 
if the U.S. conditioned trade on China’s human rights record.
Moreover, it was argued in Congressional debates that the denial of MFN, or 
trade sanctions in any form, would have damaged the U.S. political ability to influence 
the Chinese regime by isolating China from U.S. commercial contacts. The U.S. 
revocation of MFN to China would have been a risk to U.S. consumer welfare, as well. 
Increased tariffs on Chinese imports as a result of China's expected retaliation, would 
have caused a rise in the prices of consumer goods. U.S. consumers had come to rely on 
such affordable finished goods as toys, where, for example. 48 percent of the toys in the 
U.S. market were imported from China.1
Further observations, however, suggest that this realist-based assumption could 
only partially be accepted due to inherent flaws in the argument. It was discerned, for
‘Ambassador and Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Michael H. Moscow, Additional 
Requirements On The Extension o f China s Most-Favored-Nation Status, 42.
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example, that U.S. officials had overestimated China’s relative trade advantage. Total 
trade figures revealed that between the years 1980 and 1994, China incurred a trade 
deficit with the world, with the exception of only five years out of the total fifteen. In 
1993, China’s total trade balance amounted to U.S. $-12.2 billion.2 The U.S. nationalist 
rhetoric condemning China for unfair trade advantages was partly due to different 
calculation methods of trade flows between the two countries. In one investigation of 
the measurement of U.S.-China trade flows, it was found that after adjusting for U.S. re­
exports through Hong Kong, the bi-lateral balance dropped in U.S. official trade data 
from $-29.5 billion to $-25.8 billion in 1993.3
Furthermore, the threat of China’s economic wealth to the U.S. national security 
that was articulated in Congress was determined to be exaggerated. Empirical evidence 
attested to the fact that China's external debt had grown from U.S. $16.7 billion in 1985 
to $69.3 billion, by 1992.4 Additionally, the estimated increased per capita income, even 
when measured by purchasing power parity, was eclipsed by China’s increasing poverty 
population who live on the margin of subsistence. Further flaws in the nationalist 
argument pertained to threats to the welfare of U.S. consumers. Although consumer 
prices on goods imported from China would have risen, they would have risen only 
temporarily, according to some experts, until other new and viable U.S. production and
2China Statistical Abstract, 1998 ed.
J Fung and Lau, 36; General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of 
China. China's Customs Statistics, various years, Hong Kong Census and Statistics 
Department. Hong Kong External Trade, various years; Department Of Commerce, U.S. 
Foreign Trade Highlights, various years.
4Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 1993 (Manila; Oxford University 
Press, 1993); International Financial Statistics, 1996ed.
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import markets were discovered, such as India, Malaysia, Indonesia, or Africa.5 The 
second hypothesis, premised on liberal theory, was the U.S. intent to improve the respect 
for human rights in China through economic engagement influenced the 1994 decision. 
Many U.S. policy-makers in the Executive and Legislative branches of Congress felt that 
deepened economic engagement with China would pave the way to individual freedoms 
and human rights reform in China, by creating a rising middle class that would insist on 
democratic values. These U.S. leaders thought that by further isolating China from U.S. 
economic and political contacts, progress on human rights reforms would be impeded.
However, not all groups within the American political system agreed that 
economic engagement with China would advance the cause of human rights. Some U.S. 
leaders and groups expressed that the best way to advance human rights in China was to 
maintain the linkage of conditionality between MFN and human rights, which would 
serve to pressure the Chinese regime to politically liberalize. These leaders questioned 
the morality of a U.S. foreign policy of economic engagement with a country that clearly 
violated the basic American values of individual freedoms and the Universal Declaration 
Of Human Rights.
Human rights groups, such as Amnesty International USA. questioned the notion 
that humanitarian values drove the Clinton policy to delink MFN and China's human 
rights. Moreover, it was the U.S. public opinion, at the time, that MFN should be 
conditioned on human rights improvements in China.6 Because of these discrepancies of 
opinion, the value-based liberal argument of the intent to improve the respect for human
5Jagdish Bhagwati, as quoted by Berlau, 16.
"Bowman. 150.
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rights in China, held only partial weight as an influence on the U.S. decision to delink 
China’s human rights record from MFN.
The third hypothesis, that U.S. corporations influenced the 1994 decision, was 
also unable to fully account for the decision. In the years preceding the decision, U.S. 
corporations had become increasingly more prominent in Congress and had increased 
contacts with the Executive branch. Hired lobbyists representing a plethora of business 
groups argued in favor of delinkage for various corporate interests. Between 1991 and 
1994, for example, the Business Coalition for U.S.-China trade had grown from 167 
members to 800 members, who became a unified voice in the crusade for unconditional 
U.S. trade with China.7
Political contributions by business interest groups to Congressional political 
parties advocating the continuation of MFN for China, amounted to nearly $7 million.8 
Financial contributions and written and verbal testaments to U.S. policy-makers on 
Capital Hill came from such corporate interest groups as the aerospace and electronics 
industry, that had held both present and future ambitions in the China market.
Additional major business interest groups, such as The American Association of 
Exporters and Importers, the National Retail Federation (NRF) and the American 
Chamber of Commerce, were also outspoken on behalf of MFN renewal to China 
without the imposition of human rights conditions. Loss of market entry, future profits 
and market competitiveness were given as major reasons for the their position.
7Sutter. 64.
8Danitz. 22-24.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
181
A major weakness of the radical-based argument was that there was no unified 
corporate position. Some corporations wanted to maintain the linkage of trade and 
human rights because of China’s unfair trade practices, such as the use of forced labor in 
production which created competitive market and price advantages that could not be 
matched on the U.S. side. Moreover, corporate interests were not alone in their desire 
to influence U.S. foreign policy toward China in 1994.9 Broader U.S. political interests 
were also at stake. It was in the broader national interest for the U.S. to maintain and 
strengthen its private sector through increased penetration and liberalization of foreign 
markets, including the emerging market of China. Centrist leaders in both Democratic 
and Republican parties expressed that economic engagement with China was in the 
interest of the United States of America.
Deepened economic relations with China would not only secure U.S. economic 
advantages, but would also enhance the capacity for U.S. diplomatic contacts with the 
country. Thus serving as a means for greater U.S. influence in China and the Asian 
continent. U.S. corporate interests and the U.S. nationalist interest were one and the 
same in 1994. Further, it was articulated in the liberalist-based argument that increased 
corporate engagement with China would advance the cause of human rights in China
9"Few scholars argue that such lobby or organized groups were the sole or dominant 
force behind these decisions. Indeed, their influence at particular times had depended on 
fluctuating circumstances, including changes in elite and public opinion, international 
pressures and opportunities, and other factors. Measuring the influence o f individual 
interest or lobby groups on U.S. China policy remains a subjective exercise.” Sutter,
3. “Contrary to some popular notions, lobbying, even by rich and powerful domestic 
interest groups, seldom causes fundamental shifts in legislation or government decision, 
studies have found. But marginal shifts can mean life or death for specific interest 
groups.” Susumu Awanohara. “Asian Lobbies: Cash and Connections,” Far Eastern 
Economic Review (June 2, 1994): 25.
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through direct linkages to the Chinese citizenry. Because of a lack of a unified corporate 
position, as well as the influence of other U.S. interests, the third hypothesis lacked the 
power to fully explain the reasoning for delinkage. This was affirmed by Peter Tamoff. 
U.S. Under Secretary of Political Affairs:
While it is certainly the case that this administration has ranked the 
defense of American business and commercial business right up there at 
the top of our national agenda, we have never intended- the President and 
the Secretary of State have been quite explicit about this— to make our 
business, and commercial business, paramount.10
In total, each hypothesis could be accepted as causal factors for policy decision, 
but neither alone nor in combination did they hold sufficient explanatory power for the 
motives of the 1994 decision to end the connection between MFN and China’s human 
rights transgressions. Apart from U.S. policy motives to sustain and increase power in 
the Asian region, or for altruistic motives to improve the respect for human rights in 
China, or for the motives of U.S. corporate interests, external environmental factors also 
played a role in the decision to delink. Increased economic interdependence through 
multiple transnational interactions and channels came into play in the 1994 U.S. 
decision. These transnational channels include linkages through transnational 
corporations." global linkages through international organizations, and cross-national
10U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Tamoff, Congress, House, 
Committee On International Relations, Subcommittees On International Economic Policy 
And Trade and Asia And The Pacific, The Impact o f MFN For China On U.S.-China 
Economic Relations, hearing, 104th Cong.. 2nd sess., 16 May 1996 (Washington. D.C.: 
GPO. 1997). 23.
""The growing influence of transnational corporations can be seen in the increase in the 
stock of foreign direct investment and the growth in the number of transnational 
corporations and their foreign affiliates. During the I980's, and especially after 1982,
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alliances between businesses and governments. Transnational linkages have increased at 
the bilateral, regional and global levels. “The emergence of a truly global economy and 
the dawning of the information revolution have combined to create a set of truly 
transnational actors. These actors are weaving a dense web of ties, blurring familiar 
distinctions between foreign affairs and domestic affairs and calling into question 
traditional assumptions about national identity and interests."12
COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE
The intricate network of transnational actors that affected the 1994 decision on 
U.S.-China policy is labeled, in this study, as “complex interdependence.” To review 
from the first chapter, complex interdependence is defined as “a situation among a 
number of countries in which multiple channels of contact connect societies, where 
states do not monopolize these contacts.”13 in relation to the events surrounding the 
1994 decision, these multiple channels of contact include transnational corporate 
linkages, multilateral governmental linkages, and transnational formal and informal ties
annual foreign-direct-investment flows grew rapidly. By 1992. the global stock of foreign 
direct investment had reached approximately $2 trillion, which generated about $5.5 
trillion in sales by foreign affiliates (compared to world exports of goods and non-factor 
services of $4 trillion).” UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1993: Transnational 
Corporations and Integrated International Production (New York: United Nations,
1993). 4.
12Stanley Foundation. American Relations With China and India: The Growing Impact o f 
Politics and Society on Foreign Policy: Report O f A New American Global Dialogue 
Conference (Muscatinee: Stanley Foundation, 1995), 5, 16-17.
'JKeohane and Nye, 24-25.
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between government and business elites. In lieu o f these environmental factors, a fourth 
alternative hypothesis is proposed, which is that U.S. national interests, U.S. interests in 
advancing the progress of human rights in China, U.S. corporate interests, and complex 
interdependence motivated the 1994 decision. Therefore, an alternative hypothesis is 
proposed. The fourth, or alternative hypothesis draws upon elements of previous 
approaches but places U.S. foreign policy in the context of complex interdependence.
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATE LINKAGES
While the third hypothesis focused on U.S. corporations in the domestic sense, a 
transnational linkage is now established, centering on the interdependencies of 
multinational firms. The trend toward global privatization of public assets, which has 
often been referred to as part of the process of globalization, has brought the role of the 
multinational corporation into the global limelight. The recent (1990's) growth strategy14 
of most developing and transitional countries has been to follow a market-oriented 
structure where the emphasis has been placed on growth through the private sector, 
patterned similarly after the experience of Japan and the Asian NIC’s.15
'■"'Although the evidence of globalization is all around us, it is important to recognize that 
the impact of this metamorphosis is certainly not all positive. Exposure to global trade 
and investment can offer hope and opportunity for those countries capable of 
‘converging.’ Unfortunately, nations that have not developed the institutions and human 
capital necessary to fully benefit from global trade may find themselves falling ever 
farther behind.” Ron Mascitelli, The Growth Warriers (Northridge: Technology 
Perspectives, 1999), 47.
^International Monetary Fund, Issues and Developments in International Trade Policy 
(Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1992), 3.
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The increased privatization of global public assets had increased the intensity of 
cross-border corporate linkages and therefore the interdependencies of nations. These 
broader cross-border and cross-cultural transnational business and commercial activities, 
which had begun to be established, were an influential factor in the reasoning behind the 
delinkage of human rights and MFN in 1994. These commercial cross-border linkages 
had developed through various modes of contact, which included intra-firm and inter- 
firm trade and foreign direct investment.
It has been pointed out that firms engage in intra-firm trade for two reasons. 
Primarily, because it is more efficient to conduct business within firms. Secondly, 
transnational firms “internalize intermediate-product markets across borders, through 
intra-firm trade.16 This network formation consists of a “corporate strategy designed to 
internationalize the activities that are designed to integrate production both vertically and 
horizontally.17 In 1993/94. intra-firm sales by U.S. firms in the electronics industry were 
between 87 percent and 100 percent in China, Malaysia, and Thailand, (where a major 
part of assembly operations of finished goods for export are located).18
Foreign direct investment in China and in other emerging markets, have taken the 
form of wholly-owned enterprises, joint ventures, cooperative ventures, or offshore
l6J.H. Dunning, Multinational Enterprises and The Global Economy (Surrey: 
Addison-Wesley Publishing Ltd., 1993), as cited by Edward K.Y..Chen and Teresa Y.C. 
Wong, "Hong Kong: Foreign Direct Investment and Trade Linkages in Manufacturing,” 
in Multinationals And East-Asian Integration, eds. Wendy Dobson & Chia Siow Yue 
(Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1997), 90.
l7Chen and Wong. 90.
l8Chia Siow Yue and Wendy Dobson, “Harnessing Diversity,” in Multinationals And 
East-Asian Integration, eds. Dobson & Yue, 262.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
186
projects.19 "The joint venture, however, remains one of the key strategic arrangements in 
international management.”20 “Research has shown that foreign investment companies 
invest in the China market to use the high profits obtained there to invest and compete in 
other parts of the world, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region.”21 In China, for 
example, Hewlett Packard corporation not only serves the Chinese market, but also looks 
to integrate with the entire Asia-Pacific market.22
To U.S. corporations, the joint venture is often the mode of entry into foreign 
markets. International corporate alliances offer a more cost-effective and rapid way to 
achieve output than by building plants or making acquisitions.23 In emerging markets, 
such as China, for example, "the multinational corporation actively seeks possible joint 
ventures in order to take advantage of emerging opportunities, to reduce risk and to deal 
with strong nationalism in countries like China.”24 For China and other developing and
l9Yanni Yan. International Joint Ventures in China (New York: St. Martin’s Press.
2000). 22. Yan points out that a wholly-owned Sino-foreign investment project is 
one that is owned by foreign investment companies; a joint venture is shared and run by a 
Board of Directors that act on behalf o f shareholders; a cooperative venture is a "partner” 
venture and is based on contract; whereas an offshore project is based on individual 




2jA. Coskun Samli, Erdener Kaynak and Haroon Sharif, "Developing Strong International 
Corporate Alliances: Strategic Implications.” Journal o f Euro-Marketing 4, nos. 3/4 
(1996). 26.
24Yan. 30.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
187
emerging economies, the joint venture can create certain advantages which include the 
acquisition of local knowledge, marketing and management procedures, and technology 
transfer.25 In China, joint ventures have been mostly formed in the industrial sector, the 
favored market-entry mode by the Chinese government.26
These types of trans-corporate linkages, or mutual dependence between firms, are 
reflected in Table 5.1. which illustrates the U.S.-China network of two major U.S. 
multinational corporations in China, AT&T and Motorola. By 1995, U.S.-China joint 
ventures had been formed with both corporations, increasing the economic integration 
between the two country’s firms through such value-added activities as research and 




2?" Peter Dicken clarifies that “in general, we would expect denser and more extensive 
networks of linkages between TNC’s and domestic enterprises in the developed 
economies than in the developing economies. Within developing countries, such linkages 
are likely to be greatest in the larger and more industrialized countries than in others.
Peter Dicken. Global Shift (New York: The Guilford Press, 1998), 253.
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Joint ventures are of particular importance to China because it is the mode by which the 
greatest amount of foreign direct investment occurs. In 1993, for example. 54.2 percent 
of foreign direct investment to China had been invested through joint ventures.2*
In addition to the increasing amount of intra-firm linkages, inter-firm trade had 
increased as well, creating further cross-border linkages through multinational 
corporations. U.S. multinational corporations had become linked to local firms in 
developing economies, for instance, by placing orders with indigenous suppliers for 
materials or components. The expanded activities of supplying firms create ancillary 
firms involved in transport and distribution activities between foreign and domestic 
enterprises.29 These international production linkages between manufacturing, 
agriculture and service sectors create employment generation, further deepening the 
economic integration between countries through corporate ties and economic 
development.30
By the mid-1990's, the United States pushed for further entry of its financial 
institutions in China by requesting establishment of offices in cities outside of Shanghai
;sN.T. Wang. “The Role of Foreign Direct Investment in Reform and Development in 
China." Institute Reports (New York: Columbia University Press. 1993), 10, as cited by 
Yoichi Funabashi. Michel Oksenberg and Heinrich Weiss. An Emerging China In A 
World O f Interdependence (New York: The Trilateral Commission. 1994). 37.
29Dicken. 6.
'“"Government intervention in the sourcing choices of MNEs appears to have been the 
single most powerful determinant for the creation of local linkages of MNE’s. Without 
such government intervention, it is likely that, despite some market pressure, local MNE 
linkages would be much less developed than they are today in various countries and 
industries.” International Labor Organization, Employment Effects o f Multinational 
Enterprises in Developing Countries (Geneva: ILO. 1981). 94. as cited by Dicken,
253.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
191
and Beijing and to engage in China’s local currency business and underwriting deals.31 
Aside from these bi-lateral and transnational U.S. business and commercial linkages, 
there had also been a growing number of overseas Chinese who managed and owned 
corporations and who numbered about 55 million world-wide.32 These mid-size 
Chinese-owned multinationals had become a new and powerful economic influence 
through linkages to China and the Asian region. "The overseas Chinese have accounted 
for 80 percent of all foreign investment in China, making this powerful group the driving 
force behind that nation’s explosive economic growth.”33 Many overseas Chinese 
multinationals reside in the United States. Canada, Europe and Australia. Any sanctions 
imposed on China by the United States would have deterred transnational bilateral and 
multilateral business activities and the growing network of linkages resulting from them.
Although, in early 1994. U.S. direct foreign investment in China had only begun 
to take root and amounted to only U.S. $2.4 billion in actual amount utilized.34 it was 
future expectations of U.S. business in the China market, and opportunities for deepened 
U.S.-China transnational corporate linkages that fueled U.S. decision-makers to drop 
human rights conditions from MFN renewal in 1994. Although present and future 
anticipations of U.S.-China multinational corporate ties were a highly significant
■'John R. Shuman, "Global Perspectives: The International Competitiveness of U.S. 
Banks." Journal o f Commercial Lending 77 (August 1995): 23.
j2Peter Drucker. "The New Superpower: The Overseas Chinese.” Wall Street Journal 
10 Dec. 1994. A14.
33Ibid.
j4China Statistical Year Book 1995,1995 ed.
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influence on U.S. decision-makers in 1994, there were also additional transnational 
linkages that proved to be of critical significance to the framing of U.S. policy on 
China’s human rights record and MFN.
MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONAL LINKAGES
In addition to U.S. linkages through multinational corporations, there were also 
multilateral institutional linkages that had affected the U.S. 1994 decision to end the 
association between China's human rights record and MFN. U.S. multilateral linkages 
to such major international governmental organizations as the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and the United Nations, had influenced the opinions of U.S. decision-makers. In 
1994. world trade and investment activities became solidified and controlled under the 
authority of the WTO. The new WTO exercised a degree of power that had been 
previously denied due to its former existence as a "provisional organization.”35 
The culmination of the Uruguay Round agreements, signed in Marrakesh. 
Morocco, in April 1994 by 124 countries, formed the legal and institutional framework 
for new global trading rules in goods and services, and market access commitments.36 
The World Trade Organization, carried over from the GATT, represented the end of
j5Edward Luce. "Agreement creates a new bureaucracy to back it up,” Guardian,
15 Dec. 1993.12. “The U.S. Congress refused to ratify GATT’s existence when it was 
formed in 1947. thus the organization was effectively in limbo.”
j6Jeffrey Schott, The Uruguay Round: An Assessment (Washington, D.C.: Institute For 
International Economics. 1994), 3.
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seven years of bargaining negotiations that began in 1986. in Punta del Este, Uruguay.37 
The timing of the completion of the Uruguay Round was most auspicious. It occurred 
only one month before the U.S. decision was made to end the relationship between trade 
and China's human rights record.38 “Peter Sutherland, the director-general of the GATT 
warned the United States that “it ran the risk of jeopardizing a $500 billion boost to 
global income if Congress failed to ratify the Uruguay trade deal by the end of the
••39year.
It was, in addition to the previous-discussed causal factors, the influence of the 
WTO that had affected the U.S. executive decision in 1994. "The WTO, like its 
predecessor, was founded on liberal principles.”40 The theory of comparative advantage 
and factor endowments was the underlying pulse of the new WTO. Free trade, from the 
perspective of the WTO, was superior to no trade because the gains from trade 
outweighed the disadvantages.41 The global welfare gains, as a result of the Uruguay 
Round negotiations, are presented in Figure 5.1. As shown, gains were to be made by 
most of the world's trading nations as measured by percent change in real GDP.
37Ibid.
’8In 1994. the United States had also lifted its economic embargo on Vietnam. Chen Jie, 
“Tactical Alliance: Southeast Asia and China’s post-1989 human rights diplomacy,” 
China Rights Forum 46 (fall 1998): 11.
■''’Larry Elliot. “U.S. Urged Not to Kill GATT Accord,” Guardian, 11 Nov. 1994, 1.
40Marc Williams. “The World Trade Organization. Social Movements and Democracy,” 
in Global Trade and Global Social Issues, eds. Annie Taylor and Caroline Thomas (New 
York: Routledge, 1999), 153.
4‘Paul R. Krugman. Strategic Trade Policy and The New International Economics 
(Cambridge: MIT Press. 1986) as cited by Williams, 153.
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The greatest welfare gains, based on projected outcomes to the year 2005, were to 
be found in the Asian region, where the ASEAN countries gained a 2.5 percent increase 
in growth as a result of Uruguay Round trade liberalization. China gained a 1.5 percent 
increase in GDP growth. South Asia, a 1.4 percent growth increase, and the newly- 
industrialized economies (NIE's), 0.8 percent projected GDP growth increase. Projected 
benefits to the Asian region far surpassed world gains, at only 0.4 percent. Much of the 
reason for the high growth figures in the Asian region, was due to the ten-year phase out 
of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA) which had placed substantial quotas on imports 
of textiles from developing countries to developed countries through bi-lateral 
agreements.'12 Because most textiles and apparels were exported from countries of the 
Southeast Asian region, the phase-out of the MFA opened the possibilities for greater 
economic gains to Asia through increased exports of apparel, and (though to a lesser 
extent) increased imports of textiles.43
Although most of the world’s countries44 were expected to experience positive
42Schott. 11.
4-'Yang. "The Uruguay Round Trade Liberalization And Structural Adjustment In 
Developing Asia.”503-506.
"“ It should be noted that not all countries benefitted from WTO policies. “Some 30 
countries in Africa and 19 in Latin America depend on primary commodity exports for 
more than half of their export earnings. Yet, these primary commodity exporters were not 
dealt with in Uruguay Round agreements. These countries suffer from a lack of 
diversification away from commodity dependence. Primary commodity exporters have 
faced the worst depression in world markets since the 1920's. Between 1980 and 1993, 
prices for non-oil primary commodities fell by more than half in relation to prices for 
manufactured goods. The estimated annual loss to these least developing countries over 
this period was around U.S. $100 billion, more than twice the total flow of aid in 1990.” 
Caroline LeQuesne, Reforming World Trade: The Social and Environmental Priorities 
(Oxford: Oxfam, 1996), 12. For original discourse on the terms of trade for 
developing countries, refer to Raul Prebisch, “Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped
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welfare effects from the Uruguay Round agreement, the least gains were projected for 
Latin America, at 0.2 percent. North America, at 0.1 percent and Australia, at a 0.2 
percent increase in welfare.45 Table 5.2 provides a more detailed projection of welfare 
gains to the United States from the Uruguay Round. U.S. gains through the Uruguay 
Round legislation were expected to be manifested in increased imports, exports, and 
consumer welfare. Total welfare gains to the U.S. were projected to increase from $8.8 
million in 1994 to $31 million in 1999.46
During and after the formation of the WTO. it was maintained by many groups 
across the globe that the scope of the Uruguay Round favored the multilateral trading 
system as superior to national policy-making in this “new world liberal order.”47 
Admittedly, the WTO strengthened multilateralism, and at least was viewed as a 
complement to national policies. In 1994, most every nation in the world supported the 
new multilateral institutional framework for trade and policy issues.
Countries." American Economic Review 49 (May 1959): 251-273.
45 In most studies, at this time, global income gains had been understated due to the 
high representation of commodities that were representative of East-Asian economies and 
natural resource-based economies. As Jeffrey Schott notes, “Since export expansion of 
more sophisticated manufactures generates greater export environmental factors, the U.S. 
(and North American) gains were also under-estimated.” Schott. 205.
46Schott, 31.
47Williams. 155- 158.
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671,020 507,534 18,018 33,153 9,253 8,626 9,025 8, 853
95 6,753 671,020 507,534 3,604 6,631 1,851 1,726 1,805 1,771
96 6,888 711,281 537,988 6,640 14,057 3,923 3,657 3,827 3,754
97 7,028 753,958 570,265 12,147 22,351 6,238 5,815 6,084 5,969
98 7,166 799,195 604,481 17,168 31,589 8,816 8,219 8,599 8,438
99 7,310 847,147 640,750 22,747 41,855 11,681 10,890 11,394 11,177
63,304 116,482 32,508 30,306 31,708 31,106
Source: Jeffrey  J. Schott, The Uruguay Round: An Assessment (W ashington, D.C.: Institute for International Econom ics, 1994), 31.
a. US G D P for 1995 is estim ated by adjusting actual 1993 G D P for grow th in 1994 and 1995 as projected by the OECD, OECD Economic 
Outlook 1994 (D ec, 1993), for 1996 through 1999 an annual grow th rate o f  2 percent is assumed.
b. In the absence o f  U ruguay Round liberalization, im ports and exports are both assum ed to grow  at an annual rate o f  6 percent.
c. The increase in the levels o f  im ports and exports due to  U ruguay Round cuts, and the corresponding w elfare gains, are assum ed to accrue 
in equal increm ents over five years, subject to an annual growth rate o f  6 percent, starting  in 1995.
d. Increases in US im port levels due to  im port liberalization partly replace US dom estic production and partly  reflect a net increase in total 
consum ption. T he US consum er surplus gains therefore include som e loss from liberalization to  US producers o f  im port-com peting 
products.
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The prospect of increased global economic integration brought about by a new 
world trade regime was supported by leaders from the North, South, East and West. 
"President Clinton spoke for many of the world's leaders when he told the United 
Nations General Assembly that ‘a strong GATT agreement will create millions of jobs 
worldwide.' Virtually every other world leader had expressed similar sentiments.”48 
The move toward globalization and the U.S. support of it and gains from it. 
averted U.S. leaders in the Executive branch and centrist leaders in the Congress from 
forming a policy that would deter the process of economic liberalization, and hence 
WTO objectives.49 Governors of all fifty U.S. states endorsed the new world trade 
agreement, in 1994, and urged Congress to approve it as quickly as possible.50 President 
Clinton had also received a letter from 446 economists urging Congress to ratify the 
Uruguay Round agreement as soon as possible.51 Further endorsements came from 
former Presidents. Secretaries of State, Secretaries of the Treasury and U.S. Trade 
Representatives.52 As Peter Sutherland, former director-general of the GATT put it, "If
48Peter Sutherland. “If GATT Fails. We All Lose.” Wall Street Journal, 19 Oct. 1993.
A20.
4q”U.S. support for increased global economic liberalization, or ‘globalization,’ remains 
strong. During the entire postwar period, the executive branch, whether controlled by the 
Democrats or the Republicans, acted as a bulwark against congressional demands for 
increased protection.” Elliot Zupnick, Visions and Revisions: The United States in the 
Global Economy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999), 228.
50"50 Governors For Trade Pact.” New York Times, 19 July 1994, D5.
51 Public Papers O f The Presidents O f The United States: Book II, Aug. 1 to Dec. 31,
1994, U.S. Press Secretary, "Statement on Support From Economists for Prompt 
Ratification of the GATT Agreement,” (Washington. D.C.: GPO, 1995), 1432.
5*Public Papers O f The Presidents O f The United States: Book II, Aug. 1 to Dec. 31,
1994. William J. Clinton, "Message to the Congress on the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade.” 27 Sept 1994 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995), 1638
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GATT fails, we all lose.”53 Many global groups and coalitions also supported the cause 
of multilateral trade liberalization under the WTO. The Cairns group, for example, a 
group of fourteen countries,54 sought to liberalize agricultural trade through the WTO 
mechanism. For these smaller countries, the successful conclusion to the Uruguay 
Round meant greater access to markets that had previously been available only to the 
world's bigger economic players.55
In addition to global economic gains from liberalized trade and investment, 
deepened global economic integration was thought to bring security gains to the world. 
As Peter Sutherland further articulated: "It would be cruel irony if. following the 
collapse of the Iron Curtain, the U.S. and the EC were unable to keep in place a secure 
and effective trading system.”56 U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher affirmed the 
opinion of Sutherland in his statement that “Security in the post-Cold War world 
depends as much on strong economies as on strong arsenals. Advancing transatlantic 
security requires us to focus not only on renewing the NATO Alliance, but also on 
successfully concluding the GATT negotiations.”57 The WTO was also viewed as a
53SutherIand. A20.
'4The countries in the Cairns group included Australia. New Zealand. Canada. Fiji, 
Thailand, the Philippines. Malaysia, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil. Chile and Colombia, 
all together representing 130 million farmers. Catherine Foster, “Cairns Group 
Anticipates GATT's Agricultural Benefits,” Christian Science Monitor. 10 Dec. 1993, 7.
55Foster. 7.
56Sutherland. A20.
57 “Secretary Christopher's Remarks After Meeting at European Union Headquarters, 
Brussels.” Foreign Policy Bulletin 4 (JanVApr. 1994): 81.
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safeguard against the possibilities of regional protectionism that would serve as a further 
threat to global security:
Economic blocs either remain open within the multilateral trading system 
--if that system is alive and healthy— or they turn inward and become 
fortresses. If it is the latter, then the prospects for long-term growth and 
job creation are. even inside the fortress, doomed. And if the response to 
a failed round is regionalism, where will Russia fit in? Where will the 
rest of Eastern and Central Europe or China be? To whom do the 
countries of Africa look? And can the nations of Latin America expect to 
be welcomed with open arms by members of a protectionist NAFTA?
We are talking here about most of humanity.58
The WTO rule-making body was viewed, in addition to facilitating free trade, as 
a means to prevent the U.S. and USSR confrontation that had plagued the world for 
almost fifty years.54 Therefore, beyond state-centered, or corporate-centered or 
seemingly humanistic interests that may have affected the 1994 decision, global welfare
and security interests also factored into the decision. Multipolarity under the aegis of the 
WTO was thought to be a better guarantee for global security than had been the previous 
bipolar cold war arrangement.
With the acceptance of economic liberalization by most nations of the world, 
"global" interests were thought to be best served by the integration of China into the 
international marketplace and the global political community. Unilateral government- 
imposed barriers to China's economic integration with the world, such as U.S. trade
58SutherIand, A20.
59Charles Chartier, "China: Economic Reforms and WTO Accession,” Thunderbird 
International Business Review 40. no. 3 (May/June, 1998): 275-276.
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sanctions based on China’s human rights conditions, were not viewed by world leaders 
as in the best interests of the newr multilateralism and global cooperation. To close a 
potential market, such as China, would have been counter-productive to the rule of 
GATT free trade."60
Moreover. China held a "powerful and politically sympathetic constituency for 
sustaining its general course and influencing developments” through linkages to 
multilateral institutions.61 In 1980, Beijing had expressed, once again.62 an interest in 
becoming a member of the GATT. Formal negotiations between China and GATT 
officials began in 1987. and China had since established increasingly stronger relations 
with GATT officials.63 Chinese trade officials had presented to the GATT steps that had 
been taken to decentralize the economy as part of its case for accession.63 By 1994. 
China had gained the support of the GATT because of extensive diplomatic lobbying 
with GATT officials, backed by her rapidly-growing global economic presence. China 
used her economic leverage successfully to work through the GATT bureaucracy to offer 
her vast market to the world. At the 18th meeting of the working party in Geneva 
studying China’s entry into the GATT. Long Yongtu. leader of the Chinese delegation, 
made it clear that "a world trade organization without China would lack
“ Schott. 31.
61 Robert Boardman. Post-Socialist World Orders: Russia, China and the UN System 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 143-144.
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comprehensiveness and would be an imperfect multilateral trade system.”6* More than 
the U.S.. which had taken a confrontational stance with China until the 1994 delinkage, 
the EU had unremittingly taken a positive position on China that consistently stressed 
cooperative efforts to bring the country into the multilateral trading system of the 
GATT.66 The EU's support for China strengthened China’s political clout in the GATT.
Consistent with the traditions of the International Bank For Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) practices, there had also been a close connection between China 
and the World Bank and IMF officials, who had been advising China on the selection of 
projects and on macroeconomic policies.67 Leaders from multilateral trade and financial 
institutions did not wish to see China isolated by U.S. unilaterally-imposed conditions on 
trade. More problematic is that the imposition of U.S. trade sanctions on China would 
have entailed political consequences for the United States. Had the United States taken 
steps to further isolate China, in 1994. the United States would have further isolated 
itself from the international community. Isolating China would have been counter­
productive to the GATT procedures and the framing of the new WTO.6* U.S. political
65Morio Matsumoto. "China’s Industrial Policy And Participation In The GATT,” JETRO 
China Newsletter, no. 112 (Sept./Oct. 1994): 5.
“ Michaela Eglin. "China’s entry into the WTO with a little help from the EU,” 
International Affairs 73. no. 3 (1997): 495.
67Boardman. 142.
"""International Governmental Organizations are among the features of the international 
system that define limits to the maneuverability of the states that governments steer.
They offer states a variety of inducements and penalties that enter into the choices 
governments make among strategies and actions. The way in which IGO’s carry out 
these operations is subject not only to structural and policy variations in the organizations 
themselves, but also to differential perceptions of their importance by national political 
actors/’Boardman, 163.
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and economic linkages to multilateral institutions, therefore, further encouraged 
President Clinton to end the relationship between China’s human rights practices and 
MFN. contrary to the ideals that had been expressed in the 1993 Executive Order.
Aside from multilateral trade and financial linkages that had affected the 1994 
decision, the role of the United Nations was also a key component. The United Nations 
serves as a multilateral forum for discourse and grievances on human rights violations 
around the world. U.N. decisions, activities or inactivities, with regard to human rights 
issues, affect the manner in which human rights issues are handled within the global 
community of citizens. The main body dealing with human rights issues in the United 
Nations is the Commission on Human Rights, established by the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1946.69 The Commission serves as a 
"legitimator of norms and protector of individuals and groups.”70 The U.N. human rights 
regime has formed part of the complex web of interdependence opposing the centrifugal 
forces of global change, ethnic tribalism and political atomization in today’s world.”71 
Between 1993 and 1996. however, there had been a weakening of the human 
rights regime within the United Nations. The U.N.'s lack of success in peacekeeping 
missions in Haiti. Bosnia and Somalia had taken its toll on the organization.72 The U.N.
wAnn Kent. China, the United Nations, and Human Rights: The Limits o f  Compliance 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 53. The U.N. Sub- 




n Lucia Mouat, "UN Close to Approval of Human Rights Post,” Christian Science 
Monitor, 10 Dec. 1993,2.
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human rights center in Geneva received 500,000 complaints of human rights abuses in 
the first half of 1993.73 Human rights advocates complained that the center merely 
delivered a "slap on the wrist” to these worldwide abuses.74 The U.N. human rights 
regime, in addition to being politically weak, was also financially weak. In 1993. the 
U.N. spent only about $11 million, or less than one percent of its budget on human rights 
work.75
The small amount invested in global human rights priorities did not nearly meet 
the vast issues and responsibilities confronted by the U.N. during the post-Soviet era. 
when ethnic strife and the fight for new nationalities and identities were taking its toll on 
human lives. While the U.N. had weakened its human rights stance and credibility in the 
world. China's increased economic bargaining position as a formidable world trading 
power added leverage to her unyielding posture on the relativism of human rights, the 
reinstatement of the principles of state sovereignty and the self determination of states, in 
U.N. human rights forums.76
Conceived by Jan Martensen. the U.N. Under-Secretary General for Human 
Rights, and with considerable support from Germany, the seed of the Vienna Conference 
was planted in 1988. The Conference mandate [1990 UNGA] was to "take stock of 
accomplishments in human rights, assess remaining obstacles in implementing the 




76Kent. China, the United Nations, and Human Rights, 248.
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effective, and ensure adequate resources to the task.”77 By 1990, the General Assembly 
adopted the resolution to hold the conference which convened in June 1993.78 Prior to 
the U.N. World Human Rights Conference in Vienna, there had been several meetings of 
preparatory groups. The Bangkok Conference being the major pre-Vienna Conference 
human rights initiative.
The Bangkok Conference, held in April of 1993, consisted of a group of forty- 
nine Asian and Middle Eastern governments.79 Intra-regional divisions on the definition 
of human rights were found among the Asian nations at the Bangkok meeting. The 
countries of Japan. Thailand. Nepal. South Korea and the Philippines had taken a more 
relaxed, westernized view of human rights, whereas China Indonesia Iran, Iraq, 
Malaysia North Korea and Burma had taken a more hard-line position on human 
rights.80 Although the final Bangkok Declaration reaffirmed states’ commitments to the 
universality of human rights and the Universal Declaration, the Declaration also 
mentioned the principles of state sovereignty and noninterference, though not as a prior 
right, as had been the position of China.81
China's rigidity on human rights was publicly expressed only a few days before
77Congress. House, Committee On Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees On International 
Security. International Organizations And Human Rights, and The Commission On 
Security And Cooperation In Europe, Human Rights Policy Under The Hew 
Administration. hearing. 104th Cong., 1st sess., 10 June 1993 (Washington. D.C.: GPO.
1993). 62.
78 Kent, China, the United Nations, and Human Rights. 162.
"Ibid.. 165.
“ Kent. China, the United Nations, and Human Rights, 165-166.
81 Ibid.. 167.
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the U.N. World Human Rights Conference in Vienna. In alluding to the human rights 
objectives of the forthcoming U.N. Human Rights Conference in Vienna, China’s Vice 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Liu Huaqiu. commented: ‘The conference should reflect 
different political systems, economic and social as well as historical, religious and 
cultural differences of countries.”82 Chinese leaders lobbied hard to forward their 
position on human rights among Asian countries and to the rest of the world. In the final 
Vienna Declaration, the principles that China had insisted upon, such as the role of 
historical conditions, the right to development and the importance of state sovereignty 
were mentioned, but were not granted the prominence of the universality of human 
rights, and civil and political rights, enumerated in U.N. doctrine.83
Although no single nation, including China, had been able to influence the 
outcome of the Vienna Human Rights Conference in 1993 and the reinstatement of the 
universality of human rights84 expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
8:AFP report of Liu Huaqiu interview. 10 June 1993, "La Chine pour des Droits de 
1'Homme a la Carte.”as cited by Kent. China, the United Nations, and Human Rights. 
173.
8j"The only respect in which the Bangkok Declaration appeared to have retained an 
influence on the thinking in the Vienna statement was in its itemization of all the rights 
[self-determination, sovereignty, culture, development] in addition to civil and political 
rights. As well, the Vienna Declaration, in opposition to the practice of China's human 
rights, submitted an extensive section on torture, according to which freedom from 
torture was a 'right which much be protected under all circumstances, including in times 
of internal or international disturbance or armed conflicts." (sec. II, para. 56) and the 
need for an independent judiciary and legal profession (sec. I, para. 27).” Kent, China, 
the United Nations, and Human Rights, 186.
^"Maxime Tardu has observed, in his study of the effectiveness of U.N. human rights 
bodies, that external and internal pressures on human rights reinforce each other to 
produce compliance.” Maxime Tardu. The Effectiveness o f  United Nations Methods and 
Mechanisms in the Field o f  Human Rights: A Critical Overview, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.157/PC/60/Add.5 (Apr. 1,1993), as cited by Kent, China, the United
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what was of crucial significance was China’s ability to influence the U.N. human rights 
regime. China's influence on U.N. human rights activities had been most apparent since 
1989:
In the 1989 U.N. Sub-Commission and when the draft resolution 
criticizing its human rights conditions was first introduced, China’s 
inordinately aggressive lobbying tactics prompted the experts to adopt a 
resolution requiring a secret ballot for all country specific resolutions.
China opposed this procedural innovation in 1989 and continues to 
oppose it. China has consistently argued against the right of the Sub- 
Commission to engage in political debate and attack states through 
country-specific resolution.85
Further attempts by China to manipulate U.N. human rights procedures were taken 
through the tabling of a procedural no-action motion, thereby preventing the issue of its 
human rights practices from being brought to vote.86 Although the principles of the 
universality of human rights were emphasized in the final Vienna Declaration, there were 
practical signs that the U.N.'s capability to censure and act upon China’s internal affairs
Nations, and Human Rights. 249.
85Ann Kent. "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights & China: Breaker or Shaper of 
Norms?" China Rights Forum (fall 1998): 6-7.
S6Kent. "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights & China,” 7. In further evidence of 
China's continuing influence on U.N. human rights procedures, on April 18.2000, the 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights failed to consider a resolution that came 
from the United States, criticizing China’s human rights performance. '‘The procedural 
no-action motion was adopted by a  vote of 22 supporting the no-action motion to 18 
against. Human Rights Watch criticized governments of the European Union, Australia, 
Canada and Japan, which had professed concern about the human rights situation in 
China, but declined to co-sponsor the resolution with the United States or to actively 
lobby against the no-action motion....The credibility of the U.N. Commission has been 
seriously damaged by its unwillingness to censure China or even discuss its rights 
performance.” "Rights Group Deplores U.N. China Move.” Human Rights Watch, 18 
Apr. 2000. on-line, available from www.hrwatchyc.igc.org.
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on human rights had been weakened. Although outwardly, China complied with the rest 
of the world in the final determination on decisions on human rights, internally, the 
Chinese government continued to implement its own version of humans rights practices. 
For example, directly after the 1994 decision had been made, China quickly rounded up 
thousands of political dissidents and had subjected them to crimes against the state, 
torture, life-time imprisonments, or were never to be seen again.87
China's increased economic and political leverage in the WTO. the IMF and the 
World Bank was a causal variable in the U.S. 1994 decision. In further contribution to 
the U.S. decision on China, there was a heightened global trade “euphoria,” in 1994. as a 
result of the final formation and solidification of the World Trade Organization. The 
triumph of trade liberalization overshadowed the activities and actions of the U.N. 
human rights regime. The goal of most of the world's nations in 1994 was to promote 
the process of globalization through increased trade and investment liberalization. 
Therefore, the imposition of trade sanctions in any form, by any country, was not part of 
the international mind set or "global” public opinion during the time the Clinton decision 
on China was finalized. Few countries wanted to upset the new liberalized world order.
TRANSNATIONAL ELITE ALLIANCES
In addition to the complex web of interactions of states, international 
organizations and regimes, international elite alliances also swayed the 1994 decision. 
These elite alliances had taken place between governments, and between governments
s7Kaye. "Commerce Kowtow,” 18.
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and multinational corporations,88 both intra-regionally and extra-regionally. Much of the 
reasoning for these alliances had been driven by ideology as well as by economic 
considerations. With regard to ideology, the [non-Japan] Asian region, despite minor 
differences of opinion in the practice of human rights, shared a similar authoritarian 
value system. By 1991. a Sino-ASEAN89 alignment had been formed to oppose the post- 
Cold War international human rights campaign.90
At the 24th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Kuala, Lumpur in 
1991. an ASEAN consensus on human rights was formulated. 
Interestingly, it was remarkably similar to China’s human rights theory. 
Both China and ASEAN emphasize that the standards vary from one 
country to another because of differences in cultural traditions and the 
level of economic deve!opment...that in developing countries the rights to 
economic subsistence and development should take precedence over 
political and civil rights and that the application of human rights should 
not violate national sovereignty and should not be linked to economic 
cooperation.91
88D.M. Gordon notes that "it is perhaps most useful to view the relationship between 
transnational [corporations] and governments as both cooperative and competing, both 
supportive and conflictual. They operate in a fully dialectical relationship, locked into 
unified but contradictory roles and positions, neither the one nor the other partner clearly 
or completely able to dominate.” D.M. Gordon, “The Global Economy: New Edifice or 
Crumbling Foundations?” New Left Review 168 (1998): 61: Dicken. 243.
89The ASEAN countries, formed in 1967, include Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the 
Philippines. Indonesia. Brunei in 1984. Vietnam in 1995, and Myanmar and Laos in 
1997.
90”The ASEAN consensus on human rights was determined largely by the views of 
Singapore. Malaysia and Indonesia. Although the Philippines and Thailand did not share 
the same convictions, they went along with their ASEAN partners in the interest of group 
cohesion.” Chen. 9-10.
91 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
210
In order to further solidify the Sino-ASEAN alignment, Chinese Premier Li Peng 
had visited the ASEAN region several times in the early 1990's to improve the 
cohesiveness of China and the Asian region.92 As a result of Asian solidarity, Asian 
nations successfully arrested the American demand for a specific reference to labor 
standards in the final Uruguay Round agreement in Marakesh93 It was, in part. Asian 
solidarity on human rights ideology that strengthened its resistance to western values, 
and thus weakened the U.S. 1993 position of linking MFN with China’s human rights 
practices.
In addition to a shared authoritarian ideological history, Asia had experienced 
deepened economic regional integration. Table 5.3 demonstrates an intra-regional and 
U.S. comparison of capital inflows to China. As displayed, the greater part of these 
financial inflows to China had come from the Asian region. Total Asian and U.S. 
inflows to China amounted to about U.S. $40 billion, most of which had come from 
Hong Kong and Singapore, at $20.3 billion and $11.7 billion, respectively. The greater 
part of Hong Kong's investment is concentrated in Guangdong, where an estimated two 
to three million Chinese work for Hong Kong firms.94 The U.S. percentage of total U.S. 
and Asian inflows was a much less significant 6 percent.
Asian integration is further evidenced by the degree of trade intensity in the 
Asian region. Table 3.4 and Table 5.5 illustrate the degree of trade intensity among
92Ibid.
93Shada Islam. “Something for Everyone.” Far Eastern Economic Review (June 2,1994): 
82.
^Randall Jones. Robert King and Michael Klein, The Chinese Economic Area: Economic 
Integration Without A Free Trade Agreement (Paris: OECD, 1992), 14.
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Asian nations. Table 5.4. for example, presents the trade intensity of office and 
computing machinery for Southeast Asia, Japan, the United States and Europe for the 
year 1992. As exhibited, in looking at China, the highest degree of trade intensity for 
this product group is between China and the ASEAN-8, at a coefficient of 7.35, 
reflecting China's close economic integration with the Asian [non-Japan] region. 
Similarly, for textile and garments, shown in Table 5.5. the trade intensity coefficient 
was largest with regard to the intensity of trade between China and the rest of the Asian 
[non-Japan] region, at 2.92. Figures in both tables illustrate the intensity of China’s 
integration within the Asian region.
Because of these economic interdependencies. Asian elites in government and 
business used their political and economic clout to influence U.S. foreign policy across 
the Pacific. A major forum of global elite influence was the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC), a government to government group of 21 countries95 both within 
and without of the Asian region, engaged in dialogue concerning Asian and global 
economic security interests. In 1994. in Bogor. Indonesia. APEC world leaders 
convened to discuss the economic future of the Asian region and the opening of the 
exchange of goods and services.
95 APEC member countries include: Australia. Brunei, Canada, Chile, Peoples Republic 
of China. Hong Kong/China, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, 
New Zealand. Papua New Guinea, Peru, Republic of the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, 
The Republic of China, Thailand, U.S.A.. and Vietnam. These 21-member economies 
have a combined GDP of U.S. $16 trillion, and in 1998 accounted for 42 percent of 
global trade, on-line, available from wwwl.apec.org.sp/member. www.apecsec.org.sg.
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Table 5.3
Comparison of Foreign Capital Inflows Into China From Selected Asian Countries For 
The Year 1994 (U.S. SBillion)
Country/Investor Inflow to China





Total Inflows To China 40.0
U.S. Percentage of Total Inflow 6 percent
Source: China Statistical Year Book 1995,1995 ed., 556-557.
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Table 5.4
Office and Computing Machinery (ISIC 3825)%
Trade-Intensity97 Coefficients For Eight East Asian Economies. 1992
Japan United States Europe ASEAN-8a
Chinab 0.63 1.04 0.55 7.35
Hong Kong 1.62 1.02 0.58 4.48
Indonesia 0.19 0.19 0.42 12.13
Malaysia 1.36 1.21 0.51 6.95
Philippines 1.02 0.58 0.77 7.74
Singapore 0.80 1.72 0.98 1.84
Taiwan 0.46 1.60 1.30 1.23
Thailand 2.74 1.19 0.50 6.38
Source: Wendy Dobson. “East Asian Integration: Synergies Between Firm Strategies and 
Government Policies.” in Multinationals And East Asian Integration, eds. Wendy 
Dobson & Chia Siow Yue (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre. 1997).
2 2 .
a. In this study, the ASEAN-8 include those eastern Asian economies of China 
(Guangdong province). Hong Kong. Indonesia. Malaysia, the Philippines. Singapore. 
Taiwan, and Thailand.
b. China, in this instance, is Guangdong province.
'"’"Note: ISIC: International Standard Industrial Classification
97The authors Wendy Dobson and Chia Siow Yue define Trade Intensity as a measure of 
the trade between pairs or groups of countries relative to their shares of world trade. The 
intensity index (I(J) is calculated as follows:
1,,= X ./X ,
Mj /(Mw-M i)
where XtJ is country / 's exports to country j;  X, is country i's exports; Mj is country 
j  s imports: Mw is world imports; andMj is country / 's imports.
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Table 5.5 Textile and Garments (ISIC 321 + 322)98 
Trade-Intensity" Coefficients For Eight East Asian Economies, 1992
Japan United States Europe ASEAN-81
Chinab 2.07 0.83 0.58 2.92
Hong Kongc 0.31 1.44 0.73 0.24
Indonesia 1.01 0.99 1.29 2.38
Malaysia 0.73 2.02 1.38 1.51
Philippines 0.63 2.88 1.14 0.72
Singapore 0.22 1.58 0.83 1.65
Taiwan 0.93 1.42 0.37 3.29
Thailand 1.35 1.21 1.08 0.67
Source: Wendy Dobson. "East Asian Integration: Synergies Between Firm Strategies and 
Government Policies.” in Multinationals And East Asian Integration. eds. Wendy 
Dobson & Chia Siow Yue (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre. 1997).
23. 90.
a. In this study, the ASEAN-8 include those eastern Asian economies of China 
(Guangdong province). Hong Kong, Indonesia. Malaysia, the Philippines. Singapore. 
Taiwan, and Thailand.
b. China, in this instance, is Guangdong province.
c. "Of Hong Kong's apparel. 93% was also imported from the ASEAN region in 1992. 
of which 89% came from China. The United States and the European Community (EC) 
were the most important export markets, whereas the importance of the Japanese market 
for re-exports had been increasing.”
^"Note: ISIC: International Standard Industrial Classification
"The authors Wendy Dobson and Chia Siow Yue define Trade Intensity as a measure of 
the trade between pairs or groups of countries relative to their shares of world trade. The 
intensity index is calculated in the same manner as in Table 5.4.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
215
The Bogor Declaration, devised by APEC leaders, visualized an open global 
trading system and sustainable economic growth for the Asian region.100 Previous to the 
1994 Bogor meeting in Indonesia, however, there had been evidence of the increasing 
influence of the Asian region on global affairs. For example, Mexico’s Secretary of 
Foreign Relations Fernando Solana Morales had "aggressively pursued expanded 
economic ties with Asia, hoping to join APEC even before NAFTA negotiations got off 
the ground.'*101
In addition to Asian regional unity on human rights ideology, there had also been 
Asian regional unity with regard to strategic economic interests. It was in the best 
interests of the elites of Asia in 1994, to keep the region open to world trade and 
investment. The denial of U.S. MFN to China would have affected the economic 
stability of the Asian region because it had become economically inter-dependent. In 
Hong Kong, for example, it was estimated that the U.S. denial of MFN to China would 
have cost the British Colony U.S. ”$24 billion in lost trade and up to three percentage 
points off a current 5.5 percent economic growth rate.*’102 In the words of one 
Ministerial leader. Lee Kuan Yew. of Singapore: "U.S. trade sanctions could destabilize 
the region and drive up Pentagon costs.”103 Similarly. Hong Kong's Governor Chris 
Patten stated. ”We are all concerned with human rights abuses, but we have never
looOn-line. available from www.apecsec.org.sg/97brochures.
l01Schoenberger and Helm."CIinton Targets Pacific Rim for Trade Crusade,” A13.
102William Branigin. “Asians Welcome China Decision.” Washington Post, 29 May 1994, 
A8.
103Ibid.
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believed the solution is in limiting trade. Opening up markets is the best way to open up 
minds.”104 Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata of Japan “praised the U.S. decision as 
important for the continued economic development of the Asia-Pacific region.”105
Elite alliances advocating unconditional MFN to China had also been formed in 
the United States, as well. In 1993, for example, the prestigious Council on Foreign 
Relations met in Washington to advocate the end of the MFN/human rights linkage 
concerning China. Among the attendees were such renowned U.S. diplomats as Henry 
Kissinger. Cyrus Vance and Lawrence Eagleburger, who had previously been engaged in 
diplomatic contacts with leaders in Beijing.106 Cross-national business to government 
alliances had also been formed to further influence the decision. Immediately before the 
1994 decision by Clinton was made. Chinese Vice Premier Zou Jiahua was visiting such 
U.S. corporations as AT&T with prospects of a billion telephone lines to be bought by 
the Chinese government.107 The Vice Premier also informed U.S. oil companies of 
China's exploration plans and U.S. transportation and construction companies of 
objectives to build a minimum of $600 billion of road, bridges and construction 
projects.108
U.S.- Asian business to government linkages had also been formed through U.S. 
government agencies. John Huang, for example, an official at the U.S. Commerce
l04Ibid.
,05Ibid.
l06Susumu Awanohara. "The K-Street Crowd.” Far Eastern Economic Review (June 2.
1994): 25.
107Schoenberger and Helm, A l.
I08lbid.
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Department, had also been a top U.S. executive for the Lippo Group, “a multi billion 
dollar Indonesian conglomerate with extensive dealings in China.”109 The Riady family, 
who owned the multinational, reportedly had asked the Clinton administration in 1994 to 
hire Huang because of their interest in U.S. policy toward China.110 It was this complex 
network of regional and global elite alliances, both in business and in government, that 
was a direct causal variable in the formation of the 1994 U.S. decision to no longer 
condition China's human rights record on MFN status.
SUMMARY
This chapter has introduced a fourth causal variable as an explanation for the 
1994 decision. I have argued that complex interdependence influenced the U.S. shift in 
China policy from 1993 to 1994. The previous-discussed independent variables of U.S. 
national interests. U.S. humanistic interests and U.S. corporate interests were unable to 
fully explain the motives for 1994 decision. There is compelling evidence to suggest 
that complex interdependence, weighted heavily on this presidential decision. Channels 
of formal and informal contacts between and among multinational corporations, 
international organizations, and the world’s elite had factored into the 1994 decision. As 
well, linkages that had been formed between U.S. and Chinese corporations would have 
been affected had Clinton decided to base MFN renewal on China’s human rights record.
IU9"Did China Try To Influence Elections?” Congressional Quarterly (Apr. 26,1997): 
972.
,10Ibid.
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Additionally, economic and ideologic solidarity in the Asian region had a 
significant effect on the U.S. decision to separate MFN and China’s human rights. Asian 
countries acted as one with regard to their strong stance on an Asian interpretation of 
human rights. An interpretation which promoted the realist position of cultural 
relativism and underscored the sovereign rights of nations expressed in Article 2 of the 
United Nations Charter.111 It was also shown that the Asian region exhibited a high 
degree of trade and investment interdependency. The U.S. revocation of MFN to China 
would have threatened the economic security of the entire Asian region because China 
had become inter-linked with her neighbors. The increasingly influential governmental 
organization of APEC came to the rescue of China and the entire Asian region in efforts 
to keep doors open to free trade and investment. Joining the wishes of the APEC, the 
ASEAN countries "believed that international isolation of China could lead to a reversal 
of its open-door policy and to a radicalization of its regional policy.”112
The "new world order” was brought to a climax by the formation of the new 
WTO. which surpassed the glory of NAFTA tenfold. This new rule-making entity and 
overseer of word trade made it clear to the global polity that the order of the day was to 
extend and expand the process of free trade. Despite various degrees of reservations 
concerning Western hegemony and trade advantages expressed by leaders from the 
South, underpinning the goals and principles of the new WTO, was a global consensus.
1 "United Nations. Charter o f  the United Nations and Statute ofthe International Court 
o f Justice (New York: United Nations. 1945). art. 2(1): "The Organization is based on
the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”
"2Chen. 10.
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Were President Clinton to have imposed sanctions on China in 1994, it would 
have been a move against the interests of the international political community. There 
had also been a consensus, among APEC, the ASEAN Countries, NAFTA and the EU in 
1994. that China be gradually integrated into the international political economy. As one 
major U.S. Representative explained. ‘"Our goal must be over time to achieve 
compatibility, compatibility between all countries that are trading, just as we have 
compatibility between all of the states of the United States.”113
Therefore, in the final analysis, it was external environmental factors that shifted 
U.S.- China policy from linkage of MFN and China’s human rights in 1993, to the 
delinkage of these two factors in 1994. It was. in the end. the global gravitation toward 
trade liberalization, the formation of regional economic areas, and at the same time the 
opening of these regions to one another, and the trend toward multilateralism that 
ultimately pressured President Clinton to permanently end the ties between China’s 
human rights record and most-favored-nation status in 1994. The U.S. support of global 
trade liberalization was clearly expressed in the Congress in the final debates on the 
subject.
"3House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt, “Concluding Debate, House of 
Representatives:" NAFTA. APEC, GATT: Top Priority to Global Economics,” Foreign 
Policy Bulletin 4 (Jan.-Apr. 1994): 63.




The previous chapter focused on the fourth and final hypothesis of this study.
The issue of the market and ethics in the context of the 1994 Clinton decision was 
opened to a broader perspective, where transnational influences were brought into the 
argument as causal factors for the delinkage of MFN and China’s human rights 
transgressions. These externalities comprised a complex network of transnational 
linkages and interdependencies. These linkages included transnational corporate 
linkages, transnational multilateral institutional linkages, including the linkages between 
international governmental organizations and international financial institutions. 
Transnational elite alliances also formed part of this larger political landscape.
This chapter begins with a brief summary of the major findings of the research. I 
then turn to the major contributions of the research, its limitations, and issues for future 
investigation. The chapter will then extrapolate the major observations of the study, 
highlighting the events preceding the 1994 decision, as well as the events that had 
occurred after the decision. The broader implications for both economic and political 
theory will be defined, as well as implications for United States policy formulation. 
Lastly, some recommendations for U.S. foreign policy on human rights will be offered.
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In this project, I have presented and tested four hypotheses. The first hypothesis, 
premised on realist theory, was the U.S. intent to sustain and increase power in the Asian 
region influenced the 1994 Clinton decision to sever the ties between China’s human 
rights record and most-favored-nation status. According to the realist-based argument, 
the primary obligation of a state is to promote the national interest which is realized by 
the attainment of power.1 Therefore, the economic policies of nations are predicated on 
their contributions to national power.
Concerns for the U.S. national interest were repeatedly evident in the 
articulations of U.S. leaders in Congressional proceedings, debates, and in their speeches 
to U.S. groups and the public at large. U.S. global economic leadership would be 
enhanced and expanded by removing obstacles to trade and investment. The deepening 
of U.S. economic relations with China was thought to improve the economic welfare of 
U.S. citizens by supplying job growth in the importing, exporting, retailing and 
technology sectors of the economy, and by offering quality products on the U.S. market 
at prices the average American consumer can afford. As well, further entry into the 
China market would help to build a strong U.S. private sector, which would contribute to 
the power and wealth of the nation.
The fear of China's threat to the U.S. national security was also revealed in 
pronouncements on the Congressional floor. Such major threats to the United States 
security that were articulated included China’s position as a rising economic and military
’Kegley, “The Neoliberal Challenge,” 4-5; Keohane and Nye, 11.
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hegemon in the Asian region, conflict on the Korean Peninsula, and the political and 
economic stability of Cambodia. Closer economic relations with China were looked 
upon as a deterrent to these perceived threats.
The nationalist argument, however, displayed some shortcomings. The evidence 
suggested that U.S. policy-makers had overestimated China’s wealth and national power. 
It was found that although China enjoyed a positive trade balance with the United States, 
the United States had increasingly suffered a negative bilateral trade balance with China. 
China's external debt had grown to become one of the largest net debtor nations in the 
world. Also, when looking at aggregate levels, it was determined that China was not a 
major source for U.S. job growth in 1994. when compared to other foreign markets. 
China's internal structural impediments, as a result of political and economic transition, 
undermined the concerns articulated in the Congress of China’s immediate threat to U.S. 
interests. Because of these drawbacks to the realist-based argument, the first hypothesis, 
that the U.S. intent to sustain and increase power in the Asian region influenced the 1994 
Clinton decision, could not be fully accepted.
The second hypothesis was that the U.S. intent to improve the respect for human 
rights in China through economic engagement was thought to influence the Clinton 
decision to delink MFN from China’s human rights practices. Underlying this liberalist- 
based philosophy was the notion that the peace and prosperity of nations would be 
advanced by the removal of economic barriers. U.S. corporations, through individual 
choice in product selection and management and training techniques, would serve as 
pathways to democracy and human rights reform by avoiding government constraints
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and reaching out directly to the people.2 The findings suggest that there were some 
positive indications of human rights improvements in China. These positive outcomes 
could be seen the increasing availability of products on the China market. In the years 
preceding the Clinton decision, from 1990 tol993, China’s standard of living had risen, 
as measured by key consumer durables. In particular, such mid-technology products as 
VCR's, satellite dishes, construction cranes and facsimile machines, were purchased 
greater quantities. These technology products improved the pattern of information flow 
in China. For example, the facsimile machine helped to spread the word of political 
arrests across the country that had taken place in Beijing. Additionally, purchases of 
such lesser value goods as color television sets, bicycles and washing machines had 
increasingly risen.
There were some limitations to the liberalist proposition, however. There were, 
in fact. U.S. policy-makers, human rights groups and citizens who believed that MFN 
should be contingent upon human rights improvements in China. Contrary to the liberal 
hypothesis that U.S. economic engagement with China would advance the cause of 
human rights in China, some U.S. officials felt that only by attaching human rights 
conditions to MFN renewal, could human rights progress, and that the U.S. should 
follow the policy of past presidential administrations of linkage.3 In a U.S. national poll 
taken in 1993. for example, it was discerned that 65 percent of the respondents felt that
:Garten. "Business and Foreign Policy,” 71; Bernstein and Dicker. 43-44; Clark, 209- 
229.
JSee Senator Russel D. Feingold, U.S. Policy Toward China, 8. See also Congressman 
Neil Abercrombie, Additional Requirements On The Extension o f  China's Most- 
Favored-Nation Status In 1993,41.
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China should improve its human rights practices if China wanted to continue its current 
trade status with the U.S.4 In addition, 276 members of the House of Representatives 
signed a letter to Secretary of State Warren Christopher demanding that China meet the 
human rights conditions stipulated in the 1993 Executive Order by the President.5 As 
well, there was no general consensus on how to improve human rights in China among 
major human rights groups. For example, the human rights group, Asia Watch, 
expressed that human rights would improve in China only through the pressure of the 
yearly MFN renewal.6 While the human rights group Amnesty International USA did 
not take a position on linkage, but expressed that the Clinton administration simply did 
not give human rights issues the significance they deserved in U.S. policy.7 Because of 
these discrepancies within the liberal argument, the intent to improve human rights in 
China by delinking MFN and human rights, could not be fully accepted as a motive for 
the 1994 decision.
The third-stated hypothesis was that U.S. corporations influenced the 1994 
decision to end the relationship between China's human rights record and most-favored- 
nations status. This proposition, premised on radical theory, suggested that corporations 
exerted a considerable amount of influence on U.S. foreign economic policy. In this 
economically-determinist perspective, developing countries are believed to be the major
4Bowman. 150.
5Beher. A28.
6Jendrzejczyk. Additional Requirements On The Extension o f Most-Favored-Nation 
Trade Status In 1993. 92.
7Jones, H.R. 4590, United States-China Act o f1994,171.
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targets of an expansionist agenda. This expansionist agenda is guided by an international 
elite alliance and the needs of monopoly capital.8 China, therefore, as a developing 
country, would be considered a target of this expansionist agenda.
U.S. multinational corporations were indeed found to be a significant influence in 
the 1994 decision, regarding China. The growing appearance of business lobbying 
groups on Capital Hill gave evidence of the increasing attempts by business groups to 
influence U.S. foreign policy outcomes. Thousands of small to large firms and trade 
associations under the nucleus of the Business Coalition for U.S.-China Trade, came to 
the forefront of the U.S. Congressional agenda to plead their cases for the termination of 
the linkage between MFN and China's human rights. In particular. U.S. aerospace and 
defense firms, with key interests in selling to the China market, were vociferous in 
advocating for delinkage. Armed with public statements before Congress, soft money 
contributions to Congressional Representatives, and letters to and personal meetings with 
the President, corporate Executives made their positions clear to the U.S. government 
leadership.
There were some shortcomings to the radical argument, however. Primarily, 
there was no unified corporate position regarding China's human rights and MFN 
delinkage in 1994. Many corporations were adamantly against delinking MFN and 
human rights. Though human rights concerns may or may not have been a reason for 
their position, these corporations felt that China’s practice of forced labor created an 
unfair trade advantage in China’s ability to create quality products at cheaper prices than 
could the U.S. domestic industry supply, thus supplanting the U.S. home industry. This
“Shambaugh. 226-227.
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position was particularly evident of the U.S. textile industry, which argued against 
China’s trade restrictions on U.S. textile imports, among other unfair trade practices.
U.S. corporate interests were not the sole influence in advocating for MFN and 
human rights delinkage in 1994. U.S. national interests also influenced the Clinton 
decision regarding China. It was also in the best U.S. national interest to build and 
maintain a strong U.S. private sector that would be enhanced by U.S. corporate 
expansion into China and the Asian region. Because of these weaknesses in the 
argument that corporations were the sole influence on U.S.-China policy in 1994, the 
third hypothesis could not be considered a full explanation for the decision, therefore, a 
fourth hypothesis was proposed.
In the fourth hypothesis, elements of the preceding hypotheses were argued as 
partial explanations for the decision. However, a fourth causal factor for the delinkage 
of MFN and human rights in China was added into the equation, which was complex 
interdependence. Complex interdependence was defined as “a situation among a number 
of countries in which multiple channels of contact connect societies, where states do not 
monopolize these contacts. These multiple channels include formal and informal ties 
between governmental elites, as well as foreign office arrangements and channels 
between transnational corporations.”9
During the years 1993 and 1994. a significant amount of U.S. intra-firm sales 
were cross-border, with China. Malaysia and Thailand, where assembly of U.S. goods 
for export were located, particularly goods pertaining to the electronics industry. U.S. 
direct investment in China had increased, which in turn, increased the mutual
9Keohane and Nye. 24-25.
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dependencies between firms. Many U.S. firms, for example, had come to depend on 
China’s abundant and cheap labor force, and the emerging opportunity of China’s vast 
market. U.S. firms looked to the China market as a bridge to other markets in the 
Asian-Pacific region. Conversely, China’s state, collective and privately-owned 
enterprises looked to U.S. corporations for the acquisition of knowledge and technology, 
as well as for entry into the vast United States market for its goods. These growing 
trans-Pacific linkages served to solidify U.S.-China commercial relations that would 
have otherwise been interrupted had Clinton continued to condition China’s MFN on 
human rights improvements, and had he acted on that claim.
Multilateral institutional linkages also played into the 1994 decision. Major 
governmental and financial institutions that influenced the opinions of U.S. decision­
makers included the WTO. the APEC, the IMF and the World Bank. The end of the 
Uruguay Round and the formation and solidification of the new WTO in 1994. served to 
expand the process of trade liberalization and globalization. There was a general 
consensus among countries, from all comers of the world, that global trade and 
investment should be liberalized. Any conditions set by the Clinton administration to 
deter the process of trade liberalization in 1994 would have been a move against the tide 
of international opinion. Global welfare was thought to be best served by the integration 
of China into the global marketplace and the international political community.
A major influence on the 1994 U.S. decision was China’s linkage to the IMF and 
the WTO. Throughout the years. China had maintained close connections and good 
relations with these international trade and financial entities. China had come to rely 
upon the financial advice and macroeconomic policies of these institutions during the
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process of modernization. These institutional connections helped to enhance China’s 
leverage in preventing any continued and additional conditions on her trade status with 
the United States.
Finally, transnational elite alliances had been part the intricate global web that 
had influenced the shift in China policy from 1993 to 1994. These international and 
regional elite alliances had formed between governments, and between business and 
governments. Asian elites in government and business used their political and financial 
clout to influence U.S. foreign policy across the Pacific. Through the forum of APEC, 
for example, international business and government leaders from 21 countries were able 
to avert any obstruction of China’s trade with the United States, which was viewed as an 
obstacle to the economic development of the Asian region. Such major political elites as 
Henry Kissinger. Cyrus Vance and Lawrence Eagleburger. renowned for their expertise 
on U.S.-China relations, with a history of extensive dealings with leaders in Beijing, 
advocated for the end of the human rights and MFN linkage. In the final analysis, it was 
transnational linkages and the global trend toward increased trade and investment 
liberalization that convinced President Clinton to end the relationship of MFN and 
China's human rights record.
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This project has sought to enhance the general knowledge of the literature by 
testing some of the limitations of theories and by improving on traditional theoretical 
constructs as explanations for U.S. foreign policy outcomes. By applying the case of the 
U.S. 1994 decision to the three major theoretical schools, realism, liberalism, and 
radicalism, this study has provided insights into the usefulness of traditional theories for 
the analysis of foreign economic policy.
By not fully accepting any one theory as an explanation for the motives of the 
1994 decision, this research has attempted to kindle the investigation for alternative 
theories, or perhaps the synthesis of current theories as foundations on which to assess 
global evolutionary events at the turn of the century. The resolute insistence of this work 
on not accepting any one theory, in its fullest definition, does not. however, imply 
indecisiveness, or a safer "middle of the road” solution. Rather, by bringing to light the 
limitations of traditional paradigms as explanations for the 1994 Clinton decision 
regarding MFN and China's human rights record, the research has served as a caution 
against viewing events through the narrow lens of a singular theory that has been built 
upon the circumstances of the past.
This project has also contributed to practical value as well. The conclusions and 
implications that have been presented in this study can provide U.S. decision-makers 
with further insights and knowledge into the relationship between trade and hum an 
rights, and the social consequences that the lack of this relationship may cause, 
particularly as it pertains to human rights abuses in China and elsewhere throughout the
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world. Through empirical investigation and analysis, this study has strived to provide 
U.S. policy-makers with a greater understanding of the U.S.-China bilateral relationship, 
so that more fruitful policy choices can be made on future issues on human rights in 
China, and in all areas of the world.
This research has hopefully brought to light the intricacies involved in upholding 
international human rights standards through private and inter-governmental and state 
mechanisms, so that the implementation of U.S. foreign policy on human rights can be 
more effective. Beyond U.S. policy, the research has also provided the international 
community with insights into collective policy-making on human rights, and the 
complexities involved in the formulation of policy within the greater international 
bureaucracy.
In the broader perspective, this study has underscored the conflicting and 
complementary issues of the relationship between the economic criterion and ethical 
issues. Though the debate between the market and ethics has long been ingrained in the 
rhetoric of scholars throughout history, this research has approached the issue within the 
context of communism's last major threshold, thus making the contribution to the 
scholarship all the more timely. In addition, this investigation has brought forward the 
positive role that corporations can play in promoting and protecting human rights in 
China, and in all countries in which they operate, provided that human rights monitoring 
is maintained and that corporate codes of conduct are followed and carried through 
effectively.
With globalization running at its zenith, this study has stressed the critical issues 
where commercialism and human rights converge. These issues have included, for
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example, the relationship between labor conditions and production, between business 
and freedom of association, and between management and bargaining, and ultimately the 
relationship between economic relations and human injustice. While offering some 
policy solutions, this work has repeatedly questioned the morality of conducting business 
in countries where executions for political reasons are a common occurrence. 
Additionally, the study underscores the fragilities of an international human rights policy 
in an age when states are redefining themselves and national identities are being 
rediscovered.
LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The greater part of this study has been limited to the confines of propositions that 
have been based on traditional schools of thought. The theoretical arguments presented 
in this thesis, however, were not mutually exclusive. The opinions and testimonials of 
many U.S. government officials and business leaders involved in the 1994 decision 
evinced foundations in more than one theoretical school. Therefore, future research may 
move beyond the boundaries of present theoretical traditions by exploring new 
qualitative or quantitative foundations on which to base U.S. foreign policy analysis and 
international politics.
Due to financial and time constraints, this study did not employ survey research 
nor direct interview methods. In absence of direct interviews, however, enough primary 
source data was utilized to have made convincing arguments and conclusions concerning 
the motivations of the 1994 presidential decision. Through the employment of the
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content analysis method, statements by key officials in government and business were 
repeatedly found, so as to gain insights into the discourse and governmental opinion at 
the time. Passive research also kept personalities from intervening with objective 
analysis. A weakness of the interview method is its “reactivity, where biases may be 
produced not only by the wording, order or format of the questions, but also by the 
interaction between interviewer and respondent.”10 Nonetheless, it is suggested that 
direct interviewing be utilized in future research on the subject of study in order to 
confirm or deny present deductions.
An additional limitation to the research is that often articulations in 
Congressional proceedings may be emotionally-ridden, or they may serve as a 
camouflage for other underlying motives for policy. Such is the case where constituent 
interests may be involved. Although there is no sure method for deciphering the ulterior 
motives of leaders, it was found that U.S. Representatives from key districts and states 
that were engaged in direct economic relations with China, had revealed opposing 
opinions.
MAJOR OBSERVATIONS
This study has concluded that human rights in U.S. foreign policy will be 
increasingly addressed through the private sector and multilateral institutions. It was 
also concluded that each hypothesis, premised on competing theoretical perspectives.
l0Royce A. Singleton, Jr.. Bruce C. Straits and Margaret Miller Straits, Approaches to 
Social Research, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 271-275.
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could not exclusively account for the shift in the Clinton policy on China from 1993 to 
1994. It was finally concluded that it was complex interdependence set against the 
backdrop of global trade liberalization that persuaded President William Clinton and 
Executive leaders at both the national and state levels, to cede the connection between 
MFN and China’s human rights record. The decision was not only influenced by 
national concerns, but also by global concerns for China’s integration into the 
international political economy.
This thesis has presented a broad range of human rights interests, from the most 
severe violations of extrajudicial killings, prison torture, arbitrary detentions and 
executions to child labor, working conditions, and sub-standard wages relative to the 
economy of the host country. Additionally, human rights, in this case study, have been 
defined and discussed within the classical liberal and western-based tenets of civil and 
political rights. It should be noted, however, that economic and social rights, which had 
been stipulated in the Carter/Vance human rights policy position, have not been 
considered of lesser importance, and that all of these rights are viewed as mutually 
reinforcing.
With the ending of ties between MFN and human rights, multinational 
corporations will become an increasingly important global actor in the advancement of 
human rights throughout the world. This means that in U.S. policy formulation, 
corporations will work in close concert with U.S. government leaders in transm itting  and 
revealing information on human rights violations in host countries. Secondly, it had 
been concluded, based on President Clinton’s 1994 decision and his suggestion of the 
application of corporate codes of conduct, that U.S. corporations will cooperate with
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local governments in foreign countries in the enforcement of just institutions and the rule 
of law." Corporate inclusion in human rights issues is not to suggest, however, that 
corporations will become involved in ‘"moral crusading.”12 Their private nature 
guarantees that they are not accountable to the larger public to the extent that a 
government agency would be.13 Corporate wealth, resources and influence, in fact, can 
be used for self-serving interests that can cause both harm and good in a society.14 
However, the global growth of transnational corporations throughout the past decades 
gives them more influence over the lives of people. “These consequences entail that 
corporations are inescapably involved in issues of moral import.”15
With regard to issues pertaining to the market and ethics. “China, Central and 
Eastern Europe, and the Republics of the former Soviet Union will enter into greater 
trade and monetary relations with Western Europe, the United States. Japan and other 
nations. They may join trading groups that will establish international background 
institutions for firms within those countries, as well as for multinationals entering those 
countries. In the interim, as in the case of developing countries, ethics will have a larger 
rather than a smaller role to play in international business with formerly communist
"Richard T. DeGeorge. Competing With Integrity In International Business (New York: 
Oxford University Press. 1993), 54.
l2Gerard Elfstrom. Moral Issues and Multinational Corporations (New York: St. 
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countries.”16 The conclusion that the role of the private sector will increasingly become 
an important global actor in the promotion and protection of international human rights, 
does not imply, however, complete acceptance of the liberal explanation for the U.S. 
policy regarding China and MFN in 1994.
The liberal paradigm, which espouses that increased trade with China would, in 
fact, lead to increased respect for human rights in China, has not yet been borne out. 
Clearly, economic reform in China has not yet proven to be a panacea for the widespread 
political and individual repression that still exists. For example, in infringement of 
human rights qualifications (iv) and (v) of the 1993 Executive Order. China’s prison 
system, far from humane, continued to practice procedures patterned after the Stalinist 
camps:
"For every prisoner released, we can name countless others that have been 
arrested. Thousands of prisoners languish in Chinese prison cells, out of 
the headlines, isolated and overlooked. They are the nameless victims, 
shackled and dumped into cold concrete cells, beaten by guards using 
truncheons, electric prods and bare fists. Deprived of food and 
relentlessly interrogated, many confess to 'crimes' never committed.
Such is the fate of thousands in China, despite more than a decade of 
impressive economic reform." 17
Exhibit A of the appendix provides an example of one of the many accounts of 
experiences in a Chinese prison. The detailed description of the prison conditions 
expressed by the prisoner gives evidence that the list of human rights improvements that
t6DeGeorge. 157.
1 President. National Council on Chinese Affairs Haiching Zhao. Congress, House, 
Committee On Ways And Means. Subcommittee On Trade, United States-China Trade 
Relations. hearing. 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., 24 Feb. 1994 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 
1994), 133.
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were to be improved if MFN were to be renewed in 1994, had not been met. Arguments 
against delinkage were voiced prodigiously in the U.S. political arena. It was expressed 
in Congress that ’there had been no substantive change in China’s political life since the 
protest in 1989, and that the argument that a more open economy will automatically lead 
to political liberalization had not been borne out.”18 Yet despite the fact that China 
continued to open the door to trade and foreign investment, the government continued to 
imprison citizens for their political and religious beliefs.''’
In fact, 1993 was the worst year for political arrests and trials in China since mid- 
1990 and the aftermath of the 1989 massacre. Political repression in China was 
increasing, and not decreasing.20 The U.S. State Department reported that in 1994 "there 
continued to be widespread and well-documented human rights abuses in China, in 
violation of internationally accepted norms, stemming both from the authorities’ 
intolerance of dissent and the inadequacy of legal safeguards for freedom of speech, 
association and religion. Abuses include arbitrary and lengthy incommunicado 
detention, torture and mistreatment of prisoners and thousands of prisoners of conscience 
remain imprisoned or detained.”21
,8Professor Lizhi Fan. Congress. House. Committee On Ways And Means. Subcommittee 
On Trade, United States-China Trade Relations, hearing, 103 rd Cong., 2nd sess., 24 
Feb. 1994 (Washington. D.C.: GPO. 1994), 139.
"’Ibid.
20Washington Director, Human Rights Watch/Asia Mike Jendrzejczyk, Congress, House. 
Committee On Ways And Means, Subcommittee On Trade, United States-China Trade 
Relations, hearing. 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., 24 Feb. 1994 (Washington, D.C.: GPO,
1994). 119-121.
21 Country Reports On Human Rights Practices 1994, 1995 ed., China sec.
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U.S. Congressional Representatives communicated that conditioning China’s 
human rights practices on MFN had only resulted in “incremental” improvements.
China had supplied information on 235 prisoners that the U.S. had identified, and also 
promised to provide information on the status of 106 imprisoned Tibetans. A 
willingness to begin dialogue with the International Red Cross to arrange visits to 
prisoners of conscience was expressed by Chinese officials, and promises were made to 
settle certain emigration cases. China also promised to “review interference” with Voice 
of America (VOA) airwaves."
U.S. Customs inspections of a few Chinese prisons were agreed upon, but only at 
the request of a 60 day notice from U.S. Customs before the allowance of an on-site 
inspection.23 Chinese authorities, however, would not permit visits to prisons for which 
the Ministry of Justice declared there was insufficient evidence, nor access to re­
education through labor facilities.24 With regard to the other five rights issued in the 
1993 Executive Order, which included adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, there had only been modest improvements.25 But these “small steps.” in the 
views of some U.S. Representatives, in no way warranted the total delinkage of MFN
"Secretary of State Warren Christopher. “My Trip to Beijing Was Necessary.” 
Washington Post. 22 Mar. 1994. A17. Congress, Senate, Committee On Foreign 
Relations, Subcommittee On East Asian And Pacific Affairs,
23 Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord, U.S. Policy Toward China, 13.
24Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Jeffrey A. Bader, 
Congress. Senate. Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee On East Asian And 
Pacific Affairs, U.S. Policy Toward China, hearing, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., 4 May 1994 
(Washington. D.C.: GPO. 1994), 21.
"Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord, U.S. Policy Toward China, 13.
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and human rights.26 In violation of the 1992 U.S.-China bilateral Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU). Chinese prisoners continued to be utilized as slave labor for 
China’s export market. More than 100 prisons were being disguised by the Chinese 
government as civilian factories. One prison, for instance, had more than 7,000 inmates 
and was called the "Human Heavy Motor Vehicle Factory.”27 Another, a women’s 
prison in Changsha province, was known as the ’"New Life Cotton Quilt Printing 
Factory.*'28 Coercive birth control practices continued and basic freedoms of speech and 
assembly were still being denied.29 On February 22. 1993, for example, China adopted a 
new state security law to punish journalists accused of "leaking state secrets abroad.”30 
Further restrictions on emigration remained in place for dissidents, and the colonization 
of Tibet continued.31
Political repression in China also extended to U.S. territory. One of the most 
outspoken U.S. Representatives in support of MFN linkage to human rights articulated 
of having personal knowledge of Chinese nationals, active in the United States in
26Congressman Tom Lantos of California, Congressman Christopher H. Smith of New 
Jersey. Congressman Frank R. Wolf of Virginia, Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi of 
California. Congressman Neil Abercrombie of Hawaii, Congress, House, Committee On 
Ways And Means. Subcommittee On Trade, United States-China Trade Relations, 
hearing. 103rd Cong.. 2nd sess.. 24 Feb. 1994 (Washington. D.C.: GPO. 1994). 11. 17. 
21. 28.41: Senator Feingold of Wisconsin. U.S. Policy Toward China. 9.
27Todd Campbell. "China, a favored nation?” Scholastic Update 125, no.2
(Sept. 18.1992). 18-19.
2SIbid.
^Congressman Lantos. United States-China Trade Relations. 11. 
j0Jendrzejczyk. U.S. Policy Toward China, 78-79.
3lCongressman Lantos, United States-China Trade Relations, 11.
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promoting human rights, who were threatened and harassed by Chinese authorities, 
which was, according to the spokesperson, in violation of U.S. Law32 Threats by 
Chinese government authorities against Chinese human rights activists in the United 
States were also made to the their families and relatives living in China. And in many 
cases, Chinese human rights activists in the United States were denied reentry into 
China.33
Indeed, the gradual opening of the China market did result in some improvements 
in the well being of the Chinese people, particularly during the post-Mao era. The 
standard of living for many Chinese had risen. More communication with the outside 
world was possible for a once insular society. China's per capita GDP34 rose 
substantially, since the 1979 Deng economic reforms and the 1980 granting of 
conditional MFN by the United States. By the early 1990’s, many urban citizens in 
China could take advantage of new products and technology that increased trade 
liberalization brought to its eastern seaboard.33 Although China's economic 
liberalization was steadily increasing, its human rights record was not progressing as 
fast. Political repression continued, despite China's market opening and rapid rise onto 
the global political economy.
3:Congresswoman Pelosi, United States-China Trade Relations, 29.
33Ibid.
■4There are discrepancies over this figure. Most economic analysts agreed, at this time, 
on the figure U.S. $1,000 for China's per capita GDP.
j5"Out of China's over 1 billion population, only a few tens of millions, mostly in coastal 
regions and cities, were yet rich enough to become consumers of foreign brands.” 
Economist. “Multinationals In China,” (Sept. 25,1999): 72.
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The 1993 Country Reports On Human Rights Practices, published by the U.S. 
Department of State, summarized some of the conditions that were still evident in China:
"Hundreds, perhaps thousands of political prisoners remained under 
detention or in prison. Physical abuse, including torture by the police and 
prison officials persisted. Criminal defendants continued to be denied 
legal safeguards such as due process or adequate defense.”36
Moreover, "in 1995, Chinese diplomats and government officials seemed to 
intensify their efforts to underscore that good economic relations with the world's largest 
country would be fostered by decreasing pressure on human rights.”37 The very 
freedoms that are outlined in the Universal Declaration and in International Covenants, 
signed or unsigned by China, have been disregarded by rulers in Beijing.
More recently. China has disregarded Article 5 of the Declaration: "No one shall 
be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”3* 
Human rights violations in China continue to include “extrajudicial killings, tortures and 
mistreatment of prisoners.”39 Furthermore. China has disregarded Article 9 o f the 
Declaration: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.”40 Human 
rights violations in China continue to include, "forced confessions, arbitrary arrest and
'"Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 1993,1994 ed., China sec.
j7"Chinese Diplomacy. Western Hypocrisy and the U.N. Human Rights Commission,”
Human Rights Watch/Asia Report 9. no. 3 (Mar. 1997): 3.
j8United Nations. General Assembly, Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights, art. 5.
'‘’Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 1999,2000 ed., China sec.
"^United Nations. General Assembly, Universal Declaration o f Human Rights, art. 9.
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detention, lengthy incommunicado detention and denial o f due process.”41 In further 
violation of international human rights norms. China has lacked adherence to Article 10 
of the Declaration: "Everyone is entitled in full equality and to a fair and public hearing 
by an independent and impartial tribunal of any criminal charges against him.”42 
"Beginning in May of 1999, dozens of China Democratic Party (CDP) members were 
arrested in a widening crackdown on political expression, and additional CDP leaders 
were convicted of subversion and sentenced to long prison terms in closed trials that 
flagrantly violated due process. By the years end. almost all of the key leaders of the 
CDP were serving long prison terms, and only a handful of dissidents nationwide dared 
to remain active publicly."43
Finally. China has disregarded Article 12 of the Declaration: "No one should be 
subjected to arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor 
attacks upon his honor or reputation.”44 During the year 1999, "the Chinese government 
infringed on citizens privacy rights, tightened restrictions on freedom of speech and of 
the press, of assembly and of association, and tightened controls on the Internet. The 
government continued to restrict freedom of movement.”45 Despite the fact that the 
present Chinese regime continues to systematically reject Western pressure on it human 
rights practices, it is concluded that human rights reform in China will eventually, over
41Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 1999,2000 ed., China sec.
42United Nations. General Assembly. Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights, art. 10.
4jCountry Reports on Human Rights Practices 1999.2000 ed., China sec.
^United Nations. General Assembly, Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights, art. 12.
45Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 1999,2000 ed., China sec.
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time, manifest itself through increased economic interdependence with the United States, 
and other democratic countries. Continued U.S. economic engagement with China 
would also serve to support grassroots organizations in China that are struggling for both 
economic and democratic reform. In short, we can expect that the introduction of 
democratic principles via direct local linkages through multinational corporations would 
eventually advance the cause of human rights in China.
For human rights advocates and activists, the 1994 decision meant the loss of a 
powerful bargaining tool to pressure the Chinese regime to comply with international 
human rights standards and adherence to the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights. As the 
United States government gradually relinquishes part of the burden of global human 
rights responsibilities, cooperative multilateral efforts at enforcing rights will be 
increasingly called upon. International governmental organizations such as the WTO. 
the ILO. the U.N. Commission on Human Rights and its Subcommittees, will assume 
greater responsibility for the protection of human rights in China and throughout the 
globe. China's claims to cultural relativism and pleas of state sovereignty in the 
institution of her own human rights practices, will eventually give way to WTO 
pressures and obligations.
China's entrance into the WTO will serve to pressure China's current leaders to 
adopt universal standards of business conduct, including the conduct of its human 
citizens engaged in business practice. As yet, however, attempts by multilateral 
institutions have been weak in their ability to respond to human rights violations 
throughout the global community. Part of this inability is due to a lack o f cohesiveness 
and a commitment among member states in supporting human rights improvements in
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countries through multilateral mechanisms. Some suggestions are offered with regard to 
U.S. policy in addressing international human rights issues through multilateral 
institutions in the recommendations section below.
Now that the United States government has granted Beijing permanent normal 
trade relations (PNTR.) as a condition of entry into the WTO, the annual executive 
review of China's human rights performance, based on the Jackson-Vanik Amendment 
and its requirements regarding emigration, will cease to be an issue. U.S. Congressional 
decision-makers have proposed a "substitute'’ to insure that U.S. concerns about human 
rights in China will have continued attention. The new U.S. trade bill granting 
permanent trade relations with China has been augmented by the Levin-Bereuter 
proposal that would create a special U.S. Commission to monitor China's human rights 
performance/6
Though well-intentioned, this United States unilateral effort could possibly be a 
model for a more powerful and persuasive human rights initiative through international 
institutional procedures- where collective measures in the form of trade sanctions would 
be a far more effective and persuasive insurance against human rights abuses in China, 
and elsewhere. In her 1995 speech, the former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations 
articulated: "One of our top priorities at the U.N. is to build mechanisms that will 
contribute on a long term basis to human rights and peace. Accordingly, we were the 
prime movers behind the successful effort to establish a U.N. High Commissioner for
46David Rogers and Hellene Cooper, "China Trade Bill Gains Strength On Votes by 
Pivotal Committees,” Wall Street Journal, 18 May 2000, A2, A4.
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Human Rights.”47 In future years, the United Nations will not only serve as a center for 
international public governance, but will also serve as an important center for pooling 
expertise and resources needed for dealing with multinational corporations.48
POST-1994 IMPLICATIONS
This case study has significant implications for both economic and political 
theory, as well as for U.S. foreign policy-making. First, the findings question the 
plausibility of basing a singular theory, in its traditional definition and perspective, as an 
underlying framework for understanding U.S. foreign policy behavior. “Given the 
complexity and open nature of the social world, it is hardly possible that one paradigm 
could ever be fully explanatory, suggesting the need for a multi-paradigmatic approach to 
the study of socio-economic events.”49 Or. perhaps there is a need to construct an 
entirely new paradigm, as Kuhn50 might advise, on which to study international political 
behavior. Perhaps, then, this theoretical impasse implies a transitional phase for present
47Department of State. Address: Madeleine Albright on Human Rights. University of 
Connecticut. 17 October 1995, Office of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, on-line, 
available from gopher://gopher.state.gov/PublicAffairs.
48Gerard Elfstrom. Contemporary Ethical Issues (Denver: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 1993). 98.
49Heikki Patomaki and Colin Wight “After Postpositivism? The Promises of Critical 
Realism." International Studies Quarterly 44. no. 2 (June 2000): 226.
50 As Kuhn states, “More is involved, however, than the incommensurability of standards. 
Since new paradigms are bom from old ones, they ordinarily incorporate much of the 
vocabulary and apparatus, both conceptual and manipulative, that the traditional 
paradigm had previously employed. But they seldom employ these elements in quite the 
traditional way.” Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure o f  Scientific Revolutions (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press. 1970). 148-149.
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theoretical schools. There is a warning, however, that comes from the radical school of 
thought, with regard to the construction of new paradigms. That is, '‘a close related error 
in thinking about theoretical innovation in conjunction with global transformation is to 
impose Western dichotomies on the Third World, and to seek to universalize them.”51 
From the radical viewpoint, "what we see before us is a new interventionist framework 
which legalizes international inequality in the guise of a new moral universalism.”52 
Radical theory is a constant reminder of the current global trend of "commodity 
fetishism.” or the increasingly widespread commodification of social relations that is 
partly reflected in the growing conditions and struggles associated with the production of 
commodities.53 and in the global social and macroeconomic imbalances caused by the 
rapid expansion and exchange of financial capital.
As previously defined in chapter two. realist theory suggests that human rights 
would not be a factor in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. However, the realist 
assertion that U.S. foreign policy is guided solely by the principles of power and national 
interests overlooks what has been described as "a growing recognition of the need for a 
normative role for ethics in international affairs, and that even the most casual observer 
must note that today the language of politics and decision-making is ridden with
5lJames H. Mittelman. "Rethinking innovation in International Studies: global 
transformation at the turn of the millennium,” in Innovation and Transformation in 
International Studies. eds. Stephen Gill and James H. Mittelman (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. 1997), 250.
5INorman Lewis. "Human Rights. Law and Democracy in an Unffee World,” in Human 
Rights Fifty Years On. ed. Tony Evans (New York: Manchester University Press, 1998),
97.
5jStephen Gill. "Globalization, Market Civilization, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism,” 
Millennium 24. no. 3 (1995): 402.
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references to ethics and moral traditions. From the moral renewal implied in the just war 
tradition in legitimizing the use of force, the language of ethics carries great political
weight.”54
The language of ethics, however, has become more than just rhetoric, as seen by 
the fact that even a superpower, such as the United States, sought to obtain United 
Nations approval before making the moral decision to deploy the use of force in the 
Persian Gulf War.55 Though, political realists counter that ’’America may lack the 
means to conduct these crusades of global meliorism, and should not neglect its own 
interests in the service of others.”56 In 1992. the United States Ambassador to China 
posed this very same inter-paradigm quandary:
The new environment summons continued American leadership, albeit of 
a different kind. What will not change will be the need to fuse realism 
and idealism to promote our interests and project our values. Free 
countries respect human dignity, free countries make better economic 
partners. Of course, we should not press others to adopt the American 
model. Each nation must find its own path of freedom.57
That the liberal paradigm, and its principle of altruism was not fully able to 
account for the 1994 decision, challenges liberal theory, as currently defined and
54 Denis Goulet. "International Ethics and Human Rights,” Alternatives 17 (1992):
231.
55Ibid.
56Noam Chomsky. "The United States and the Challenge of Relativity,” in Human Rights 
Fifty Years On. ed. Tony Evans (New York: Manchester University Press, 1998), 24.
57Winston Lord. Congress. Senate, Committee On Finance, Extending China’s MFN 
Status, hearing. 102nd Cong.. 2nd sess., 30 July 1992 (Washington. D.C.: GPO, 1992). 
31.
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practiced, as a basis on which to gauge international political and economic behavior.
Has Wilsonian idealism and neoliberal Ricardian economic theory been justified in its
promises for peace, utilitarianism and the betterment of humankind? As mentioned
earlier, in the literature review, it has been argued that globalization has caused an
asymmetry between owners of capital and unskilled or semiskilled workers as trade and
investment expand across national borders. This would suggest a need for maintaining a
balance between the market and society- one that would promote private enterprise
without undermining social cohesion.58
The juxtaposition between the market and ethics was clearly exemplified in
Keynesian theory. In his 1938 autobiographical essay. "My Early Beliefs.” Keynes noted
that society overvalues "the economic criterion" in decision-making and actions, thus
destroying the "quality of the popular ideal.”56 Keynes' notion inevitably led to his thesis
that governments must intervene for the public good.”60 Similarly. Karl Polanyi. in The
Great Transformation, wrote of the contention between the market and ethics:
To allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human 
beings and their natural environment, indeed, even of the amount and use 
of purchasing power, would result in the demolition of society. For the 
alleged commodity “labor power” cannot be shoved about, used 
indiscriminately, or even left unused, without affecting also the human 
individual who happens to be the bearer of this peculiar commodity.61
58Rodrik. 4,13; Ruggie, 92.
59 John Maynard Keynes. The Collected Writings o f John Maynard Keynes, vol. X (New 
York: St. Martin's Press For The Royal Economic Society. 1938). 445.
60 John Maynard Keynes. The General Theory o f  Employment, Interest and Money (flew  
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1935), 138-155.
6'Karl Polanyi. The Great Transformation (New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc.,
1957). 73.
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In lieu of these past theoretical criticisms, it may be considered that present 
theoretical debates which premise themselves on problems arising from "post­
modernist" times, may actually be historical repetitions. Quite possibly, the realist 
utopian vision of unsurpassed state power, the liberal utopian vision of peace through 
commerce, and the radical utopian vision of "pure collectivity” may have been, all along, 
oversimplifications of evaluating global events since the turn of the twentieth century. 
However, with the social complexities brought about by the global transformations of the 
late 1980's, the search for theoretical explanations for social behavior indeed becomes all 
the more urgent.
International corporate expansion and the privatization of foreign markets at the 
turn of the twenty-first century begs the question of what the appropriate role of the 
transnational corporation is in a liberal society within the context of a global market.62 
"In determining the moral legitimacy of the role of government and the corporation, 
aggregate social utility is certainly one of the relating considerations. Whether a minimal 
government with a laissez-faire capitalist market is optimally efficient, whether this 
arrangement would produce what is best for all. are important considerations, even if not 
the sole consideration in determining the moral defensibility of a system of political 
economy."63
6"John R. Danley. The Role O f The Modem Corporation In A Free Society (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 271.
63Ibid.
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Neoliberal economic theorems based on Pareto efficiency64 and the attainment of 
market equilibrium, however, may not be a complete indication of social utility when 
comparing different economic systems, or when one system is coercive,65 such is the 
system of China. This liberal shortcoming may imply the need for a revisionist 
liberalization that would take into account that human welfare is more than simply the 
satisfaction of preferences.66 Part of this theoretical reassessment would include not only 
a reassessment of human needs within an economic system, but also a reassessment of 
the function of the transnational corporation in upholding international standards of 
human rights and the Universal Declaration.
Secondly, the findings of this study demonstrate significant implications for U.S. 
human rights policy toward China, and for U.S. international human rights policy, in 
general. The U.S. granting of permanent normal trade relations (PNTR.) to China, in 
May of 2000, has completely and unconditionally liberalized trade between the two 
countries. Now that trade between China and the U.S. has become permanently 
unconditional, and is no longer subject to the yearly MFN renewal process by the U.S. 
President, the question remains how will U.S. policy on human rights be adjudicated and 
implemented? Where will the chips fall in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy on 
human rights?
64 Pareto efficiency refers to "the giving up output of one good in order to get more output 
of the other good" in order to obtain optimal production efficiency. Dennis R. Appleyard 
and Alfred J. Field. Jr.. International Economics, 2nd ed. (Boston: Irwin, 1995), 75.
65Danley. 268.
“ Ibid.
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More significantly, the findings suggest that the United States will no longer be 
the sole actor in the formulation of international human rights policy. Such private and 
non-private international actors as multinational corporations and international 
governmental organizations, will increasingly factor into U.S. policy decisions on human 
rights. This would further imply a transfer of a certain degree of state sovereignty to 
other actors within and beyond the state to help advance the cause of human rights in the 
global polity. The changing role of the state will affect the U.S. decision-making process 
on human rights policy because it challenges the traditional notion of the state as the sole 
proprietor of the public good.
Problematic is that "an international law of sovereign equality has always 
contained the unfortunate implication of providing legitimacy for the national repression 
of citizens, or at least impunity for its tyrants. The emergence of a body of human rights 
law may seem to be competing with the traditional principles of respect for sovereign 
equality of states and non-interference."67 The proclamation of the “Charter of Paris for 
a New Europe." adopted in 1990 at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, addressed the role of the state in human rights issues:
Human rights and fundamental freedoms are the birthright of all human 
beings, are inalienable and are guaranteed by law. Their protection and 
promotion is the first responsibility of government. Respect for them is 
an essential safeguard against an over-mighty state.6®
67Martti Koskenniemi. "Future of Statehood.” Harvard International Law Journal 32, no. 
2 (spring 1991): 398.
68Koskenniemi. 399. Note, such a statement returns to the liberal philosophy of John 
Locke, where Locke contends that “the citizenry retains substantial rights of resistence 
against the state.” See Ian Shapiro, The Evolution o f  Rights in Liberal Theory (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 82.
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This same sentiment was stated earlier in U.S. history. Section 502B of the 1975 United 
States Foreign Assistance Act read:
It is the policy of the United in accordance with its international 
obligation as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in keeping 
with the Constitutional heritage and traditions of the United States, to 
promote and encourage increased respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race. sex. language, 
or religion. To this end, a principle goal of the foreign policy of the 
United States is to promote the increased observance of internationally 
recognized human rights in all countries.69
Beyond the implications for state sovereignty, the findings further suggest that in 
U.S. policy formulation on human rights, more emphasis will be placed on U.S. 
corporate involvement and responsibility for the promotion and protection of human 
rights standards in countries where business is conducted. In the United States, for 
example, such groups as the National Labor Committee Education Fund in Support of 
Worker and Human Rights in Central America, have already launched protest campaigns 
designed to oblige corporations to effectively implement their codes of conduct. 
Particularly as they relate to the treatment of workers in Export Processing Zones 
(EPZ's).70
The inclusion of the corporation in international ethical issues, such as human 
rights, is not to suggest however, that corporations become involved in moral crusading. 
Their private nature guarantees that they are not accountable to the larger public to the
69Bicker. 95.
™Forcese, 11.
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extent that a governmental agency [or intergovernmental agency] would be.71 To be 
sure, the first objective of a business is to maximize profit and to satisfy shareholders. 
Neoclassical economists will argue that the test for “social insurance” lies in the 
efficiency of the market. As stated by one notable economist:
There is one and only one social responsibility of business— to use its 
resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long 
as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say. engages in open 
and free competition, without deception or fraud.77
The global growth of transnational corporations during the past decades, however, gives 
them more influence over the lives of people. This would suggest that corporations carry 
the social responsibility that comes with increased global influence.
The rise of the transnational corporation onto the global scene has become a 
commonly accepted notion as part of the globalization process. Transnational 
corporations control about five percent of the global workforce and control over 33 
percent of global assets.73 They employ about 72 million people, of whom about 15 
million reside in developing countries.74 By 1994. in the financial markets, the daily 
flow of foreign exchange transactions exceeded U.S. $1 trillion, or "roughly the foreign 
exchange holdings of all the central banks of the major industrialized nations.”75
71Elfstrom. Moral Issues and Multinational Corporations. 32.
^Milton Friedman. Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press. 1962). 133.
^United Nations Research Institute For Social Development. States o f  Disarray: The 
Social Effects o f Globalization (Geneva: UNRISD. 1994), 154, as cited by Gill, 399-423.
74 Ibid.
75Ibid.. 423-425.
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Multinational corporations, with their close physical proximity and day-to-day 
interactions with indigenous peoples and local government groups, are at an advantage, 
relative to the more distant and intermittent contacts by public officials, to assume 
increased responsibility for upholding human rights standards.
Although many U.S. corporations have instituted codes of conduct in their 
operations at home and abroad, they have not been enforced and have been poorly 
monitored. For example, in a study conducted by the U.S. Department of Labor, of 42 
textile firms, it was found that effective monitoring of codes remains uncommon.76 The 
lack of enforcement of codes of conduct by corporations presents a challenge to U.S. 
policy-making on international human rights. In U.S. foreign policy-making, “it is no 
longer enough to say: 'when in Rome, do as the Romans do.* The question is rather, can 
companies afford to ignore the human rights which governments violate, despite their 
claimed international commitment to protect them?”77
In addition to the role of the private sector. United States policy on human rights 
in foreign countries will be increasingly addressed through such multilateral avenues as 
the WTO. the ILO. the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, and its Subcommittees. 
Specifically, with regard to the WTO. “the entry of China into the WTO, with its 
requirement for permanent normal trading relations, would make it more difficult for the 
United States to exercise the economic leverage it has been used to enjoying. Bringing 
the case to the WTO. with its cumbersome and lengthy adjudication process, with cases 
judged by international arbitrators, would remove most of the flexibility the United
76Department of Labor. The Apparel Industry and Codes o f Conduct, v.
77Forcese. 8.
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States now exercises to calibrate its pressure and set its own timetable for conflict 
resolution.*’78 On the other hand, U.S. policy-makers will come to rely on the WTO to 
assure that China complies with international standards of business practices, which 
would include the abatement of forced or indentured labor in the production and 
distribution of products. Additionally, United States human rights policy toward China 
will lean more heavily on the ILO and its major ILO Conventions79 in upholding 
international labor laws. The “ILO's supervisory machinery is generally acknowledged 
to be the most sophisticated and its scrutiny the most rigorous and least politicized of any 
in the U.N. system.”80 Governments have accepted and often ratified their national law 
and practice after ILO reviews.81
Regarding China. U.S. lawmakers in Washington will increasingly rely on the 
open market mechanism and direct corporate linkages to help advance the cause of 
human rights. These direct local corporate linkages include direct contacts with China’s 
local citizenry, through management and training procedures, through technology and 
resource sharing, through supplier networks, and eventually through greater product
78Thomas J. Duesterberg. ”Zhu Rongji, Political Magician,” Washington Quarterly 22. 
no. 4 (autumn 1999): 17.
79ILO Conventions include: Conventions 87 & 98: freedom of association and the 
effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; Conventions 29 & 105: the 
elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor; Convention 138: prohibition of 
child labor: Convention 111: the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment 
based on race, color, sex, religion, national origin or political opinion. International 
Labor Organization, Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 86th 
Session (Geneva: ILO, 1998), on-line, available from www.ilo.org
“ "International trade and labour standards: The ILO Director-General speaks out,” 
International Labour Review 135, no.2 (1996): 231.
81 Ibid.
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choice on the China market. As one corporate executive director of a major U.S. 
multinational corporation in China verified: “When Motorola looks at China, we see not 
only a great commercial market for our technology, but also a social obligation that we 
are taking very seriously. Motorola exposes its employees to a market-driven business 
and management practice, core principles of respect for the individual and 
uncompromising integrity in everything we do."82
Leaders in Beijing continue to reiterate that "China will not adopt foreign models 
of democracy, and have continued to appeal to fellow Asian nations not to give into 
Western pressure."83 Undeniably, U.S. policy-makers are still faced with the legacy of 
the Cultural Revolution which firmly denied the freedoms of speech, expression, 
assembly and association.84 The political participation which China had temporarily 
allowed its citizens proved to be an arbitrary and invalid right.85 This revolutionary 
legacy, still ingrained in Chinese political culture, despite the new population of urban 
"technocrats." makes U.S. policy-making on human rights in China fragile, and at best, 
tenuous. In broader respects, the China case implies the fragility of a human rights
8:E.\ecutive Vice President and Corporate Executive Director Richard W. Younts. 
Intemational-Asia and Americas. Motorola. Inc.. Congress. House. Committee On Ways 
And Means. Subcommittee On Trade. United States-China Trade Relations And Renewal 
O f China s Most-Favored-Nation Status, hearing, 104th Cong.. 2nd sess.. 11 June 1996 
(Washington. D.C.: GPO. 1997). 103.
SjCharles Hutzler. “U.N. Official Visits China As Groups Report More Crackdowns." 
New York Times. 27 Feb. 2000, Al.
84 Ann Kent, Between Freedom and Subsistence: China and Human Rights (New York: 
Oxford University Press. 1993). 139.
85Ibid. One can refer, for example, to the 100 Flowers Movement o f 1957, where Chinese 
intellectuals were advised by the government to speak their views and then years later, 
were suppressed and reprimanded.
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policy at all. This is particularly true when such a policy is applied selectively. This 
warning came during the Carter administration, which is just as applicable to present 
time. It was said, "the Carter administration runs the risk of dividing the world into two 
categories: countries unimportant enough to be hectored about human rights, and 
countries important enough to get away with murder.”86 Nonetheless, it is frequently 
argued that the U.S. policy of economic engagement with China has helped to bring 
about a Chinese government that is less repressive today than it was twenty years ago.87 
Chinese leaders are more aware of an alternative to a state-controlled economy.88 They 
now understand how free enterprise works and knows what democracy is about even 
though it is not practiced, and at least there is an awareness, if not the practice o f basic 
human rights.86
The results of this study expose some inherent dangers in the post-1994 era of 
responsibility-sharing for the protection of human rights in the global polity. The 
question is who will step forward first? The U.N. High Commissioner warned of this 
danger in referring to the tragedy of Kosovo, where “the most important lesson to be 
drawn was that despite ten years of warnings, the international community failed to act in
86R.J. Barnet. “U.S. Needs Modes, Uniform Standard on Human Rights,” Los Angeles 
Times. 12 Mar. 1977. as quoted by Cohen, “Human Rights Decision-Making in the 
Executive Branch.” 224.
8'Congressman James P. Moran, Congress, House, Committee On International Relations. 
Subcommittee On International Operations And Human Rights, China MFN: Human 
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time to prevent tragedy there. Everyone saw the conflict coming, but the political will to 
do something about it was absent until the situation reached the point where conflict 
prevention was no longer possible.”90 This dilemma would further imply that social 
accountability in the international community begins at the state level, with individuals 
assuming responsibility for the implementation and enforcement of international 
procedures to protect human rights across the globe.91
The fact that the United States has been, historically and ideologically, a leader in 
the promotion and protection of individual rights that are ingrained into the American 
value system.92 has significant implications for a state's foreign policy that is 
increasingly shaped by actors beyond the state. It brings to the fore the question of 
whether the United States will renege on its role as champion of individual freedoms. 
Will the United States, for example, subsume its human rights responsibilities to 
multinational corporations and international governmental organizations? Can there be a 
happy medium amongst these multi-collective avenues of moral responsibility?
An additional problem that is confronted in U.S. policy-making on human rights 
is the reality that “rights” can be used as a tool for achieving other objectives. Realism
""U.N. High Commissioner Mary Robinson Speaks on Human Rights and Conflict 
Prevention.” WHS Words 8, no. 4 (fall 1999): 4.
9lIbid.
92"Throughout the history of the United States a broad consensus has existed among the 
American people in support of liberal, democratic, individualistic, and egalitarian values. 
These political values and ideals constitute what Gunnar Myrdal termed “the American 
Creed.” and they have provided the core of American national identity since the 
eighteenth century.” Samuel P. Huntington. “American Ideals versus American 
Institutions.” Political Science Quarterly 97, no. 1 (spring 1982): 1. See also Louis 
Hartz. The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 
1955).
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contends that moral issues can be used to conceal ulterior motives for actions in 
international politics.93 Too often, “ethical and human rights advocacy easily becomes a 
power play and a lobby game, which makes it difficult to find strategies to implement 
rights. Strategies which include the institutional procedures and rules as well as criteria 
tor advocating resources.”94 As a result, there is a very mixed record regarding U.S. 
policy on international human rights.95 In U.S. foreign policy-making, the issue of 
human rights is a dangerous one because it “touches on the very foundations of a regime, 
on its sources and exercise of power, and on its links to its citizens.”96 When United 
States lawmakers enact the resources to promote and protect basic human rights 
throughout the world, these issues will remain an ever-present, but necessary challenge.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The conclusion that the respect for fundamental human rights has not yet been 
witnessed in China, suggests the need for U.S. policy-makers to continue to exert 
pressure on China to improve its human rights practices. The 1994 decision, combined 




^Stanley Hoffman. “The Hell of Good Intention,” Foreign Policy 29 (spring 1978):
8. as cited by Tom J. Farer and Felice Gaer, “The U.N. and Human Rights: At the End 
of the Beginning.” in United Nations, Divided World, eds. Adam Roberts and Benedict 
Kingsbury (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 293.
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permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) has placed the cause of international human 
rights in the hands of both private and public international actors. These international 
actors on human rights issues include U.S. multinational corporations, their affiliates and 
suppliers, as well as international governmental organizations.
There are, however, other important national and international actors that can 
affect the substance of human rights policy. These actors include non-governmental 
organizations (NGO's), U.S. investors, constituents and consumers. It is recommended 
that U.S. policy-makers continue to exert pressure in order to improve human rights 
conditions in China and in other developing, transitional and developed countries, 
through all possible avenues.
U.S. policy-makers should develop and maintain a non-relative position toward 
international human rights. The notion that rights are subject to the interpretation of 
cultures is a detriment to the betterment of human rights across the globe. U.S. policy­
makers should maintain the view that human rights are universal and are subject to the 
principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights set forth in 1948. wherein "the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a common standard of achievement for all 
nations.”*" Wherein, "everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex. language, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”’8 And 
wherein, “no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or
‘"United Nations. General Assembly. Universal Declaration o f Human Rights, preamble.
^United Nations. General Assembly. Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights, art. 2. 
sec. 1.
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international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be 
independent, trust, non-self-goveming or under any other limitation or sovereignty.”^  
Secondly, it is recommended that the view of a duality between civil and 
political rights, and economic, social and cultural rights, so often utilized in 
Congressional policy debates, be discarded. U.S. lawmakers should adopt and adhere to 
the international human rights policy that had been recommended by former Secretary of 
State Cyrus Vance, in 1977. As Secretary Vance had asserted:
Let me define what we mean by “human rights.” First, there is the right 
to be free from governmental violation of the integrity of the person.
Such violations include torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment, and arbitrary arrest and imprisonment. And they include the 
denial of fair public trial and invasion of the home. Second, there is the 
right to the fulfillment of such vital needs as foods, shelter, health care 
and education. We recognize that the fulfillment of this right will depend, 
in part upon the stage of a nations economic development;
But we also know that this right can be violated by a Government's action 
or inaction-- for example, through corrupt official processes which divert 
resources to an elite at the expense of the needy, or through indifference 
to the plight of the poor. Third, there is the right to enjoy civil and 
political liberties. Our policy is to promote all of these rights.. .  I believe 
that with work, all of these rights can become complementary and 
mutually enforcing.100
It is further recommended that U.S. lawmakers on global human rights issues, 
consider emphasizing the right of physical security, meaning that “no one can fully enjoy 
any right that is supposedly protected by society if she or he lacks the essentials for a
“ United Nations .General Assembly, Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights, art. 2, 
sec. 2.
'“ Department of State. Speech by Cyrus R. Vance, “Human Rights Policy,” 30 Apr. 1977 
(Washington. D.C.: Bureau of Public Affairs) PR 194, I.
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healthy and active life and the right to subsistence.”101 However, the right to subsistence 
need not supplant civil and political rights in U.S. policy on human rights. Particularly, 
regarding China, it is recommended that the nation’s indigenous culture be respected, but 
that Asian culture not be a justification for lack of civil and political rights, or that the 
Asian conception of freedom differs from that of the West.102
Moreover, the international community has decided through a number of 
covenants and agreements103 that the protection of inherent human rights transcends 
national and cultural boundaries.1<M Human rights are designed to protect the inherent 
dignity of the human person regardless of cultural background. Nor can they be 
considered an encroachment upon national sovereignty. Without respect for these 
human rights, the rule of law is undermined.”105
""Henry Shue. Basic Rights. 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press 
1996). 24.
",:Shue. 66.
IUjSome of these major international agreements include: the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (adopted in 1966 by the U.N. General Assembly); the 
International Covenant on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights (adopted in 1966 by the 
U.N. General Assembly); the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (adopted in 1979 by the U.N. General Assembly); the 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel. Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (adopted in 1987 by the Council of Europe); the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (adopted in 1965 by the U.N. 
General Assembly): the Convention On The Rights of the Child (adopted by the U.N. 
General Assembly); the International Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and 
members of Their Families (adopted by the U.N. General Assembly). Humphrey, 
annex.
104Amnesty International, Report ACT 70/01/98 January 1998, Outreach Work, General 
Human Rights Principles for Companies, on-line, available from 
www.amnesty.it/ailib/1998/ACT.
105 Amnesty International, General Human Rights Principles for Companies.
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Regarding U.S. corporations and their role in human rights, there are a number of 
recommendations that can be made for U.S. policy on the matter. First, U.S. decision­
makers should ensure that American corporations comply with the "Nine Principles”106 
that have been developed and suggested by the United Nations for corporations that 
operate internationally. They include the following:
1) Identify Human Rights Issues:
That corporations identify human rights issues that are specific to a country. 
While most companies focus on labor standards, companies in the mineral 
extraction, apparel, footwear and agricultural industries have distinct issues that 
require different approaches.
2) Develop Policy Options
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the ILO core labor standards are 
generally the foundation of a company’s policies.
3) Operationalize The Company Policy
Guidelines to aid the implementation from principle to practice and the ability to 
communicate internally to business and externally to the world by seeking 
contributions within the company and reaching out to non-governmental 
organizations.
4) Dialogue/Outreach/Collaboration
For many companies, this is the first step. It is essential to outreach to 
academics, as well as to other groups concerned about the corporate approach to 
human rights issues in advance of policy-setting. Consultation with human rights 
groups and social partners can enhance the basic structure of the 
company position and will help establish a system of public accountability.
5) Educating and Training Key Staff
To educate the staff about the philosophy and U.N. principles behind the 
human rights policy to staff from other cultures and from other nations.
6) Develop Appropriate Internal Capacity
Proper expertise on the complex topic of global human rights is necessary to 
monitor and communicate and manage human rights violations.
'“ United Nations. United Nations Global Compact Network, The 9 Principles: From 
Principles to Practice. Partners and Initiatives 1999, on- line, available from 
www.globalcompact.org.
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7) Communicate effectively with business partners, vendors, subcontractors and 
governments on codes of conduct.
8) Develop Internal Accountability
Establish performance benchmarks on human rights with a country to country 
approach.
9) Independent Verification and Public Reporting
Independent Verification is one way that companies can contribute to higher 
standards of human rights throughout the world. Such independent verification 
can be obtained from non-govemmental human rights monitoring groups who 
possess the experience and expertise to carry out investigative human rights 
procedures.107
U.S. decision-makers should also ensure that corporations abide by the ILO 
Declaration on the "Fundamental Principles and the Rights at Work,” which include:
I ) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining. 2) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor.108 3) the 
effective abolition of child labor, and 4) the elimination of discrimination with respect to 
employment and occupation.100 Labor standards should not be used for protectionist
l07Ibid.
l0SFor example, "in 1992. Levi Strauss & Co. applied its codes of conduct by employing 
auditors to inspect the Saipan factories using a questionnaire developed by the company. 
The company quickly canceled its contract with those suppliers when it was discovered 
that Saipan factories were operating with forced sale conditions on its employees. Many 
of the workers were immigrant Filipinos housed in padlocked barracks with their 
passports confiscated during the contract period. They were working as much as 11 hours 
a day. seven days a week, for as little as U.S. $1.65 an hour. In addition, contracts with 
suppliers in the Philippines, Honduras and Uruguay were terminated when it was found 
that they were working with a set of ethical values not consistent with those of Levi 
Strauss & Co. In all. Levi Strauss terminated contracts with thirty suppliers worldwide 
and forced reforms in employment practices in over one hundred others.” John 
McCormick and Marc Levinson, "The Supply Police.” Newsweek (Feb. 15, 1993):
48-49. as cited by Compa & Darricarrere, 189.
^International Labor Organization, Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work.
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purposes, and that “the comparative advantage110 of any country should not be called into 
question by this Declaration.1" This recommendation is not to presume that labor 
standards of developing countries approach Northern levels, but that U.S. policy should 
promote and protect a "core set of basic labor standards that can be applied to any 
country, without exception, irrespective of its current state of development.*'112 
The 1LO Conventions on core labor standards for countries are further 
strengthened by the ILO “Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational 
Enterprises (MNE's) and Social Policy,” which provides guidelines for MNE’s. 
governments, employers and workers in areas of employment, training, conditions of 
work and life, and industrial relations. The ILO Tripartite Declaration urges the parties 
to respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the principles laid down in the 
Declaration of Philadelphia on freedom and association and collective bargaining.113
It is also, of course, recommended that the United States adhere to its own 
"Model Business Principles.” adopted in 1995. for U.S. companies operating overseas.
1 l0For example, the contrary argument is raised by Martin Khor. Director of the influential 
Southern NGO. "Third World Network,” who argues that "the raising of labor standards 
to Northern levels, or to cross beyond market parameters may well result in more harm 
than good for the South if it results in closure of industries and thus job retrenchments.” 
Martin Khor. as cited by Lequesne.. 53.
1 "International Labor Organization, Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work.
"2LeQuesne. 52.
113 "Some workers* organizations reported problems regarding the implementation of the 
Declaration, such as FDI legislation limiting rights of unions, in particular, Export 
Processing Zones (EPZ’s) as well as threats by firms to relocate in an attempt to influence 
the bargaining process.” OECD, Trade, Employment and Labour Standards (Paris: 
OECD. 1996), 190-191.
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These principles serve to reinforce ILO core labor standards at the national level. The 
U.S. "Model” calls for 1) fair employment practices, 2) avoidance of child and forced 
labor, 3) avoidance of discrimination based on race, gender, national origin or religious 
beliefs, and 4) respect for the right of association and the right to organize and bargain
collectively."4
It is important to consider that business codes of conduct for U.S. corporations 
have been recommended by the U.S. government on a voluntary basis. Because of their 
voluntary nature, business codes of conduct in foreign countries can be subject to 
implementation at the discretion of the individual corporation. Rather than having 
business codes of conduct be simply voluntary, they should be adjudicated into U.S. law. 
The codification of corporate codes of conduct strengthen human rights protections 
throughout the globe by ensuring that fundamental human rights standards are legally 
binding.
Infringement of business codes of conduct in countries, once discovered, would 
then be considered illegal, rather than simply a negligence, and would therefore be 
subject to legal action in the form of a trade sanction or corporate divestiture from the 
country in which the infringement is found. More general measures to ensure that 
human rights standards in host countries are upheld by multinational corporations have 
been recommended by one author,"5 and are worthy of consideration when formulating 
and implementing U.S. global human rights policy. These include the following:
"4Ibid.
" 5DeGeorge, 45-54.
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. Multinationals should do no intentional harm.
. Multinationals should produce more good than harm for the host country.
. Multinationals should contribute by their activity to the host country's 
development."6
. Multinationals should respect the human rights of their employees.
. To the extent that local culture does not violate ethical norms, multinationals 
should respect the local culture and work with and not against it.
. Multinationals should pay their fair share of taxes.
. Multinationals should cooperate with local governments in developing and 
enforcing just background institutions.117
"°To a certain extent, the contribution to China’s development by U.S. corporations has 
already begun. For example. “The Boeing Company has worked closely with Chinese 
airlines to develop better air traffic control procedures. Eastman Kodak Company 
supports cooperative research programs in imaging science and software development at 
several Chinese universities. Ford Motor Company has established, with a Chinese 
foundation, the Ford-China Research and Development Fund, which support 28 three- 
vear grants for advanced research automotive technology. Ford has also supported 125 
rural students throughout four years of university, and also supports scholarships for 
students at Qinghua University. IBM Corporation has established programs in advanced 
computer technology in over 20 of China's universities, and has contributed U.S. $25 
million worth of computer equipment, staff support, scholarships and grants for this 
project. The Chubb Corporation has conducted joint research on catastrophe 
management, with particular emphasis on earthquakes, and has funded visits to the U.S. 
by senior Chinese scientists. Motorola Inc., has sponsored and estimated 2.000 
scholarships for Chinese students in technical universities and has donated more than 
U.S. $820,000 to the Hope Project (a Chinese charity) to help build rural elementary 
schools. Amgen Inc. sponsors an award for junior nephrologists, who treat disorders of 
the kidney, in three Chinese cities. Ameritech is funding GLOBE Program in China, 
providing students at more than 35 schools with computer and environmental monitoring 
equipment to enhance learning about the earth and its resources. General Motors Corp.. 
Bristol Meyers Squibb Co.. and Pfizer. Inc. donated funds for victims of the Yunnan 
earthquake.” U.S.-China Business Council, U.S. Corporate Practices in China: A 
Resource Guide (Washington, D.C.: U.S.-China Business Council, 1996), 4-8.
"7DeGeorge. 45-54.
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it was also concluded that multilateral institutions will increasingly be called 
upon in human rights issues throughout the globe. It is. therefore, recommended that 
U.S. policy-makers take the necessary financial, organizational and support measures to 
strengthen and solidify the human rights regime within the U.N. system. With a stronger 
and more effective U.N. human rights regime, human rights violations in various areas of 
the world may be identified and acted upon more readily. Also suggested is that the 
United States support and ensure the inclusion of human rights NGO’s in the U.N. 
decision-making process. "International NGO’s, through fact-finding, networks, and 
field work, serve as a bridge between the real world of violations- what happens out 
there- and legal, political and bureaucratic institutions in the human rights world.”11*
In addition to the above measures. U.S. Executive and Congressional leaders 
should encourage a more integrated approach to addressing human rights issues within 
the U.N. system and its various agencies, such as the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP), the ILO. the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), the U.N. Human Rights Commission, and the WTO.119
Increased cooperation among multilateral agencies within the United Nations 
system would serve to lessen the often disjointed and repetitive work of inter-U.N. 
organizations, which would in turn hasten a unified global human rights strategy. One 
such recommendation would be that of a joint WTO/ILO advisory body that would 
review periodically human rights complaints that are justified by countries or persons.
"*Rachel Brett. "The Role and Limits of Human Rights NGO’s at the United Nations.” in 
David Beetham. ed.. Politics and Human Rights (Cambridge: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1995). 99-103.
ll9LeQuesne, 34.
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with the intention that if no progress is made over a certain period of time, trade 
penalties would then be applied to the government.120 In further explanation:
The GATT is the principle body that regulates international trade. Its 
expertise is in determining the existence of unfair trade practices, such as 
dumping or subsidies that breach existing GATT/WTO obligations or 
nullify or impair the receipt of reciprocal trade benefits. It also supervises 
the cessation of those practices through the imposition of 
countermeasures and economic penalties. Therefore, the GATT/WTO 
should bring its expertise on trade practices and its well-developed 
dispute settlement system and environmental procedures to this joint 
[WTO/ILO] enforcement regime.121
Lastly, with regard to the role of multilateral institutions, it is suggested that U.S. 
policy-makers press for a social clause in the WTO122 to help ensure that core ILO and 
U.N. labor and human rights standards are met in trading countries, and that economic 
sanctions be applied in the event that they are not met. It is. then, further recommended 
that U.S. policy-makers help to assure that these multilateral efforts can be implemented 
by supporting them at the state level.
There is another influential avenue through which U.S. Congressional leaders can 
promote and protect human rights throughout the world. That is by mobilizing U.S. 
shareholders, consumers and constituents. The encouragement of socially responsible 
investment and consumption can be a powerful economic lever in its inherent ability to
‘-“Ibid.
121 Daniel Ehrenberg, "From Intention to Action: An ILO-GATT/WTO Enforcement 
Regime for International Labor Rights.” in Human Rights. Labor Rights and 
International Trade. eds. Lance A. Compa and Stephen F. Diamond, eds (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 165.
'“ Robert A. Senser. "Exploring a New Frontier.” China Rights Forum 40 (summer 
1998): 26.
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withhold funds or purchases o f products. First, socially responsible investing (SRI) “is a 
practice in which those who purchase stocks and other securities make their investment 
decision on the basis of social as well as economic criteria.”123 When following this 
method of investment, capital can be steered to socially responsible firms and diverted 
from firms that are socially irresponsible, and can thus prove to be a powerful force and 
economic influence on human rights causes.124
Secondly, the power of consumer sovereignty can be an influential force in the 
protection of human rights throughout the globe. This basic principle is often called 
"ethical consumption.” which is to "persuade consumers to base their consumption 
decisions not only on price considerations, but also on moral principles relating to the 
condition of production.”125 This powerful consumer force is realized by boycotting 
products from countries where ILO and other core labor and human rights standards are 
not upheld. However, in order to encourage ethical investment and consumption, there 
must first be a public awareness of the critical and country-specific issues pertaining to 
the production of products for trade and the social performance of corporations.
I230ECD. Trade, Employment And Labor Standards, 202.
l24"There are active and growing associations of SRI practitioners who share 
information and ideas through newsletters, investment clubs, computer networks and 
organizations such as the Social Investment Forum in the United States and the Ethical 
Investment Research Service in the United Kingdom. SRI has been expanded to several 
other countries as well. The International Association of Investors in the Social 
Economy, founded in 1989. is a Brussels-based organization that has 35 member 
organizations in 15 countries. Other NGO’s and firms involved in this field are located in 
Austria. Australia, Canada. Germany and in other countries.” OECD, Trade, Employment 
And Labor Standards. 202.
I250ECD, Trade. Employment And Labor Standards, 199.
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To enhance public awareness of global human rights issues before these issues 
reach the point of tragedy and media attention, U.S. policy-makers on Capital Hill should 
include a broad range of citizens in the decision-making process on human rights issues. 
An inclusive range o f citizen participation that would reach beyond elite government, 
business and academic factions, where the well-honed tools of rhetoric can be used for 
the purposes of various elite interests, to the public at large.125 An ex-Amnesty 
International member reflected:
Twenty years ago, when you went to a meeting at a human rights group, 
you saw all kinds of people. But these days, you usually find that most of 
the people there, are either lawyers or human rights professionals. To me, 
the human rights movement has not been successful in capturing the 
imagination of a broad group of people- the way. whatever I may think of 
them, a strong civil-society group like the National Rifle Association has 
done.127
Increased economic interdependence among nations at all stages of development, 
caused by the globalization of physical, financial and human capital necessitates the need 
for the "globalization of human rights.” With regard to U.S. foreign policy on human 
rights, at least the beginnings of this can be met, with government support, through 
enforced corporate codes of conduct, collaborative efforts by international governmental 
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Letter From China Written To President Clinton, March 18,1993 
"Dear President Clinton:
I am a reporter.
After the Tiananmen massacre my name was placed on the wanted list. I was arrested but the police did 
not have any evidence against me. The police were determined to discipline me, so under the orders of the 
provincial party organization and without any respect for the law, I was placed under detention for thirteen 
and a half months. No reason was given and I never appeared in court.
During my detention I was subjected to all kinds of torture and mistreatment I was not allowed outside 
and was not allowed access to sunlight. Even time to use the toilet was strictly controlled to the shortest 
time possible. The food was never washed and after each meal there was a thick layer of sand and dirt at 
the bonom of the plate. Over ten prisoners were crammed into a 3 x 12-foot cell. Because food was 
scarce and there were not enough places for everyone to sleep, there was often fighting among the 
prisoners. A steel worker (arrested for participation in the June 4th movement) suffered a burst intestine 
because of a fight over sleeping space.
The physical suffering from poor prison conditions did not compare with the mental suffering. The 
detention center where I was placed was considered "progressive.” Beating of prisoners was a common 
occurrence. I opposed the guards' personal persecution o f me and attempted to stop them from beating 
the students who were arrested during the June 4th movement. Because o f this I was repeatedly hit and 
kicked and beat with a baton. My hands were placed in handcuffs which were connected to a chain over 
100 pounds in weight. I was put in a cold damp cell and was not given humane medical treatment I 
became completely paralyzed as a result. Finally, I was given medicine by an untrained prisoner.
Though I can stand now, I still have serious medical problems as a consequence: On cold days and nights 
my legs and shoulders are lifeless. My memory is greatly affected, my teeth have all rotted, my hands 
shake constantly, and my waist is constantly in pain due to a  spinal injury. The doctor says that if 1 do not 
receive proper medical treatment I could be paralyzed again.
I have brought my case before every level o f the judicial branch, but my personal appeal has been ignored. 
Now. I am not able to work. I do not even have a chance to get a job (since I am a June 4 criminal). I have 
no money for medical care. I must try and support my family, but I do not have the resources to even take 
care of myself, much less others too.
Please Mr. President, when giving MFN, remember that China should give me, and others who have been 
treated like me, at least our minimum human rights so we can keep on living.”1
'One o f  the many letters collected by The Independent Federation of Chinese Students and 
Scholars, of which the names have been deleted for fear of reprisal, submitted before Congress. 
House. Committee On Ways And Means, Subcommittee On Trade. United States-Chma Trade 
Relations, hearing. 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., 24 Feb. 1994 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994), 
236-237.
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